In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris [2025] NSWCA 159 (18 July 2025), the NSW Court of Appeal upheld a finding of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, and followed its recommendation that the respondent be struck off for professional misconduct. The court found that the respondent – who had been admitted as solicitor in 1987, was not a fit and proper person. His breaches of the conduct rules, the court found, were coupled with a lack of insight into his professional shortcomings. He had engaged in grossly discourteous, course, disrespectful, gratuitously offensive, improperly threatening and wholly unprofessional communications, communicated directly with the opposing client communicated and had made false statements as to his residence to avoid service of the proceedings. The court wrote:
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Background and overview
[10] The Respondent was admitted to the legal profession in New South Wales on 3 July 1987, and held a practising certificate in each year from 13 July 1987 to 30 June 2022. The Respondent has not held a practising certificate from 20 October 2022 to the present date.
[11] The origin of this application lies in actions by the Respondent in acting for his elderly mother-in-law, Mrs Norma Sim, in her dealings with the Salvation Army (TSA) and its then solicitor, Mr Luke Geary of the firm Mills Oakley, in relation to the mother-in-law’s liability to pay a Refundable Accommodation Deposit and the balance of that deposit. TSA was the provider of Mrs Sim’s aged care accommodation.
[12] On 18 May 2021, Mr Geary sent an email to the Respondent stating that he acted for TSA, was in the process of confirming TSA’s instructions, and to “Please direct any further correspondence concerning this matter to my office”.
[13] By email dated 5 July 2021, Mr Geary again requested that the Respondent direct any correspondence concerning the dispute to his office, as opposed to TSA directly. This request was repeated by Mr Geary in what the Tribunal described as “increasingly direct terms” by emails on 8 July 2021, 30 August 2021, 6 September 2021, 19 October 2021 and 29 October 2021: TD1 [19].
[14] The Respondent was and remains adamant that, in his dealings with TSA, he was acting in his capacity solely as a caring son-in-law and not in his capacity as a solicitor. This founded his argument that the conduct of which Mr Geary ultimately complained to the Law Society, and which underpins the Tribunal’s recommendation and the Council’s application, did not involve the Respondent acting in his capacity as a solicitor and thus did not entail a breach of rr 33 and 4.1.2 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW) (Conduct Rules). The relevant version of r 33 is quoted below (at [24]). Rule 4.1.2 provided (and still provides) that a solicitor must “be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice”.
[15] The Tribunal disagreed with the Respondent’s contention as to the capacity in which he acted, following a close analysis of the facts and the terms of the very great deal of correspondence sent by the Respondent directly to TSA, including that bypassing its then solicitor, Mr Geary: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris [2024] NSWCATOD 3 at [98]–[147] (Stage 1 Decision or TD1). The Respondent was found to be acting as a legal practitioner in the course of the dispute between his mother-in-law and TSA from 1 July 2021 to 17 February 2022: TD1 [129]. It is apparent from the correspondence detailed in the decision that the finding was soundly based. As the Tribunal held, the Respondent referred to himself both explicitly and implicitly as a solicitor in his correspondence with TSA and Mr Geary on multiple occasions.
[16] The “no contact” rule, as r 33 is sometimes known, has a long pedigree in the legal profession; direct contact by one party’s solicitor with the other party rather than through his, her or its solicitor, being described as “extremely unprofessional” as long ago as 1847: Jones v Jones (1847) 5 Notes of Cases in the Ecclesiastical and Maritime Courts 134 at 140. In Re Margetson and Jones [1897] 2 Ch 314 at 318 –19, Kekewich J described this professional rule as “highly consonant with good sense and convenience, because otherwise solicitors cannot really do their duty, and it is impossible for business to be properly conducted unless the solicitors have the full confidence of their clients and are enabled to communicate the one with the other upon that footing”. In Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Wharff [2012] SASCFC 116, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia stated that:
[11] It is unethical and improper for a legal practitioner to communicate with an opposing party whom he or she knows to be represented by another legal practitioner in the matter without the latter’s consent.
[12] The rationale for this principle includes protecting the opposing party against the solicitation of information by the opposing legal practitioner contrary to that party’s interests, as well as preventing the undermining of the other party’s trust and confidence in his or her own legal practitioner.
[17] In the present case, each breach of the no contact rule was found to be unsatisfactory professional conduct and, by reason of persistent breaches of r 33, after Mr Geary had requested that the Respondent deal directly with him as TSA’s solicitor, the Tribunal at TD1 [167]–[168] characterised the conduct considered cumulatively as professional misconduct, being conduct which involved a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence: LPUL s 297(1)(a).
