Welcome to the latest edition of Hearsay. Much has happened since the last edition and we have an interesting array of pieces for your reading pleasure.

Vale

Since the last edition, we have seen the passing of the Honourable James Patrick O’Hara Barry, a former Justice of the Family Court of Australia.

Justice Barry retired from the Family Court of Australia on 27 June 2011 after 27½ years of service. He was the first judge appointed to the Townsville registry of the Court and served there from 1983 until 2000 when he transferred to Brisbane. In 1988 his Honour was also appointed a Presidential Member of the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
We also saw the passing after a short illness of one of our members, Guy Burridge who was called to the Bar on 8 November 1999. 

Valedictory Ceremony for The Honourable Paul de Jersey AC, Chief Justice of Queensland

Members are reminded that the Valedictory Ceremony in honour of the retiring Chief Justice, the Honourable Paul de Jersey AC, will be held on Friday 27 June 2014.  The ceremony will be held at 9.15am in the Banco Court, Level 3 Queen Elizabeth II Courts of Law, 415 George Street, Brisbane.
 
Queen’s Birthday Honours

Congratulations go to her Honour Chief Judge Patricia Mary Wolfe who was made Officer of the Order of Australia (AO) in the Queens’ Birthday Honours List. The citation read:

For distinguished service to the judiciary, to the law through legal education reform, and as a mentor and role model for women.

Her Honour was admitted as a barrister in 1978. She served as Deputy Commissioner in the Commission of Inquiry that became known as the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Her Honour was appointed to the District Court in 1995 and became Chief Judge in 1999.

New Chief Justice

The Honourable Judge Tim Carmody QC, the Chief Magistrate, has been appointed as the next Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland to succeed the Hon Paul de Jersey AC, on 8 July 2014.

Judge Carmody was admitted to the Bar in 1982 and took Silk in 1999. From 1987 to 1989, he was Counsel Assisting the Fitzgerald Inquiry into police corruption. From 1996 to 1997 he was Counsel Assisting the Inquiry into the Criminal Justice Commission and from 1998 to 2002 he was the Queensland Crime Commissioner. In 2003 he was appointed a judge of the Family Court of Australia, a position he held until 2008. Prior to his appointment as a District Court Judge and Chief Magistrate in September 2013 he served as Chairman of the Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry.

Congratulations and best wishes go to his Honour for the challenge ahead.

Resignation of Davis QC

On a sad note for the bar, Davis QC recently tendered his resignation as President of the Bar.

Davis QC was called to the bar in 1990, having first practised as a solicitor since 1984. He took silk in 2005. He has been a member of the Bar Council since 2007 and has served as Chair of the Criminal Law Committee and Professional Conduct Committee and as Vice President prior to becoming President.

Members will no doubt join in expressing gratitude to him for his sterling service.

New Bar Office Holders

Doyle QC succeeds Davis QC as President of the Bar. Doyle QC has practiced as a barrister since 1987 and took silk in 1995. He had previously practised as a solicitor for some years. He has been a member of the Bar Council from 2002 to 2008 and from 2011 to date, and of course recently served as Vice President. He has been Chair of the Commercial Law Committee since 1996.

Diehm QC has become the new Vice President of the Bar. He was called to the Bar in 1991 and took silk in 2008.

Hunter QC has taken up the vacant position as member of Council. Hunter QC was called to the Bar in 1987 and took silk in 2008.

Congratulations and best wishes to each of them for the challenges ahead.

Happy reading.

Adrian Duffy

By Declan Kissane

Earlier this month the New South Wales Court of Appeal delivered its decision in the much awaited Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Sakr [1] appeal relating to the operation of section 473(10) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act). That section relates to the matters a Court should consider when determining a liquidator’s remuneration for the purposes of section 473(3) of the Act.

Summary of the Key Points

The liquidator’s appeal was successful and the Court ordered that the determination of the liquidator’s remuneration be remitted for rehearing.

The key points from the appeal are as follows.

• The statute does not mandate a separate approach for smaller liquidations.
• There is no general rule that in the ordinary course of determining remuneration in smaller liquidations, the calculation of fees on an ad valorem basis is to be preferred.
• While section 473(10)(h) of the Act provides as a relevant factor the value and nature of any property dealt with or likely to be dealt with, it is just one of the factors to be considered.
• It remains the responsibility of the Court to fix reasonable remuneration on the evidence before it, taking into account each of the matters referred to in section 473(10) of the Act.

Background

The liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) was appealing the decision of Justice Brereton which had controversially fixed the liquidator’s fees in the amount of $20,000. His Honour’s determination was based on an ad valorem rate rather than allowing remuneration based on the liquidator’s firm’s standard hourly rates.

The Court of Appeal was constituted by five members including Bathurst CJ who provided the only substantial reasons for the decision with the other members agreeing with the Chief Justice’s decision and reasons.

The appeal was important because there had been recent divergence in authority between first instance decisions before the NSW Supreme Court and decisions in before the Federal Court. Much of the controversy regarding the operation of section 473(10) came from earlier decisions of Justice Brereton. [2]

Section 473(10) of the Act prescribes that:

“ In exercising its powers under subsection (3), (5) or (6), the Court must have regard to whether the remuneration is reasonable, taking into account any or all of the following matters ….”.

The section then lists 11 specific matters for the Court to consider as well as the catch all “any other relevant matter”. [3]

The Primary Judge’s errors

The Court Appeal found that the primary judge erred by:

• not giving any consideration to the value of the additional work completed by the liquidator when fixing the remuneration at $20,000;
• not taking the evidence presented by the liquidator into account or considering any of the factors in section 473(10) of the Act relevant to the assessment of remuneration; and
• focusing solely on the question on proportionality;
• failing to give consideration to the work actually done and whether the amount charged for it was proportionate to the difficulty and complexity of the tasks to be performed.

The Liquidator’s Argument

In support of the appeal the liquidator argued that once it was established that the work was necessary and was performed in a reasonable and timely fashion, the value of the work involved was an irrelevant consideration. [4]

The Court rejected this proposition out of hand saying that the primary judge was entitled to consider the value of the work as it was one of the factors in section 473(10) that must be taken into account. [5]

That being said, the Court accepted that the fact that the work was required and that there was no evidence that the rates charged or hours spent were excessive was a highly relevant factor. [6]

Further, the Court recognised that some of the liquidator’s other criticisms of the primary judge had greater force. In particular, that:

· The primary judge inappropriately focused solely on proportionality.

· In focusing solely on proportionality, the primary judge failed to give consideration to the work actually done and whether the amount charged for it was proportionate to the difficulty and complexity of the tasks to be performed.

