Written by Nick Cave and released in their 10th studio album ‘the boatman’s call” in 1997.

The single was released on 7 January 1997.

Wikipedia says that in Cave’s lecture “The Secret Life of the Love Song” to the Academy of Fine Arts Vienna, he counts the song among those he is most proud of having written.  

Cave said he wrote the song in rehab: “I was actually walking back from church through the fields, and the tune came into my head, and when I got back to the facility I sat down at the cranky old piano and wrote the melody and chords, then went up to the dormitory, sat on my bed and wrote those lyrics.” [Nick Cave and Sean O’Hagan (2022). Faith, Hope and Carnage. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p. 51. ISBN 9780374607371.

A master gifting us some of his finest work.

From the album of the same name – this sublime song was written by David Gilmour and Roger Waters in 1974 when in Pink Floyd.

Wikipedia says:

Both Gilmour and Waters have praised the song as one of Pink Floyd’s finest. Waters has noted that the collaboration between himself and Gilmour on the song was “really good. All bits of it are really, really good. I’m very happy about it.” Gilmour has playfully called “Wish You Were Here” “a very simple country song” and stated that “because of its resonance and the emotional weight it carries, it is one of our best songs.”

“Wish You Were Here” was recorded at Abbey Road Studios, as part of the sessions for the entire album.

The following is a performance by David Gilmour on vocals and guitar at the Royal Festival Hall, London in January 2002 as part of the Meltdown Concert.

Also performing were Neill MacColl: Guitars, backing vocals Michael Kamen: Piano, English horn Chucho Merchán: Double bass Caroline Dale: Cello Dick Parry: Sax Nic France: Drums & percussion Gospel Choir: Sam Brown (choir leader), Chris Ballin, Pete Brown, Margo Buchanan, Claudia Fontaine, Michelle John Douglas, Sonia Jones, Carol Kenyon, David Laudat, Durga McBroom, Aitch McRobbie, Beverli Skeete.

8 April 2024 marked 30 years since Kurt Cobain of Nirvana passed away, at 27.

I have friends that saw Nirvana perform at Fisherman’s Wharf, Southport in 1991 – not long after the release of It Smells like Teen Spirit.

Nirvana was then the support act for the Violent Femmes. Unfortunately I didn’t make it, but I hear it was fantastic, and hectic.

They then played at the first year of the Big Day Out – in 1992 – in Sydney on Australia Day.

It would be safe to say that if Nirvana had come back to the Southport Spit a year later – the crowd would have been huge – and utter chaos.

In 1993 Nirvana recorded MTV Unplugged in New York.

This record was released on 1 November 1994, some 7 months after Kurt’s passing.

There is a lot I could say about the record – it is one my favourites – but I won’t bore you.

Suffice to say that it does not contain a large number of the group’s then big hits – apparently a cause of some disagreement with record producers.

I could have picked any of the songs, they are all excellent, but here are two:

Jesus Doesn’t Want Me for a Sunbeam

About a Girl

You will notice a youthful Dave Grohl on drums, who had been recruited in 1990.

I would recommend a dinner party or drive with the whole record playing through.

I’m no expert – just a music lover, but in my view the record is a legitimate bookmark in the history of rock and roll.

On 6 February 2024 the US Court of Appeals (for the Federal Court) for the District for Columbia Circuit, comprising Henderson, Childs and Pan, Circuit Judges, held that Donald Trump as a former President was not immune from facing criminal prosecution.

A link to the decision is here.

Notable extracts from this joint decision include:

Former President Trump moved to dismiss the Indictment and the district court denied his motion. Today, we affirm the denial. For the purpose of this criminal case, former President Trump has become citizen Trump, with all of the defenses of any other criminal defendant. But any executive immunity that may have protected him while he served as President no longer protects him against this prosecution. [p.3]

….

We emphasize that whether the Indictment’s allegations are supported by evidence sufficient to sustain convictions must be determined at a later stage of the prosecution. [p.4]

….

Indictment charges that he and his co-conspirators allegedly advanced their goal through five primary means: … [p.5]

….

Importantly, by the time the United States Senate conducted a trial on the article of impeachment, he had become former President Trump. At the close of the trial, on February 13, 2021, fifty-seven Senators voted to convict him and forty three voted to acquit him. See 167 CONG. REC. S733 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021). Because two-thirds of the Senate did not vote for conviction, he was acquitted on the article of impeachment. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. [p.7]

….