[18] When Mr Geary raised his complaint with the Respondent and requested that he deal with him as TSA’s solicitor rather than directly with TSA, the manner and tone of the Respondent’s correspondence with him and later the Law Society deteriorated to such an extent that the Tribunal also found that the Respondent had breached r 4.1.2 of the Conduct Rules. Indeed, the Tribunal (at TD1 [188]) characterised the Respondent’s breaches of the rule as “deliberate and wilful” after Mr Geary had written to him saying:
I do not think it is appropriate for solicitors to use language of the kind you have used, in professional communications … please ensure your compliance with the Solicitors’ Rules regarding communications between practitioners.
[19] Courtesy and civility by and between practitioners are critical to the administration of justice, respect for and the reputation of the legal profession and ultimately, respect for the rule of law. “The importance of courtesy in the legal system, and in the relationship between the legal profession, the court system, and general public should not be understated”: Legal Profession Complaints Committee v in de Braekt [2013] WASC 124 at [28] (de Braekt). The Full Bench of the Western Australian Supreme Court in de Braekt at [30] also referred to the admonition of Benham CJ of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Butts v State 546 SE 2d 472 at 486 (2001):
Civility is more than just good manners. It is an essential ingredient in an effective adversarial legal system such as ours. The absence of civility would produce a system of justice that would be out of control and impossible to manage: normal disputes would be unnecessarily laced with anger and discord; citizens would become disrespectful of the rights of others; corporations would become irresponsible in conducting their business; governments would become unresponsive to the needs of those they serve; and alternative dispute resolution would be virtually impossible.
This same passage was quoted with approval by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in Lander v Council of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory [2009] ACTSC 117; (2009) 231 FLR 399 at [23].
[20] The importance of legal practitioners displaying an appropriate standard of courtesy and civility was emphasised by Allsop J in Barghouthi v ING Custodians Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 636 at [16] who said “[c]ourtesy and civility are not bourgeois affectations. They are not the mark of the effete or inept litigator. They are part of a practitioner’s overriding duty to the court, indeed to the standards of the profession and to the public.” We agree.
[21] Other authorities are to like effect: Garrard (t/as Arthur Anderson & Co) v Email Furniture Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 662 at 667; Griffin v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 364 at [105] –[106]; McDonald v Legal Services Cmr (No 2) [2017] VSC 89 at [6]; Barkla v Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd [2018] FCA 2070 at [79]; see also G E Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (Lawbook Co, 8th ed, 2025) at 767; FT Horne, Cordery on Solicitors (Butterworths, 8th ed, 1988) at 273.
[22] As will be seen, the Respondent’s correspondence both before and indeed after the Tribunal’s decisions was grossly discourteous, coarse, disrespectful, gratuitously offensive, improperly threatening and wholly unprofessional. Its continuation after the Tribunal’s decisions also rendered the Respondent’s apology to the Tribunal on 24 August 2024, shortly after the Stage 2 Decision recommending his removal from the Roll, utterly hollow and disingenuous. This apology is extracted at [49] below and is dealt with in greater detail later in these reasons.
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[99] The Respondent’s conduct before, during and after the Tribunal’s two hearings has been the very antithesis of the professional courtesy that is required of legal practitioners, as reflected in r 4.1.2 of the Conduct Rules. To a large extent, the Respondent has made the case for his lack of current and continuing fitness to practice out of his own mouth as the sustained verbal barrage set out at length above makes apparent. It reveals a complete lack of understanding or appreciation of what is expected and required of a legal practitioner admitted to the Roll. It is not just that the language is consistently coarse but it also discloses a complete absence of respect for individuals, institutions and the Tribunal. The extreme lack of courtesy and understanding is matched by a wholesale absence of any self-discipline by the Respondent in his professional communications.
[100] The Respondent sought to explain at least some of his language by saying he had been “under a heck of a lot of stress”, including because of his concern about his mother-in-law’s accommodation with TSA and various claimed concerns about other relatives. Even if the Respondent is given the benefit of the doubt as to the existence of such concerns, this does not come close to explaining, let alone excusing, his conduct. It is the nature of legal practice that practitioners may be interacting in the course of disputes whilst under personal or professional strain. That fact is itself connected to the importance of maintaining civility in discourse so as ensure that disputes can be managed and resolved professionally, in the interests of both clients and the community. Sometimes great personal pressure can lead to intemperate or ill-judged behaviour, later regretted, and this may be called in aid by way of explanation and mitigation. The concerns raised by the Respondent were of a vague and generalised kind. Moreover, the long period over which the Respondent’s impugned conduct has occurred undermines any attempt to rely on any such explanation. So, too, does his lack of insight or genuine remorse.