Submissions on behalf of ASIC and ARITA

Significantly, the ASIC and ARITA were also represented at the hearing of the appeal and made separate submissions to the Court.

In summary the ASIC’s submission [7] was that in the ordinary course of determining remuneration in smaller liquidations, the calculation of fees on an ad valorem basis was to be preferred.

In argument the ASIC conceded that to suggest that ad valorem remuneration should always be preferred or adopted without modification or regard to the facts would fetter the discretion of the Court and is not supported by section 473(10) of the Act.

At the other extreme ARITA’S primary submission [8] was that the time based methodology is the best method of calculating reasonable remuneration in the format of section 473 (10) of the Act.

While ARITA accepted that it may be legitimate to use percentage based calculation as a cross check it submitted that time based methodology remained the best method of calculating reasonable remuneration pursuant to section 473(10).

To the extent that they should be propositions of general application, the Court rejected both the ASIC’s and ARITA’s respective submissions that ad valorem and time billing were the preferred methodology.

The Court emphasised that it is the responsibility of the Court to fix reasonable remuneration on the evidence before it, taking into account each of the matters referred to in section 473(10). [9]

Because the decision does not go so far as to anoint time charging as the correct basis for calculating remuneration, it is likely that some liquidators will be disappointed. However, having regard to the terms of section 473(10) such an outcome in the appeal was highly unlikely.

Any disappointed liquidators should be heartened the following two passages from the reasons of Bathurst CJ at paragraphs [57] and [58]:

“[57] I would add two matters. First, the mere fact that the work performed does not lead to augmentation of the funds available for distribution does not mean the liquidator is not entitled to be remunerated for it. The most obvious example is work done by a liquidator in complying with his or her statutory obligations. As Farrell J pointed out in Warner, Re GTL Tradeup Pty Ltd supra at [71] it is relevant to consider whether the work was necessary to be done. If it was, there is no reason the liquidator should not be remunerated for it.

[58] Second, there are commonly cases where work is undertaken in an unsuccessful attempt to recover assets whether at the request of creditors or otherwise. Provided it was reasonable to carry out the work and the amount charged for it was reasonable, there is no reason a liquidator should not recover remuneration for undertaking the work. …”

Conclusion

It’s fair to say that the New South Wales Court of Appeal’s decision represents a sensible and balanced approach that is entirely consistent with the statutory mechanism. In that regard the case is actually unremarkable.

Nonetheless it is still an important appeal because it provides a level of certainty to insolvency practitioners as to how the Court should approach their applications for remuneration once they have undertaken the important function of winding up insolvent companies.

---

[1] [2017] NSWCA 38.

[2] See for example Re AAA Financial Intelligence Ltd (in liquidation) (No.2) ACN 093 616 445 [2014] NSWSC 1270.

[3] Section 473(10)(a) to (l).

[4] Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Sakr [2017] NSWCA 38 at paragraph [61].

[5] Ibid at paragraph [61].

[6] Ibid at paragraph [61].

[7] Ibid at paragraphs [31] to [38].

[8] Ibid particularly at paragraphs [39] and [48].

[9] Ibid at paragraph [65].

Sizing Up Your Opponent

It is important when dealing with an LIP to try to obtain some insight into their character and motivation.  This will affect how the advocate approaches his or her task.  This really only comes with experience of LIPs in particular and people in general.  However here are some categories to look out for.

Perhaps the most well-known category of LIP (though not the most common kind encountered) is the so-called ‘querulous’ litigant or ‘vexatious’ litigant.  The querulous litigant is one who is obsessed with a particular issue or grievance.

Some querulous litigants pursue an issue like a modern day Don Quixote, tilting at constitutional or legal windmills.  Challenges to the validity of paper money were for a long time the quest of a number of LIPs.  They will pay no attention to any judgment contrary to their set views, but otherwise can be pleasant to deal with.

More common is the querulous litigant driven by a personal grievance, real or imagined.  The writer’s experience is that such obsessive grievance often emerges from the failure of some grand financial scheme or the loss of face as a result of failed financial dealings.  The humiliation of the loss of the family farm can be such a catalyst.

The querulous litigant has been described by one psychiatrist in the following terms³:

At times, these chronic grumblers may become ‘querulant’ (morbid complainants). In general, they have a belief of a loss sustained, are indignant and aggrieved and their language is the language of the victim, as if the loss was personalised and directed towards them in some way. They have over-optimistic expectations for compensation, over-optimistic evaluation of the importance of the loss to themselves, and they are difficult to negotiate with and generally reject all but their own estimation of a just settlement. They are persistent, demanding, rude and frequently threatening (harm to self or others). There will be evidence of significant and increasing loss in life domains, driven by their own pursuit of claim. Over time, they begin to pursue claims against others involved in the management of claims, be it their own legal counsel, judges and other officials. While claiming a wish for compensation initially, any such offers never satisfy and their claims show an increasing need for personal vindication and, at times, revenge, rather than compensation or reparation.

Despite 150 years of psychiatric research into querulous paranoia, there is no consensus as to the underlying pathology. Theories range from an underlying organic disease process, similar to schizophrenia, through to psychogenic processes; that is, certain vulnerable characters are sensitised by certain life experiences and are then struck by a key event which triggers their complaining. Preceding the querulousness, they have often received some form of blow to their individual  sense  of  self-esteem  or  security.  This  was  often  in  the  nature  of  a  loss  of relationship, through separation or death, ill health or loss of employment.

The key event is usually a genuine grievance and seems to echo previous losses. The key event is often of a type to threaten the (male) status symbols of prestige, position, power, property and rights. Environmental factors influence their complaint.

This kind of LIP has to be treated with particular caution by the advocate, both outside Court and before the Court.

A further category of LIP the writer has observed is what might be called the misguided or misled LIP.   Litigants in this category comprise people who have obtained informal advice, usually from persons without legal qualifications, who assure them that they have a defence to a particular kind of claim (frequently tax claims or claims relating to mortgage securities and money lending).   These defences are usually based on some obscure and wrong point of law, though to the hopeful and untrained litigant they look impressive.

The internet age has made this situation more common.  In some cases, the LIP will  have  paid  for  the  advice,  which  often  takes  the  form  of  a  draft  court document.  People who fall for this kind of thing are usually more gullible than malicious.

Finally, and importantly, many LIPs are people who simply cannot afford legal representation or for whom the risk posed by the litigation does not justify the cost of legal representation.  An example of the latter is the appellant in Ross v Hallam [2011] QCA 92, who only belatedly realised (in the Court of Appeal) that defending himself was beyond him.