On December 1, 2023, the district court issued a written opinion denying the two motions that are based on presidential immunity and the two constitutional provisions. In relevant part, the district court rejected Trump’s claim of executive immunity from criminal prosecution, holding that “[f]ormer Presidents enjoy no special conditions on their federal criminal liability.” United States v. Trump, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2023 WL 8359833, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2023). It concluded that “[t]he Constitution’s text, structure, and history do not support” the existence of such an immunity, id., and that it “would betray the public interest” to grant a former President “a categorical exemption from criminal liability” for allegedly “attempting to usurp the reins of government.” Id. at *12. It also held that “neither traditional double jeopardy principles nor the Impeachment Judgment Clause provide that a prosecution following impeachment acquittal violates double jeopardy.” Id. at *18.3. [p.8]

….

Nor was the question presented in Midland Asphalt anything like the one before us. Procedural rules are worlds different from a former President’s asserted immunity from federal criminal liability. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the President is sui generis. In the civil context, the Court has held that the denial of the President’s assertion of absolute immunity is immediately appealable “[i]n light of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 743. And in United States v. Nixon, the Court waived the typical requirement that the President risk contempt before appealing because it would be “unseemly” to require the President to do so “merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of the ruling.” 418 U.S. 683, 691–92 (1974). It would be equally “unseemly” for us to require that former President Trump first be tried in order to secure review of his immunity claim after final judgment. When the Court instructs us to read its opinions “with a careful eye to context,” see Nat’l Pork Producers, 598 U.S. at 374, it authorizes us to consider the “special solicitude” due a former President, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 743. [p.14]

….

Former President Trump’s claimed immunity would have us extend the framework for Presidential civil immunity to criminal cases and decide for the first time that a former President is categorically immune from federal criminal prosecution for any act conceivably within the outer perimeter of his executive responsibility. [p.19]

….

The Supreme Court exercised its cognizance over Presidential action to dramatic effect in 1952, when it held that President Harry Truman’s executive order seizing control of most of the country’s steel mills exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority and was therefore invalid. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1952). The Congress had not legislated to authorize President Truman’s seizure and in fact had “refused to adopt the seizure] method of settling labor disputes.” Id. at 586. President Truman could lawfully act only to execute the Congress’s laws or to carry out his constitutional duties as the Executive; and he lacked authority from either source to seize the steel mills. Id. at 587– 89. As Justice Jackson explained, the Court’s holding invalidating the executive order was proper because “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Based on Youngstown and Marbury, the Supreme Court in Clinton easily concluded that “when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 703. [ps.23-24]

….

Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the judiciary’s power to “direct appropriate process to the President himself.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 705. The President does not enjoy absolute immunity from criminal subpoenas issued by state and federal prosecutors and may be compelled by the courts to respond. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33–34; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713–14; Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2431. We have “200 years of precedent establishing that Presidents, and their official communications, are subject to judicial process, even when the President is under investigation.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2427 (citations omitted); see also Clinton, 520 U.S. at 703–05 (recounting history of sitting Presidents complying with court orders to provide testimony and other evidence). [ps.24-25]

….

We therefore conclude that Article III courts may hear the charges alleged in the Indictment under the separation of powers doctrine, as explained in Marbury and its progeny and applied in the analogous contexts of legislative and judicial immunity. The Indictment charges that former President Trump violated criminal laws of general applicability. Acting against laws enacted by the Congress, he exercised power that was at its “lowest ebb.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Former President Trump lacked any lawful discretionary authority to defy federal criminal law and he is answerable in court for his conduct. [p.30]

….

We consider the policy concerns at issue in this case in two respects. First, we assess possible intrusions on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch and the countervailing interests to be served as those concerns apply to former President Trump’s claim that former Presidents are categorically immune from federal prosecution. We conclude that the interest in criminal accountability, held by both the public and the Executive Branch, outweighs the potential risks of chilling Presidential action and permitting vexatious litigation. [p.31]

….