[101] Beyond that, no excuse for the Respondent’s conduct has been proffered and, in point of fact, the Respondent emphasised that he had been given a clean bill of psychiatric health by Dr Samuels when examined in 2023. He also relied upon his wife’s positive medical assessment of him: see [70] above. In many respects, that makes his conduct even more egregious in that it establishes that he was not labouring under any medical condition when conducting himself as he has over the last several years. We have already pointed out that Dr Samuels’ understanding and positive prediction in relation to the Respondent in the final paragraph of his report has not been vindicated.
[102] Nor is it to the point that the Respondent may be (or has in the past been) a technically competent lawyer. We infer that this was the purpose of the tender of a testimonial from Mr Jonathan Park, set out at [68] above. The Respondent’s fitness to practise is not a function of any technical competence (upon which we make no comment); rather it is a matter of whether this Court, in exercising what is a protective jurisdiction, considers that his conduct renders him unfit to remain on the Roll.
[103] What emerged during the hearing as the Respondent’s attempts to evade service of these proceedings and the false statements made as to his whereabouts, his requirements for physical service in Filia, Greece, and the reasons proffered to the solicitors for the Council for his asserted absence from the jurisdiction and other priorities (see [56]–[63] above) have also factored into our assessment. This Court must insist on the maintenance of the highest standards of honesty and integrity in the performance of duties by legal practitioners: Yoon at [34].
[104] Admission to legal practice and presence on the Roll of Australian lawyers is a privilege and not a right. Admission is contingent upon continuing adherence to a lawyer’s oath or affirmation sworn or made on admission to the legal profession: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Croke [2024] NSWCA 195 at [11]. That oath or affirmation, sworn or made at the outset of a lawyer’s career, is one of a continuing and critical nature and significance. The privilege of admission will be withdrawn in cases where a lawyer is established not to be a fit and proper person to continue in practice.
[105] In its current form, the oath or affirmation requires lawyers admitted to the Roll maintained by the Court to undertake “truly and honestly [to] conduct yourself in the practice of a lawyer of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and faithfully to serve as such in the administration of the laws and usages of this State”. That form has not in substance changed since the Respondent’s admission to practice in 1987. The laws and usages of this State include the Conduct Rules, faithful and continuing adherence to which is fundamental to the good standing of the legal profession and to an individual’s current and continuing fitness to practice as a lawyer of this Court.
[106] Breach of the Conduct Rules and findings of professional misconduct will not necessarily result in the removal of a person’s name from the Roll. That is a very serious and very public consequence for any legal practitioner. The Court is aware of the reputational consequences of this course for any legal practitioner but its responsibility is to ensure, in the public interest, and for the protection of the public, that only practitioners who are fit and proper to practise law are permitted to do so.
[107] The ultimate question for this Court, as Gleeson JA recently said in de Robillard at [236], is whether the Respondent is a fit and proper person to remain on the roll. As noted above, that involves consideration of whether the lawyer is presently not fit to practise and is likely to be unfit for the indefinite future. As his Honour continued:
Given that legal practitioners have heavy responsibilities and particular privileges which must be properly exercised in the interests of justice and of maintaining public confidence in the legal profession, the Court is concerned to ensure that only fit and proper persons, once admitted, continue in practice as officers of the Court.
[108] Regrettably, we have come to the clear conclusion, based upon the materials before us and in light of submissions made to us, including in response to questions from the Bench, that the Respondent does not meet the description of a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll. We also consider that he is likely to remain unfit to practise for the indefinite future.
[109] In our assessment the Respondent’s conduct “betoken[s] unfitness to be held out by the court as a member of a profession in whom confidence could be placed”: Kennedy v The Council of the Incorporated Law Institute of New South Wales (1940) 13 ALJ 563 at 563 –564 per Rich J.
[110] We would make the following orders:
(1) Declare that the Respondent, Mr George Sideris, is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Roll of Australian lawyers maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, pursuant to s 22 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW);
(2) Order that the name George Sideris be removed from the Roll; and
(3) Order that the Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the proceedings.
(emphasis added)
A link to the full decision is here.