The categories I suggest are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive.  However, in each case, it is helpful to try to get some insight into the background of your opponent and their motivation and character.   A name search can be helpful to find out if your opponent has form.  Also worth trying is a phrase search of some of the more unusual turns of phrase which might appear in a particularly odd looking court document.   This might turn up previous cases where usual contentions have been run before and dismissed.

A  discussion  before  Court  with  your  opponent  can  also  assist  in  trying  to understand the kind of opponent you confront.  Care must be taken in those discussions, however, as I will now discuss.

… Read more download>

Footnotes

1. The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd c McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254
2. G. Lindsay SC, Review of Owen Dixon: A Biography (2003) 23 Aust. Bar Rev. 198
3. Dr G. Lester, The Vexatious Litigant (2005) 17 Judicial Officers’ Bulletin 17 at 18-19 cited by Douglas J in Access to Justice-Problems of Self-Representation Hearsay Issue 55

Many well-wishers, kind enough to express regret at my retirement seven and a half years prior to statutory senility, have asked why? The answer is multi-faceted. I was but 36 years old when appointed a judge. It was never my ambition to hold office for 34 years. My role as President over the past almost 19 years involves the demanding court workload of a judge of appeal and a significant administrative role which at times is onerous. I have wide community and cultural interests and a much loved large extended family. I have had to place many things I would dearly wanted to do on the back-burner. The position of President of the Court of Appeal demands and deserves nothing less than 100 per cent commitment. I wanted to leave at a time of my choosing when at least some would say, “Must you go?” I had long planned to retire after 25 years of judicial service but when that date approached, I did not consider it to be in the interests of the Court for me to leave. My decision to stay another 15 months was not all selflessness: it gave me the opportunity to participate in the Court of Appeal’s 25 year ceremonial sittings last month, attended by the Presidents of the Courts of Appeal of New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and New Zealand. I hope that my departure from the Court at this time will allow me to build a productive post-judicial life, and the Court of Appeal to benefit from new energy and ideas.

Ms Smyth, you and your predecessor Mr Potts may be pleased that my first contact with the law was through the solicitor’s branch of the profession to which my father, Joe Hoare, belonged. And I was inspired to study law by some bright young articled clerks at Brisbane solicitors, Thynne and Macartney, whilst working there in my summer holiday after finishing high school.

A few years later when volunteering as a law student with the fledgling Aboriginal Legal Service I realised I wanted to be a criminal law barrister. One episode of this volunteering is indelibly etched in my memory. Some fellow law students and I were instructing a barrister in a committal proceeding. The elderly female complainant gave evidence that an Aboriginal youth at her front door offered to sell manure for her garden. Meanwhile, others in his gang entered her house through the back door and stole her handbag. The police prosecutor asked whether she could identify the youth. She confidently stated: :She would remember that evil face anywhere”, as she pointed to my cherubic-faced student colleague of pure Irish descent, now revered legal academic, National Treasure and Jesuit priest, Father Frank Brennan. An unforgettable early lesson in the dangers of identification evidence!

I am delighted to see retired Supreme Court Judge, Alan Demack, and his wife Dorothy, here today. As Chief Justice Holmes noted, he chaired the Bjelke-Petersen Commission of Inquiry into the Status of Women in Queensland. Chapter 4 of the Commission’s 1974 Report dealt with women in public life and noted under the heading “Judiciary”:

“There are no female judges in Queensland, and there is no immediate prospect of there being any. Persons appointed as judges must have acquired skill and understanding in Court procedures, as well as considerable knowledge of the law. This happens only through many years of practice in the Courts. … There are no women practising as barristers in Queensland. Therefore it will be many years before a Queensland woman is in the position to be considered for appointment to either the Supreme or the District Courts. The most positive contribution that can be made at this time is for the Crown Law Office to encourage women to enter its ranks…. Since the practising barristers employed by the Crown Law Office act as Crown Prosecutors, this may seem to be an unsuitable role for a woman. However, this kind of thinking cannot be heeded in 1974.

The Commission sees it as an essential long-term aim that there should be many women practising as barristers as well as solicitors and that women should become Judges in Queensland. …

Therefore the Commission recommends that the Crown Law Office encourage women to practice as barristers within its employment.” [Page 5]

Under the heading, Magistracy, the Report noted:

“The Commission understands that there are already women in Queensland who are working towards attaining the qualifications which will enable them to be appointed as Magistrates. The Commission applauds this step and recommends that the Public Service Board encourage women to qualify for appointment as Clerks of the Court and as Stipendiary Magistrates.” [Above]

Judge Demack walked the walk and, knowing I wanted to be a barrister, appointed me as his clerk in 1975. I have been privileged to work full-time in the law ever since.

There have been great changes to the substantive and procedural law over that time, changes which, I think, debunk the urban myth that the law and the judicial arm of government are out of touch. Over time, the law and the courts do change, responding appropriately to valid criticism and changing community values, expectations and attitudes.

In civil law these changes include the dramatic shift from court-based litigation to mediation and alternative dispute resolution. The comparatively few civil cases which do progress through the courts are tightly case-managed to minimise costs for both litigants and the taxpayer. Our 2017 challenges will include dealing with class actions.

Perhaps the greatest changes to the criminal law concern sexual offences. In 1975 a person could not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a child witness. Complainants in alleged sexual offences gave their evidence before strangers in open court, in full view of the accused and, often with lengthy, aggressive cross-examination of marginal relevance, including about previous sexual experience. And all this, including the names of complainants, was liable to be reported in the media. It was only the courageous or the naive who pursued their complaints of sexual offences.

Nowadays the evidence of children is given by way of the child’s initial statement to police, and cross-examination is pre-recorded in closed court, with a support person in a room remote from the court, and with limits on the nature and style of cross-examination. Adult complainants also give their evidence in closed court, where appropriate with a support person and with the accused screened from their vision. And unlike in 1975, men can now be convicted of raping their wives.

Another positive change for the legal profession and the judiciary has been the increasing participation of women. Despite the 1974 Demack recommendations as to the Magistracy, no woman magistrate was appointed in Queensland until 1990. But since then women have steadily increased their representation at all levels of the judiciary in Queensland. I am proud and delighted that today both Queensland and Australia have woman Chief Justices who have been my colleagues and friends over the past four decades.