Additionally, recent historical evidence suggests that former Presidents, including President Trump, have not believed themselves to be wholly immune from criminal liability for official acts during their Presidency. President Gerald Ford issued a full pardon to former President Richard Nixon, which both former Presidents evidently believed was necessary to avoid Nixon’s post-resignation indictment. See, e.g., President Gerald R. Ford’s Proclamation 4311, Granting a Pardon to Richard Nixon, Ford Presidential Library (Sept. 8, 1974); Statement by Former President Richard Nixon 1, Ford Presidential Library (Sept. 8, 1974). Before leaving office, President Bill Clinton agreed to a five-year suspension of his law license and a $25,000 fine in exchange for Independent Counsel Robert Ray’s agreement not to file criminal charges against him. [p.33]

….

Instead of inhibiting the President’s lawful discretionary action, the prospect of federal criminal liability might serve as a structural benefit to deter possible abuses of power and criminal behavior. [p.34]

….

Weighing these factors, we conclude that the risk that former Presidents will be unduly harassed by meritless federal criminal prosecutions appears slight. [p.35]

….

There is also a profound Article II interest in the enforcement of federal criminal laws. The President has a constitutionally mandated duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. As part of this duty, the President is responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal violations. [p.36]

….

We cannot accept former President Trump’s claim that a President has unbounded authority to commit crimes that would neutralize the most fundamental check on executive power — the recognition and implementation of election results. Nor can we sanction his apparent contention that the Executive has carte blanche to violate the rights of individual citizens to vote and to have their votes count. * * * At bottom, former President Trump’s stance would collapse our system of separated powers by placing the President beyond the reach of all three Branches. Presidential immunity against federal indictment would mean that, as to the President, the Congress could not legislate, the Executive could not prosecute and the Judiciary could not review. We cannot accept that the office of the Presidency places its former occupants above the law for all time thereafter. Careful evaluation of these concerns leads us to conclude that there is no functional justification for immunizing former Presidents from federal prosecution in general or for immunizing former President Trump from the specific charges in the Indictment. In so holding, we act, “not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance.” See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754. [ps.40-41]

….

We have balanced former President Trump’s asserted interests in executive immunity against the vital public interests that favor allowing this prosecution to proceed. We conclude that “[c]oncerns of public policy, especially as illuminated by our history and the structure of our government” compel the rejection of his claim of immunity in this case. See Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 747–48. We also have considered his contention that he is entitled to categorical immunity from criminal liability for any assertedly “official” action that he took as President — a contention that is unsupported by precedent, history or the text and structure of the Constitution. Finally, we are unpersuaded by his argument that this prosecution is barred by “double jeopardy principles.” Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.16 [p.57]

….

On 28 February 2024, the US Supreme Court agreed to hear argument on the appeal filed by Donald Trump from this decision in the week of 22 April 2024.

On 13 March 2024 the High Court handed down the decision of Redland City Council v John Michael Kozik & Ors [2024] HCA 7. 

The plurality of Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ – Gageler CJ and Jagot J dissenting – dismissed the appeal. 

The claim was a class action by the plaintiff ratepayers levied by the defendant local authority with and paid invalidly raised special charges.  The plurality found against the appellant authority in respect of the respondent ratepayers’ claim in restitution at common law.

The plurality said (at [179] – [181]):

Unjust enrichment

179. In Australian common law, unjust enrichment has a “taxonomical function referring to categories of cases in which the law allows recovery by one person of a benefit retained by another”.[170] During the historical period in which cases were pleaded by forms of action, these categories of case were forced, by the use of fictions, into forms (rather than causes) of action, including counts of money had and received, quantum meruit and quantum valebat.[171] Today, as causes of action, the categories include unjustified payments of money or performance of services that benefit another in circumstances where the benefit was the result of mistake, undue influence, duress, or an absence or failure of consideration.[172] Since unjust enrichment expresses only the conclusion that follows the exposed process of reasoning within these categories of case, it has repeatedly been said in this Court that “unjust enrichment” is not a premise that is capable of direct application.[173]
180. At a high level of generality it can sometimes assist when considering the boundaries of a particular category of case to structure a common law enquiry into whether a defendant has been unjustly enriched by asking what benefit a defendant has received, whether the benefit is at the plaintiff’s expense, whether the circumstances render the provision of that benefit unjust, and whether any defences apply.[174] But these well-known concepts such as “benefit” or “unjust” are not to be applied in the abstract, divorced from the rules that have been developed in particular categories of case.[175] In this category of case, the relevant benefit is the receipt of money by the Council and the “injustice” arises because the payments by the respondents and other group members were made by mistake of law and without obligation to do so. Those matters were not controversial in this Court.
181. The issue that arises consequent upon the respondents’ prima facie claim at common law is whether the Council has a defence of good consideration based on the Council’s performance of the relevant works. In short, the Council submits that it can resist restitution because: (i) the “consideration” or basis for its receipt of the payment was that it confer a corresponding benefit upon the respondents and group members, and (ii) that it did so. As will be seen, both submissions are wrong. It is convenient to begin with the concept of “benefit” and the concept of “consideration” in the context of failure of consideration as a ground for a prima facie claim for restitution of unjust enrichment before considering “good consideration” as a defence to restitution.