A second irksome urban myth is that judicial officers are light on sentence. In truth, the vast majority of sentences are uncontroversial. Those that are manifestly inadequate or excessive are corrected on appeal. The myth has been convincingly debunked by two respected academic studies with jurors, first in Tasmania and more recently in Victoria. These show that when members of the public have all the relevant information, most would impose a lesser or the same sentence as that actually imposed by the judge.

Last year during Law Week, whilst speaking with legal studies high school students at Caboolture, I was asked for my career highlight. This answer was easy, not multi-faceted. It was standing with my sister and brother judges of appeal, the Senior Judge Administrator and the judges of the Trial Division, between 2013 and 2015, in successfully resisting a calculated and sustained attack on the independence of the Supreme Court of Queensland by some members of the legislature and the print media. They were dark days for the judges and their support and registry staff. To those, from both sides of politics, who suggested judges should get back to work, I emphasise that we never stopped hearing and determining cases according to our judicial oaths and affirmations. The support from your professional associations, Mr Hughes, Ms McLeod and Ms Smyth, from individual leaders and members of the profession and from retired judges sustained us. But the real heroes of this battle were the people of Queensland. Exit polls conducted after the 2015 State Election made clear that ordinary Queenslanders cherish the independence of the judicial arm of government.

There are a great many things I will miss on my retirement from judicial life. First and foremost will be my loss of the privilege and responsibility of exercising judicial power and its ability to influence lives and develop jurisprudence. I will miss the daily contact with my fellow judicial officers, whether members of QCAT, the magistracy or the higher courts. All judicial officers are united in their daily, often grinding commitment to striving to do equal justice according to law to every litigant. The majority of matters before the Court of Appeal are from the District Court and the Trial Division of the Supreme Court. The people of Queensland are well-served by both these great institutions. Queensland has experienced considerable population growth since 1975 but the resources provided to its Courts have not grown commensurately. The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ annual publications show that Queensland courts are amongst the nation’s most productive yet the least costly to operate. This is due in large part to the industry and efficiency of its judicial officers. But it is also because the courts have long been under-resourced. Whilst appreciating the many demands on precious funds, it is time for Queensland Courts to receive comparable funding to courts in other states.

It has been wonderful to have spent the past five years of my working life in this spectacular award-winning building. I will miss this stunning courtroom with Sally Gabori’s evocative mural, the dignified light-filled Court of Appeal next door and my superb corner chambers’ suite.

But buildings and judicial officers are only part of what makes the judicial arm of government function. The joys of my judicial life include the brilliant associates who reinspire me each year with their enthusiasm for the law and life. I am delighted that 9 of mine are present this morning, with Magistrate Ho watching on videolink from Gladstone.

In Queensland, the court and registry support staff are employees of the Executive rather than the judiciary. I hope that, one day, consistent with the seminal concepts of the separation of powers and judicial independence, this will change, as it has recently in Victoria. But despite this imperfect model, Queensland Courts, on the whole, have been well-served by their staff. I particularly, note the assistance over the years of the Court Administrators and the talented appeals registrars with whom I have worked. I am delighted that so many of them are present today.

I will also miss my capable executive assistants with whom I have worked so closely. That no doubt challenging role has been filled by three people: Andrea Suthers who spent even more of her working life in the Court of Appeal than I, Vivienne Koroglu, and my current EA, the unforgettable and irrepressible Kelly Morseu!

And finally, my precious family, who have come out in numbers to support me today, as they have throughout the celebrations and tribulations of my career. I am joined by three of my five siblings, David, a retired solicitor and my sister-in-law Sharon, my sisters Diana and Rosalind, nieces Katie (a lawyer) and Sally (my flower girl), nephews Aram and Kieren (both lawyers), my nephew-in-law Cameron and my very patient great-nephew, Angus.

My dear children, Helen and James who have travelled from Sydney, together with Lachie, his wife Alexandra (a solicitor) and the original Alex McMurdo, have taken time out of their busy lives to be with their Mum at her swan song. Thank you for sharing your lives with me. I am so proud of each of you.

And last, but never least, Philip. I am afraid that marrying me was not your best career move! But it was mine! Thank you for your unconditional love, support and wise advice — most of which I have accepted — over the past 41 years.

It is enormously comforting to be leaving the Supreme Court of Queensland in such a pleasing state under the thoughtful and steady leadership of my dear friend and clever, hard-working colleague, Chief Justice Holmes. But this is not a time for complacency. There may be future attacks on the independence of the judiciary. If so, I urge my judicial colleagues, the professional associations and individual lawyers to again be courageous in undertaking their ethical responsibility to defend the independence of both the legal profession and the judicial arm of government. In 1975 when I commenced my full-time career in the law the Queensland Law Society had never had a woman President and there were no Queensland women barristers to participate in such a defence. Today, we have our second female Attorney-General, our fourth female President of the Law Council of Australia, our fifth woman President of the Queensland Law Society, and about 22 per cent of the Queensland Bar and about nine per cent of its silks are women.

With the adoption of the Law Council of Australia’s latest Equal Opportunity Briefing Policy by the Executive and an increasing number of Queensland solicitors, the proportion of women barristers, silks and judges will rise. It cheers me to know, as I hand on the baton, that Queensland will increasingly have the benefit of intelligent, courageous, compassionate, hard-working women, together with men of similar qualities defending the institutional democratic role of its independent legal profession and judiciary.

My gratitude, admiration and warmest wishes are with you all.

Welcome to the latest edition of Hearsay.

With the year now in full swing, we have been able to bring readers an interesting variety of papers, book reviews and other items of interest. There are also a number of very important events coming up that will be of interest to readers, details of which are included in this edition. I commend them to you.

Appointment of Solicitor-General

Peter Dunning QC was appointed Solicitor-General on Thursday, 10 April 2014.

Mr Dunning was called to the Bar in 1992 and took silk in 2005.

He has extensive experience in a broad range of commercial matters including appellate matters, constitutional and public law and Royal Commissions and inquiries.

As an aside, Mr Dunning’s appointment comes almost 250 years after that of his namesake, John Dunning, the 1st Baron Ashburton, appointed solicitor general in England in 1768, who was notable for, among other things, having defended the radical John Wilkes against charges of seditious and obscene libel.

Contributions

Many thanks to those that have contributed papers and other items for inclusion. As I mentioned in the last edition, contributions are welcome and I am happy to discuss proposed contributions at any time.

In the next edition we plan to include a review of the upcoming Federal Budget and how it will affect the profession, as well as some useful tips for the inevitable end of financial year rush.

Happy reading.

Adrian Duffy

Welcome to the last edition of Hearsay for 2013. This edition features a number of excellent articles, book reviews and other items that will hopefully be of interest.