As to the Council’s defence of good consideration, the plurality said (at [204] – [212]):

204. There are three independent reasons why the Council’s defence of good consideration must fail. First, restitution of the special charges by the Council would not cause any failure of the basis upon which the relevant works were performed by the Council. Secondly, the particular individual respondents and other group members did not benefit from the relevant works in the sense in which the concept of benefit operates in the law of unjust enrichment. Thirdly, to recognise a defence of good consideration based on a benefit to the respondents would stultify the operation of the Local Government Act.(1) No failure of the basis for the relevant works

205. The Council’s defence does not satisfy the requirement for the defence of good consideration that restitution of the special charges must cause the basis of the Council’s performance of the relevant works to fail. At certain points in the submissions of the Council and the State of Queensland this requirement was accepted, and described as being a requirement that the relevant works were “correlate[d]” with or provided “in exchange for” the payment.
206. The Council’s performance of the relevant works was not done objectively on the basis that the works would be funded by the special charges because, as explained in the background section above, it was admitted at trial that the Council was obliged by statute to perform the relevant works. The Council’s obligation to perform the works was independent of the levying or receipt of special charges. On this appeal, the Council ultimately accepted that this admission had been made at trial and did not seek to re-open the admission. Indeed, as also explained above, for each of the Aquatic Paradise works, Sovereign Waters works and Raby Bay works the special charges had only been used to defray, respectively 66 per cent, 78 per cent, and 26 per cent of the cost.
207. At one point in oral submissions, the Council appeared to deny any requirement for the defence of good consideration that the performance by the Council was in “exchange” for, or on the basis of, the payment of the special charges. The acceptance of that submission would require recognition of a different defence, or an adaptation of the defence of good consideration by reference to a broad notion of counter-restitution. However, even if the requirement were not one of exchange but were more broadly one of sufficiently close connection,[237] it was common ground that the defence would still require that the respondents or group members obtained a benefit in the sense recognised by the common law. They did not.(2) No benefit to the respondents or group members

208. It may be accepted, consistently with the primary judge’s unchallenged finding, that the respondents and other group members, or their land, “specially benefit[ed]” from the relevant works within the meaning of that phrase in the Local Government Act. But the relevant works did not benefit the respondents or other group members in the sense in which benefit must be established to satisfy a defence of good consideration. As explained above, it is usually sufficient for a benefit that a person merely performed non-gratuitous services that the other party had requested, or for which the other party freely accepted a liability to pay.[238] Conversely, it is not generally a benefit to receive a service that is not requested and is not freely accepted with an opportunity to reject.[239] As Pollock CB said in argument in Taylor v Laird,[240] “One cleans another’s shoes; what can the other do but put them on? … The benefit of the service could not be rejected without refusing the property itself.”
209. Perhaps due to the absence of any request for, or free acceptance of, a liability to pay for the relevant works by the respondents, the Council submitted that the benefit to the respondents and other group members was not the value of the service but was, effectively, a net accretion to the wealth of the respondents and group members by an asserted increase in the value of their land by one to two per cent. Apart from the problem that this misunderstands the relevant meaning of benefit, the Council’s submission is factually inaccurate. As explained in the background section of these reasons, the relevant works were performed on public land. The evidence was that any incidental benefit for the land of the respondents and group members was not an increase in the value of that land but an avoidance of a diminution in value on the basis that no work was carried out. Even then, the enhancement was not uniform and the evidence was that objectively quantifying the enhancement was not possible for any individual respondent or group member. Even assessed by reference to the colloquial, and incorrect, meaning of “benefit” as a net accretion to the wealth of a recipient, no individual respondent or group member was shown to have benefited.
210. Furthermore, the Council could not justify the law of unjust enrichment treating as a benefit an increase in the value of an owner’s land and dwelling, in circumstances in which the owner has no intention to sell the land or to use it in order to obtain a loan. It was not suggested, for example, that the Council should be limited to a lien over the land of each respondent or group member, realisable only upon sale of the land.[241](3) A defence of good consideration would stultify the operation of the Regulations

211. The final reason that the Council has no defence of good consideration is that the application of such a defence would stultify the operation of the Regulations, just as the joint judgment and Brennan J in David Securities considered that allowing the bank a defence of good consideration would stultify the purpose of the statutory provision that rendered void any contractual obligation that required a borrower to pay withholding tax.[242]
212. The Resolutions to levy the special charges were invalidbecause the Resolutions did not comply with the requirement in the Regulations to identify an overall plan which stated the estimated cost of carrying out, and the estimated time for carrying out, the overall plan. As the respondents submitted, the purpose of these cost and time safeguards in a plan is to ensure that care is taken by a local council before incurring substantial costs that will ultimately be borne by a section of the community. In the course of allowing a claim for restitution in Kiriri Cotton Co Ltd v Dewani,[243] a case to which the joint judgment referred on this point in David Securities,[244] the Privy Council said that “[t]he duty of observing the law is firmly placed … on the shoulders of the landlord for the protection of the tenant”.[245] So too, in this case, the duty of compliance with the Regulations in respect of the cost and time safeguards in a plan is firmly placed on the shoulders of the Council for the protection of those members of the community within its area of government. The common law defence of good consideration, if it applied here as a defence to restitution of the payments, would need to be excluded to avoid undermining the purpose of the Regulations.

[170] Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498 at 516 [30].

[171] Bullen and Leake, Precedents of Pleadings in Personal Actions in the Superior Courts of Common Law, 3rd ed(1868) at 35-37, 44-50. See Baker, “The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law”, in Cornish et al (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future (1998) 37 at 37-56.

[172] See Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [1988] HCA 17; (1988) 164 CLR 662 at 673; David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1992] HCA 48; (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 374, 379; Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at 156 [150]-[151]; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498 at 516 [30].

[173] Friend v Brooker [2009] HCA 21; (2009) 239 CLR 129 at 141 [7]; Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd [2009] HCA 44; (2009) 239 CLR 269 at 299 [85]; Australian Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd [2014] HCA 14; (2014) 253 CLR 560 at 579 [20], 618 [139].

[174] Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] HCA 32; (2019) 267 CLR 560 at 648-650 [212]– [213]. See also Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498 at 516 [30].

[175] Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul [1987] HCA 5; (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 256-257; Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] HCA 32; (2019) 267 CLR 560 at 598 [81]. See also at 648-649 [212].

[237] See School Facility Management Ltd v Governing Body of Christ the King College [2021] EWCA Civ 1053; [2021] 1 WLR 6129 at 6163 [83].

[238] Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police v Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1449; [2009] 1 WLR 1580 at 1597 [47].

[239] Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (In liq) [2008] HCA 27; (2008) 232 CLR 635 at 663 [80], quoting Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co [1886] UKLawRpCh 230; (1886) 34 Ch D 234 at 248; Stewart v Atco Controls Pty Ltd (In liq) [2014] HCA 15; (2014) 252 CLR 307 at 326-327 [47]– [48]. See also Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 498 at 542 [106].

[240] [1856] EngR 648; (1856) 25 LJ Ex 329 at 332.

[241] Mitchell, Mitchell and Watterson (eds), Goff & Jones on Unjust Enrichment, 10th ed (2022) at 97-98 [4-39]; Cooney, “Restitution for Unrequested Improvements to Land” (2023) 139 Law Quarterly Review 179 at 183.

[242] [1992] HCA 48; (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 384, 400.

[243] [1960] AC 192.

[244] [1992] HCA 48; (1992) 175 CLR 353 at 384.

The link to the full decision is here.

The lead singer of The Pogues – British born Shane MacGowan – died on 30 November 2023, aged 65, in Dublin, Ireland.

Without descending into the ups and downs of an eventful and turbulent life, MacGowan said in a 2020 interview that he has also been in drunk tanks on Christmas eve.

The classic – Fairytale Of New York – first released in 1987 – took the band over 2 years to write and was performed with Kirsty MacColl.

‘American Songwriter’ reports that Elvis Costello first suggested MacGowan write a Christmas duet that he could sing with The Pogues’ then-bassist Cait O’Riordan – who later married Costello.  