Since the last edition we have seen the sad passing of one of the luminaries of the law, the late the Hon Bruce McPherson CBE QC. Included in this edition is a fitting memorial kindly written by Justice Keane. Justice Dowsett also kindly agreed to a copy of the eulogy delivered by him being included.

We have also seen the untimely passing of the Hon Neil Buckley, formerly of the Family Court. A tribute by Justice Kent of the Family Court is included in this edition.

Readers will be particularly interested in the excellent review by Roger Derrington QC of John McKenna QC’s outstanding book Supreme Court of Queensland: A Concise History.

Also included is an interesting and thought provoking speech by Lord Pannick QC delivered to the Bar Council of England and Wales Annual Conference held recently.

There are many other fine articles and book reviews for readers’ holiday enjoyment.

Congratulations to all the new judicial appointments and the new silks. Peter Davis QC takes the Presidency of the Association, and together with Vice President Shane Doyle QC and new Bar Council come to the task at a challenging time. Congratulations and good luck go to them for the year ahead.

Thanks also to Roger Traves QC whose term as President has concluded and who can now take a well deserved break from those challenges.

As well as challenges, there are many exciting things taking place in the coming year. The Bar Practice Course has now taken up residence at the Inns of Court. The Bar Conference in March 2014 promises to be an interesting and informative event. Members are encouraged to read the first hand accounts by Sue Brown QC and Jeremy Sweeney on the advocacy courses and to consider taking those courses.

This is the first edition for the new editorial team. Thanks to Geoff Diehm QC and his team, and in particular Jennifer Hewson, to the previous editor Martin Burns QC for his kind advice and ready offers of assistance and to Greg Hale and the publication team for their efforts and help in the transition. We have been lucky to be the beneficiaries of the work done by my predecessors in making Hearsay the fine publication it is today. All errors and shortcomings are, however, entirely those of your current editor.

Best wishes to all members and readers for a safe and happy and possibly even relaxing festive season. Hearsay will be back in the new Court Year.

Adrian Duffy

The given topic suggests that advocacy in arbitration differs from advocacy before a court. The assumption is justified but the differences are subtle. The principles of advocacy, its tactics and strategy, are basically the same in whatever forum the advocate appears. To understand what differences in approach there might be requires an exploration of how the arbitral process differs from litigation.

I take my topic to include all aspects of conducting a case, not just the practical techniques of examining witnesses and crafting submissions.

Most arbitrations in this State are conducted under the auspices of the (Qld) Commercial Arbitration Act 2013. Each State has an almost identical Act and there is, as well, a Commonwealth Act for international arbitrations. Put simply an arbitration is international if the parties to the arbitration agreement conduct their businesses in different countries, or if they do business in the same country but the agreed place of arbitration is in another country, or the place where a substantial part of the contract is to be performed is in another country; or if the parties have agreed that the subject matter of their agreement relates to more than one country. My experience suggests that the day to day conduct of an arbitration does not vary between domestic and international arbitrations.

This is not the time or place to undertake an analysis of the various Acts which would certainly be dreary for everyone. As I said, they are all very similar. All of them mandate a particular approach to arbitrations. Section 1AC of our Act declares that:

“(1) The paramount object of this Act is to facilitate the fair and final resolution of commercial disputes by impartial arbitral tribunals without unnecessary delay or expense.

(2) This Act aims to achieve its paramount object by—

(a) enabling parties to agree about how their commercial disputes are to be resolved (subject to subsection (3) and such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest); and

(b) providing arbitration procedures that enable commercial disputes to be resolved in a cost-effective manner, informally and quickly.

(3) This Act must be interpreted and the functions of an (arbitrator) must be excercised so that… the paramount object … is achieved.

….”

Note the mandatory “must” in sub-section 3. Arbitrators have a statutory obligation to resolve disputes economically, informally and quickly. Sub-section (2) introduces what has been called “proportionality”, allowing parties and the arbitrator to mould procedures in order to determine the case in a manner that is cost effective in relation to the amount in dispute, its complexity, and the capacity of the parties.

Section 19 of the Act provides that the parties can agree upon the procedures by which the arbitrator is to conduct the proceedings. This recognises “party autonomy”, the right of parties to conduct their cases as they wish. There is, however, a substantial limitation on the right. It is subject to “the provisions of th(e) act”, a reference to the paramount objective of economy and efficiency. The agreed procedure must meet the objective.

In the absence of agreement, the arbitrator “may … conduct the arbitration in such a manner as (he) considers appropriate”. This power is also subject to, and must be exercised to achieve, the paramount objective.

Importantly the power extends to determining the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence. This means that arbitrators are not bound by the legal rules of evidence. This has a consequence for advocacy which I will mention later.

Section 18 confers an unusual power on arbitrators. It requires them to give the parties a “reasonable” opportunity of presenting their cases. The requirement is not to allow a “full” opportunity to present a desired case. Arbitrators can interrupt and curtail the presentation of evidence or argument. I have never seen the power exercised. I assume it would occur only when a party was acting oppressively against an opponent or was disregarding its obligation to be concise and efficient. However the section does not confine the circumstances in which arbitrators can limit the number of witnesses or experts, or impose time constraints on their evidence.

You should note that S24B puts an obligation on parties to “do all things necessary for the .. expeditious conduct of … proceedings”.

Section 24 permits arbitral proceedings to be conducted on written materials without hearing oral evidence or oral argument, though if any party requests such a hearing, the arbitrator must accede to it. Obviously where proceedings are conducted entirely on written materials their importance is critical. It is the only chance of persuasion the advocate has.

Importantly s.5 provides that no court may intervene in arbitral proceedings “except where so provided by this Act”. The scope for judicial intervention is very limited: there is no appeal against findings of fact. Appeals on questions of law in an award can be heard by the Supreme Court only if both parties agree, and if the court grants leave. Section 34A(3) advises the court not to grant leave unless the decision of the arbitrators on a question of law is obviously wrong, and the error had an actual, substantial, effect on the rights of one or more of the parties. Apart from that, a court can only interfere if the arbitrator misbehaves, or was not properly appointed, or decides a dispute not referred to arbitration. So arbitrations are meant to be fast, informal and final. Your conduct of the case should reflect that philosophy. You cannot have at the back of your mind that errors can be tidied up on appeal. You only get one shot of having your arguments accepted.