MacGowan said the lyrics and imagery in “Fairytale Of New York” initially came to him in a state of delirium during a bout with double pneumonia and that he named the song after a 1973 novel, ‘Fairytale of New York’ by Irish-American author J.P. Donleavy.

The lyrics might be seen as a reflection of MacGowan’s rollercoaster life.

As to the ups:  

[Verse 4: Kirsty MacColl & Shane MacGowan & Together]

You were handsome, you were pretty, queen of New York CityWhen the band finished playing, they howled out for moreSinatra was swinging, all the drunks, they were singingWe kissed on a corner, then danced through the night

[Chorus: Shane Macgowan & Kirsty MacColl]

The boys of the NYPD choir were singing, “Galway Bay”And the bells were ringing out for Christmas Day

The Official Video

The link below is from the 2006 La Scala production by Zeffirelli.

Wikipedia describes Act 2, Scene 2 as follows:

The grand gate of the city of Thebes

Radamès returns victorious and the troops march into the city (Chorus, Ramfis: “Gloria all’Egitto, ad Iside” / Glory to Egypt, [and] to Isis!).

The Egyptian king decrees that on this day the triumphant Radamès may have anything he wishes. The Ethiopian captives are led onstage in chains, Amonasro among them. Aida immediately rushes to her father, who whispers to her to conceal his true identity as King of Ethiopia from the Egyptians. Amonasro deceptively proclaims to the Egyptians that the Ethiopian king (referring to himself) has been slain in battle. Aida, Amonasro, and the captured Ethiopians plead with the Egyptian King for mercy, but Ramfis and the Egyptian priests call for their death (Aida, Amneris, Radamès, The King, Amonasro, chorus: “Che veggo! .. Egli? .. Mio padre! .. Anch’io pugnai .. Struggi, o Re, queste ciurme feroci” / What do I see?.. Is it he? My father? .. Destroy, O King, these ferocious creatures).

Claiming the reward promised by the King of Egypt, Radamès pleads with him to spare the lives of the prisoners and to set them free. The King grants Radamès’ wish, and declares that he (Radamès) will be his (the King’s) successor and will marry the King’s daughter (Amneris). (Aida, Amneris, Radamès, Ramfis, The King, Amonasro, chorus: “O Re: pei sacri Numi! .. Gloria all’Egitto” / O King, by the sacred gods … Glory to Egypt!). At Ramfis’ suggestion to the King, Aida and Amonasro remain as hostages to ensure that the Ethiopians do not avenge their defeat.

This is truly spell bounding and uplifting.

Opera Australia is presently performing Aida at the Lyric Theatre, QPAC, Brisbane until 20 December 2023.

For more information and to book click here.

Here is Status Quo playing ‘Rockin’ All Over The World’ live as the opening song of the opening set of Live Aid on 13 July 1985 – the worldwide concert as organised by Sir Bob Geldof and Midge Ure that raised some £150m for victims of famine in Ethiopia.

This is at Wembley Stadium in London with 72,000 people. A concert was then held that day at John F. Kennedy Stadium in Philadelphia where 90,000 people attended. Wikipedia says: ‘On the same day, concerts inspired by the initiative were held in other countries, such as the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, Yugoslavia, Austria, Australia, and West Germany. It was one of the largest satellite link-ups and television broadcasts of all time; an estimated audience of 1.9 billion, in 150 nations, watched the live broadcast, nearly 40 percent of the world population.’

The line ups were seriously star-studded, including Elton John, Queen, Madonna, Santana, Run DMC, Sade, Sting, Bryan Adams, the Beach Boys, Mick Jagger, David Bowie, Duran Duran, U2, the Who, Tom Petty, Neil Young and Eric Clapton. Francis Rossi lead singer and guitarist of Status Quo later sad “Bob told me, ‘It doesn’t matter a fuck what you sound like, just so long as you’re there.”

This a reminder of times when countries around the world made a true effort to work together for the common good.

Wikipedia says:

“exile” (stylized in all lowercase) is a song by American singer-songwriter Taylor Swift, featuring American band Bon Iver. It is the fourth track on Swift’s eighth studio album, Folklore, which was released on July 24, 2020. “exile” was written by Swift, Joe Alwyn (under the pseudonym William Bowery), and the band’s frontman Justin Vernon, with production by Aaron Dessner and Alwyn. Republic Records sent “exile” to US alternative radio stations on August 3, 2020.