I have mentioned the differences between litigation and arbitrations as mandated by the legislation to give you some idea of how arbitrations are required to proceed so you can adjust the techniques of advocacy accordingly. The combination of sections 1AC, 19 and 24B particularly, results in a substantial departure from the previous philosophy which underlay litigation, the right of parties to conduct the case as they see fit and at the pace that suits them. The Commercial Arbitration Act obliges arbitrators to get on with the job and to actively encourage parties to prepare and prosecute their cases, and to equally actively discourage delay. Arbitral proceedings are compressed and advocacy in them has to adapt to the compression.

Interestingly s.24A provides that the parties to an arbitration may appear in person or by a representative who need not be a legal practitioner. You may find yourself arguing against a layman, though one expert in a particular field.

Arbitrators have only the powers the parties can agree to give them. They do not have coercive powers. They cannot compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents. Parties can, however, apply to the Supreme Court for the issue of subpoenas for the production of documents to the arbitrators, or the attendance of witnesses. They must first obtain the permission of the arbitrator to make the application.

Arbitral proceedings are flexible and informal and the parties can choose their own rules. Normally the arbitration clause in a contract which has given rise to the dispute will identify a set of rules which will govern the proceedings. Commonly parties choose rules such as those published by the Resolution Institute (formally IAMA) or the rules of ACICA, the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration. I was once in an arbitration which had no connection with shipping or the United Kingdom but the parties had agreed it should be conducted in accordance with the rules of the London Maritime Arbitrator’s Association. Arbitrations under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) are quite common. If you are engaged in one, study its rules very carefully. They are proscriptive and elaborate, calling for steps in the proceedings other sets of rules don’t require, and each case is supervised from Hong Kong.

There is no point in going into the details of any particular set of rules. They deal with the same sorts of subject matter that you would expect rules of procedure to cover, and in a broadly similar fashion. The point is that as professional advocates you should make yourself familiar with the particular rules by which the arbitration you are briefed in is to be conducted. Whatever set of rules are applicable they will differ from the UCPR.

One topic the rules do not cover is discovery, or disclosure of documents. You might think discovery has no place in an address on advocacy, but advocacy is about presenting your case and for that you need material. Normally the parties, through their solicitors, agree upon some form of disclosure, and it is usually limited to categories of documents and/or communications between specified persons. The “direct relevance” test of the UCPR does not apply unless the parties agree it should. If documents are required from an opponent or third party and are not produced voluntarily, you will have to have recourse to subpoenas issued by the court. Given that two applications are necessary, first to obtain the arbitrator’s permission and then the court’s order for the issue of the subpoenas, you may have to act expeditiously to get the documents in time. If you are asked to advise on what discovery regime should be agreed to, obviously the aim is to ensure that the categories of documents are likely to produce what is needed.

I mentioned, as one of the attractions of arbitration, the fact that the parties get to choose the arbitrator. Obviously the disputes in which I have been involved have had at least one venerable lawyer as arbitrator, but I once sat with an accountant. In some disputes however, the arbitrators are engineers, architects, valuers, or even builders, sometimes as sole arbitrator and sometimes as one of a panel of three. In such cases a different approach is called for. There is no point in being overly legalistic. This is especially so if you attempt to bamboozle or overbear the arbitrator by a display of your legal knowledge. An intelligent layman will quickly see what is going on and resent it. You should show a lay arbitrator the same respect and courtesy you would show senior counsel or retired judge. If a point of law does have to be raised because the dispute turns upon the meaning of a contractual term, or because there is some proper reason for objecting to evidence, the point should be argued as simply as possible with as little reference to authorities as possible, the object being to clarify things to assist the arbitrator’s understanding of the issues.

Arbitral proceedings are informal both in the actual conduct of the hearing and in the relaxation of rules of procedure. This informality should not lead to any display of disrespect to the arbitrators or familiarity. There may be a temptation, especially if the arbitrator is a layman, to make him your friend, but the temptation should be sternly resisted. You will gain more respect from the arbitrator if you exhibit a proper degree of professional deference.

There is an unavoidable physical closeness between arbitrators and the parties and lawyers. Hearing rooms are small. The absence of court staff means that documents have to be handed to the arbitrator, usually by solicitor or junior counsel. There is no bailiff to open or adjourn proceedings; there is no standing up when the arbitrator enters. He or she will be sitting at a desk when parties and their lawyers straggle in, or the arbitrator will enter the room when everyone else is there. The examination of witnesses and addresses are conducted with the practitioners seated. Nevertheless it is important to preserve a psychological space between advocate and arbitrator. The deference, or psychological space, facilitates good decision making and, I think, most arbitrators would resent a friendship being imposed on them by a party. Such an approach might be seen as an improper attempt to influence the outcome and is likely to be counterproductive.

When I initially thought about preparing this address I intended to be analytical rather than particular, assuming that approach would appeal to an audience of professional advocates. However, early on when speaking about the topic to some junior counsel, I was asked questions which suggested that it might be appropriate to deal with some detail that might seem mundane. I was asked how the arbitrator should be addressed. The problem may appear acute if the arbitrator is a retired judge. Despite natural respect “your Honour” is to be avoided: it is wrong. That particular mode of address is reserved for serving members of the judiciary. Call the arbitrator by name, Mr, or Ms Smith, or Mr (or Ms) Arbitrator. Often there is a panel of three arbitrators (which is a called a Tribunal in the legislation) and if referring to the arbitrators collectively you would use such a phrase as “if the Tribunal pleases” or “does the Tribunal wish to have a view”, or whatever the case might be. If an individual arbitrator asks a question he or she should be answered by name.

A substantial difference between arbitration and litigation is that arbitrated disputes often arise in the context of an on-going commercial relationship which both parties wish to preserve. Litigation, by contrast, is usually an exercise in pathology where the parties are engaged in working out why the relationship died and allocating fault. Advocacy can take on a sharp edge in that context which will have no place in finding the answer to a dispute between parties who may wish to use each other’s services in the future, or are bound together in a contract of long duration. The conduct of such an arbitration must value civility over forensic point scoring in order to maintain rather than destroy the business relationship. I don’t mean to say that you should not present your case forcefully but I think you should do so in a manner that avoids personal attacks. On occasions even these may be necessary, for example when a witness may be lying on an important point.

Most disagreements which go to arbitration commence with a Notice of Dispute, or a Referral to arbitration and there is usually a response, which may be called by different names. These two documents summarise the rival contentions in the case. They are the first documents the arbitrator will see, so advocacy in promoting the parties’ cause should begin with the drafting of the Notice and the Response. I don’t suggest that you treat these documents as final submissions, but they are the first chance to articulate a client’s case persuasively, succinctly and clearly. You should take advantage of it.