Depicting an imaginary narrative of two estranged lovers having an unspoken dialogue, “exile” is a minimal, but cinematic, indie-folk ballad with gospel, orchestral and chamber pop elements, combining Swift’s honeyed vocals and Vernon’s deep baritone into a melancholic duet propelled by a plodding piano, swirling strings, and soaring harmonies. Upon release, “exile” garnered widespread critical acclaim, with emphasis on the duo’s vocal chemistry, the agonizing lyricism, rich instrumentals and bleak atmosphere. Music critics picked it as a standout on Folklore and named it one of Swift’s best collaborations to-date, comparing it to her 2012 single “Safe & Sound“. Several publications listed “exile” as one of the best songs of 2020.

Wikipedia includes the following in reviews:

The song received widespread critical acclaim upon release. E! Online‘s Billy Nilles described “exile” as a “devastating dream” that “hits like a punch to the gut”. Praising the song’s passion and conversational lyricism, Clash writer Valerie Magan called the song a “scintillating” duet and “a wintry, tortured monster of a song” that best showcases the “sonic beauty” of Folklore. Writing for Consequence of Sound, Matt Melis named “exile” the Song of the Week upon the album’s release, and called the duo’s pairing a “minor miracle in 2020”. Reviewing for the same publication, Katie Moulton stated that “exile” portrays a “dissolving” romance with two voices in counterpoint, and remarked the lyrics as “clever but restrained” with maturity, observing the song’s emotions to be “not only high-pitched” but possessing “complex, shifting depths”.                     

The performance below was produced during Covid, as was the album Folklore, and hence the ‘minor miracle’ reference above; it is:

Integrity of Evidence – Annotations to rules 68 – 74 of the Barristers’ Conduct Rules

Rule 68 – 74 of the Bar Association of Queensland – Barristers’ Conduct Rules relate to the integrity of evidence.  These include such matters as the prohibition as against coaching: r.68(b), a witness can however be questioned and tested in conference: r.69, unless as provided for in r.71 (such as relating to undertakings to the court), a prohibition of conferring with more than one lay witness at a time: r.70,  unless as expressly provided for (such as the prior consent of the opponent), a barrister must not confer with a witness while that witness remains in cross examination: r.72, unless as provided for in r.74 – not to prevent or discourage a witness from conferring with an opponent: r.73. The knowledge, understanding and compliance with these rules is critical in the practice of a barrister.  To assist, below are some annotations with respect to rules 68 and 70.

Rule 68 provides:

A barrister must not:

a. advise or suggest to a witness that false or misleading evidence should be given nor condone another person doing so; or

b. coach a witness by advising what answers the witness should give to questions which might be asked.

1. Overriding guidance with respect to dealing with witnesses is provide by rule 25 – the barrister’s overriding duty is to the Court and the administration of justice, and rule 26 – a barrister must not knowingly mislead the Court on any matter.
2. The text ‘Professional Responsibility and Legal Ethics in Queensland’ says with respect to r.68 BCR:[1]

The proscription extends to both giving a positive indication as to what evidence should be given and to a negative suggestion as to the undesirability of giving certain evidence, as well as to the advantages of selective forgetfulness. 

That is not to say that a barrister should not prepare witnesses by, for example, simulating the giving of evidence or cross-examination.  Such practices allow lay witnesses to become used to the forensic environment and enhance their ability to give evidence in a way which assists the court.  Although examining the question in the civil context, Ipp J considered that there was “nothing improper in preparing witnesses this way.  It is indeed desirable for lawyers to prepare witnesses, particularly those who give lengthy or complex evidence, for trial.”[2]

Indeed, a barrister would be derelict in his or her duty to the client if they failed to take advantage of the opportunity to gauge how a witness will respond in court, and to identify aspects of the evidence which require clarification. 

3. The concept of coaching a witness is clear enough. In an 1880 New York disciplinary case of In re Eldridge[3] the judge said:

[The lawyer’s] duty is to extract the facts from the witness, not to pour them into him; to learn what the witness does know, not to teach him what he ought to know.