The same is true where the rules under which the arbitration is conducted, or the parties agree, that there should be an exchange of pleadings by whatever named called. The elaborate and prescriptive provisions of the UCP Rules do not apply. Typically the rules of the arbitration organisations provide that a statement of claim should include:

· the identification of the parties

· a statement of the facts supporting the claim

· the points in issue

· the relief or remedy sought

· the legal grounds or arguments supporting the claim

The defence is required to respond with particularity to the contentions in the statement of claim.

It is common, though not universal, for the statement of claim to have attached to it copies of the contract from which the dispute has arisen and, as well, “all documents and other evidence relied upon by the claimant”. The same obligation is imposed on the responding side.

Evidence in chief by a party’s witnesses is invariably in written form. The statements and expert reports are delivered to the arbitrator when finalised, or when exchanged between parties, depending upon their agreement. The result is that the arbitrator knows a very great deal about the case well before the hearing starts. The conduct of the case should reflect that reality. There is no point in lengthy opening addresses or in explaining the case. The arbitrator will know what the lay witnesses say, what the expert’s opinions are, and they will have read the relevant documents. The presentation of the case, the advocate’s task, needs to be focused and direct. It is also relevant that the arbitrator will have been chosen by the parties for his known competence and/or experience so that you can address the issues confidently knowing the arbitrator understands the case and appreciates the competing arguments.

This observation holds good even when the arbitrator, or one of them, is a layman, engineer, accountant, or whatever. It is a mistake of advocacy to treat such people as inferior beings. Avoid being condescending. The advocate’s task is to persuade, not antagonise.

There are special problems which sometimes arise in international arbitrations where the arbitrators may come from different legal systems, from different cultural backgrounds and may not have English as their first language. These special problems can be ignored for present purposes. Perhaps they might become the subject of a separate address on another occasion.

I mentioned section 9(3) which gives an arbitrator the power to determine the admissibility, relevance and weight of any evidence. If you are going to object to the reception of evidence, you will need better arguments than one which says that the impugned evidence should not be received because Cross on Evidence says it is inadmissible or because its reception would contravene one of the many restrictions on receiving evidence. Especially if the arbitrator is a layman, you will need to demonstrate why it would be an affront to the orderly conduct of the arbitration for the arbitrator to have regard to it. Putting technicalities aside, the two basic objections to the reception of evidence is that it is hearsay i.e. the witness had no direct knowledge of the event testified to; or the evidence is an opinion, or a conclusion, and the person expressing it is not duly qualified as an expert, or the opinion is not truly the subject of relevant expertise.

As a general rule objections to evidence should be kept to a minimum and only made where the evidence objected to cannot be properly admitted and will be damaging. It is surely better to ignore harmless or irrelevant hearsay than take up valuable time arguing about its reception. The same is true of objectionable opinion evidence. Arbitrators are professional people. They will want to reach the right decision and for the right reasons, which includes acting only on proper evidence. It is easy to lose sight of the fact that the rules of evidence are designed to ensure that what is put before a court is likely to be reliable. If you can demonstrate to an arbitrator that the evidence you object to looks to be unreliable, for example because it is hearsay and cannot be challenged or because it is opinion and the proper groundwork for the expression of the opinion has not been established, the arbitrator is likely to uphold the objection.

Section 19(4) gives an arbitrator “The power to make orders …for the examination of a … witness on oath or affirmation”. That has a practical application. It means that witnesses are not necessarily sworn or affirmed when called to give evidence. The arbitrator decides whether he requires that form of binding the witness’s conscience. In my experience the parties will tell the arbitrator if they want the witnesses to testify on oath, or the arbitrator will ask if they want the witnesses sworn. My own preference is to proceed in that way. It is especially important in cases involving contested questions of fact. Even in an apostate age such as ours, the taking of an oath or affirmation brings to the attention of the witness the importance of the occasion, and the need to be both honest and accurate.

Arbitrations are often conducted according to an agreed timetable, which may be tight. A fixed period of time is allowed for the entire hearing and it is common for parties to agree to an equal division of time for adducing evidence, cross examining and addressing. There are so-called “stop clock” arbitrations in which the time is divided and regulated to a matter of hours. Where this is the case, or where there are more general time constraints, cross examination in particular has to be thoroughly planned and conducted so as to stick to the point, avoid distractions and irrelevancies, and conclude within the allotted time. Because your time with the witness is limited, the cross examiner must identify the critical point or points and determine how to develop them quickly. Discursiveness and rambling are obnoxious in any jurisdiction but are truly pernicious in arbitrations. Time is of the essence and a hardnosed focusing on the important is essential.

Counsel will, in most cases, be involved in the preparation of witness statements. The drafting of these is part of advocacy, just as adducing evidence in chief from a witness orally, is part of the advocate’s task of persuasion.

Of course I do not mean that the statement should become the lawyers’, or that a witness should be coaxed or coached. The evidence must be that of the witness but it can be presented in such a way as to be persuasive and incline the decision maker to accept it. Statements should contain facts not arguments. They should be concise, coherent and proceed by way of understandable narrative. They should comply with the rules of evidence because, although an arbitrator can overlook the rules, statements that contain evidence beyond the witnesses own knowledge, or express opinions not facts, will diminish their weight.

Written submissions have assumed greater importance in recent years and this is particularly true of arbitrations where, as I have said, time is compressed, arguments and issues are condensed and the arbitrator will have had given to him large amounts of documents which may not have been the subject of oral debate but would have been referenced in statements or pleadings. The written submission is the medium to draw all the threads together and present the party’s case in a clear and compelling manner. You are all familiar with the requirements for producing good written submissions and I will mention only the aspects that may have particular application for arbitration. The submissions must of course be tailored to the particular arbitrator or arbitrators as well, of course, to the subject matter of dispute. You may be dealing with arbitrators who, though competent in their field, may not be used to the discipline of fact finding, analysis or the writing of reasoned judgments. Your written submissions should be designed to help them along that path.

At a basic level the submissions should set out what relief or remedy the party contends for and why that result should be given. The submissions should formulate each proposition of fact which the arbitrators is asked to find by reference to the evidence which supports it. Where question of law have to be decided, the propositions contended for should be identified and the legal arguments clearly laid out.

In all cases, but especially with lay arbitrators, you should use clear, simple language, short sentences and numbered paragraphs. The subject matter of the submission should be logically structured and each part identified by appropriate headings. Where documents are relied on they should be clearly referenced and should be given to the arbitrator in an easily accessible format. Remember the arbitrator does not have an associate or secretary to help with handling or accessing documents. All cases generate paper, but strive for economy. A folder, as small as possible in the circumstances, containing all the critical documents, is a good start.

Sometimes submissions can include the findings of fact that the party contends for so that an arbitrator may incorporate them easily into the award. This can be a convenient way of structuring the submissions. The proposed findings of fact have to be argued for with reference to the evidence, any relevant law, documents, witness statements and oral testimony.

Conciseness is a virtue. Succinctness leads to easier comprehension, especially when the arbitrator is not an experienced lawyer. Too much detail, too many references to evidence, or to cases may be a distraction. Where there are copious references it is best to proceed by way of footnotes rather than incorporating them in the text. Only the essence of the evidence, or the propositions of law, should be in the body of the submissions.

Take the gospel’s advice: let your speech be plain: say “yes or no: anything more comes from the devil”. Avoid adjectives and adverbs, completely if possible. Do not use rhetorical flourishes or any kind of hyperbole. Do not overstate.

I recently came across some good advice for the drafters of submissions, which was new to me. It was that having prepared the first draft the advocate should put it away for a time then read it afresh as if he or she were the arbitrator. In that process prune anything that smacks of verbosity or repetition, and see to what extent expressions can be shortened and simplified.

In the same place where I found that advice I came across the statement that arbitrators generally will be annoyed or alienated by written submissions that:

· are prolix, including irrelevancies; or excessive quotations of fact or authority; or a failure to distil the essence of the argument;

· include too many points or issues resulting from a failure to cull weak points;

· are incoherent because they lack a logical theme or fail to organise material into an integrated whole;

· are inaccurate, containing misstatement of facts or issues;

· omit or misquote authorities, or quote them out of context;

· are mechanically defective because they lack an index; or have an inadequate chronology; or inaccurate references to authorities and transcripts; or because they contain typographical errors, poor grammar or spelling.

Remember that the calibre of the written submissions establishes the credibility, or lack thereof, of the advocate advancing them. If your written submissions are poor your oral argument in support or amplification of them is likely to be received doubtfully. Written submissions which are inaccurate or poorly argued or suffer from some of the defects I have identified, are likely to be put aside by the arbitrator who will pick up the opponent’s submissions if they have obeyed the rules of advocacy. You want your submissions to be the ones the arbitrator turns to for help in writing the award.

It is, of course, unethical to mislead any tribunal as to the law. The obligation not to do so, and to be absolutely precise and accurate when arguing any point of law is much stronger when the tribunal is not legally qualified, such as a lay arbitrator, and the chance of misunderstanding or confusion is greater than with a trained lawyer.

Can I finish with a brief reference to two unrelated concepts. One of the advantages of arbitration is its complete confidentiality. It is not uncommon for an arbitration agreement to provide that even the existence of a dispute between the parties is not to be revealed so that no-one unconnected with the dispute knows that a disagreement has arisen. Only the arbitrator and reporter, if transcription has been agreed, the parties, their legal representatives and their witnesses are allowed into the hearing room. There are ethical constraints on what barristers can reveal about their instructions but there is no constraint on talking of what happened in court, and a day’s excitement is often repeated over an after-work drink. Section 27E of the Act prohibits the disclosure of confidential information in relation to an arbitral proceeding, subject to some limited exceptions. Confidential information is defined in s.2 to mean any information that relates to the arbitral proceedings including, specifically, the pleadings, the evidence, the rulings and the award.

I mentioned the limited right of appeal against awards. There is an additional, though also limited, right to have the award corrected with respect to “any errors in computation, any clerical or typographical errors or any errors of similar nature”. The right does not apply so as to change substantial findings of fact, but errors of a kind which give the award an effect different to its stated intention can be corrected. A party who wants the correction to be made must request it within 30 days of receiving the award.

There is also a power to request the arbitrator “to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award”. I have no personal experience of such a proceeding. It would seem appropriate where there is some ambiguity or uncertainty in the reasons for the award, or the award, or some conflict between the reasons and the award itself. The arbitrator can be asked to remove the uncertainty.

Can I end as I began by suggesting that arbitrations are a valuable adjunct to dispute resolution and can afford a speedy and therefore economical decision making process. They offer flexible proceedings and competent Tribunals with an interest in efficiency and the delivery of result both legally and factually correct. As advocates I think you will find the arbitral experience satisfying, personally and for your clients.

Specialised accounting advice for barristers 

Hanrick Curran has over 30 years experience helping legal professionals create and execute strategies to achieve greater success. 

THE NEW JURIST

America First and the Harmon Doctrine’s Demise – A History Lesson

Making Human Dignity Central to International Law

Equity

Upholding the Rule of Law: How We Preserve Judicial Independence in the United Kingdom

 

ABA JOURNAL 10th ANNUAL BLAWG 100

Every year since 2007, ABA Journal staffers have assembled a list of their 100 favorite legal blogs for the December issue, the latest being the 10th Annual Blawg 100.

Below is a selection of blogs from the list that may be of interest to readers:

Arbitration Nation

Trial Insider

Verdict

LAW REPORT

Advocates Immunity defence is refined

3D guns and regulation

Hijabs and high heels

25 years of Class Actions in Australia

Deportation of non citizens with criminal record

Grandparents seeking custody of grandchildren

The views of children in Family Court disputes

Hellenic Australian Lawyers Association

“Embracing Diversity in the Law

— Solutions and Outcomes”

The Queensland Chapter of the Hellenic Australian Lawyers Association (HAL) is hosting a CPD event on “Embracing Diversity in the Law — Solutions and Outcomes” and is privileged to have, as speakers, the Hon Yvette D’Ath MP, Attorney-General and Minister for Justice; the Western Australian Patron of HAL, the Hon Chief Justice Wayne Martin AC; the CEO of CareerTrackers , Michael Combs; and CareerTrackers Law Intern, Clark Donovan .

The Queensland Patron of HAL, the Hon Justice Anthe Philippides, Judge of Appeal, Supreme Court of Queensland, will close the proceedings.

When: Friday, 10 June 2016

Time: 5.30 pm — 6.30 pm

(followed by drinks, hors d’oeuvres and a performance of the music of Peter Sculthorpe by the acclaimed William Barton and friends from 6.30 pm — 7.45 pm)

Where: Banco Court, Queen Elizabeth II Courts of Law, 415 George Street, Brisbane

Cost: $30.00 for HAL members, $50.00 for non-member

To book and pay online visit http://www.hal.asn.au/diversity. For further information please see the attached brochure or contact Mal Varitimos QC at malvaritimos@qldbar.asn.au

 

Click here to download Registration Form