4. When considering the permitted professional boundaries involved in lawyers conferencing with any witness, Young J (as his Honour then was) said In Re Equiticorp Finance Ltd; Ex parte Brock:[4]

It is clear that a witness might confer with his or her solicitor or counsel, or the solicitor or counsel for the party calling the witness, and that during such conference the solicitor or counsel concerned may give the witness advice.  That advice may certainly include:

(1)    advice that the witness should refresh his or her memory from contemporaneous documents; 

(2)    directing the witness’ mind to the point about which questions may be asked; 

(3)    giving the witness a sketch of court procedure; 

(4)     directing the witness’ attention to points in his or her evidence which appear to be contradictory or fantastic; 

(5)    reminding the witness to bring to court all relevant documents; 

(6)    advising the witness as to the manner of answering questions (for example, ‘In cross-examination listen to the question, just answer the question asked with as concise an answer as possible’); and 

(7)    giving advice as to appropriate dress and grooming.

There may be other permitted areas.

5. In the text ‘Cross on Evidence’, Heydon says on the role of the legal practitioner and the preparation of expert reports:[5]

…. It is legitimate for legal practitioners to identify the real issues for the expert, to indicate when the report fails to direct itself to the real issues, to point out obscurities and gaps in the reasoning, to indicate that the report fails to distinguish between the assumed facts and the opinion which is supposed to be based on them, and to indicate that the report does not explain how the opinion is substantially based on the expert’s specialised knowledge.[6] …

6. The learned author of the text ‘Expert Evidence’[7] refers to the comments of McDougall J in Thiess Pty Ltd v Dobbins Contracting Pty Ltd:[8]

21. Lawyers must play an active, and important, part in the preparation of statements of expert evidence. First of all, the lawyers for a party who proposes to rely on expert evidence must inform the expert of the assumed facts on which his or her opinion is to be based. To enable the opinion to have any value, the statement of assumed facts (and of course, those facts include documents) must be comprehensive.
22. Next, the lawyers should do what they can to ensure that the expert expresses his or her opinions in a way that demonstrates clearly the application of specialised knowledge to those assumed facts and the reasoning process that leads to the opinions expressed. Of course, it is a matter for the expert, and only the expert, to formulate those opinions, and to employ an appropriate reasoning process in doing so. However, if the expert’s statement of evidence is to be of any real utility, the lawyers who have retained the expert must do what they can to ensure that the reasoning process is adequately displayed. In this case, the lawyers for both the plaintiffs and Mr Bate appeared to be either ignorant of, or uncaring as to, their responsibilities in this regard.

7. Coaching was also considered by Martin CJ in Majinski v State of Western Australia:[9]

Questioning of the witness moves beyond “proofing” to impermissible “coaching” when the witness’ true recollection of events is supplanted by another version suggested by the interviewer or other party, whether by repetitive reading of a statement to the point where their testimony is mere regurgitation or by otherwise influencing the witness…  A solicitor or counsel should not advise a witness as to how to answer a question… By way of example, in Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd the defendant’s solicitors prepared an extensive document for the defendant outlining “possible areas of questioning (to be passed onto the prospective witnesses)” and included suggestions as to appropriate responses which would be in line with the defendant’s case. This conduct, alongside the holding of a pre-trial conference by the practitioner in which multiple witnesses jointly discussed evidence to be given at trial, was held to seriously undermine the trial and “tainted” the defendant’s case.

8. Dal Pont says in his text ‘Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility’:[10]

The lawyer’s professional responsibility to a client dictates that he or she should prepare witnesses (including the client) for the type and manner of questioning, and not put a witness on the stand without knowing in advance how he or she will respond to vital questions.[11]  The level of preparation is influenced by the experience of the witness.[12]  Witness preparation of this kind can serve the efficient administration of justice and save time.[13]

9. The involvement of legal representatives in the preparation of expert reports was considered by Callinan J in Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd, when his Honour said:[14]

… I do not doubt that counsel and solicitors have a proper role to perform in advising or suggesting, not only which legal principles apply, but also that a different form of expression might appropriately or more accurately state the propositions that the expert would advance, and which particular method of valuation might be more likely to appeal to a tribunal or court, so long as no attempt is made to invite the expert to distort or misstate facts or give other than honest opinions. …

10. Dalton J helpfully discussed the assistance that legal representatives can usefully provide in the process of the preparation of expert reports In Landel Pty v Ltd & Anor v Insurance Australia Limited [2021] QSC 247, when her Honour said:[15]

[19] First, while lawyers must not coach expert witnesses, or influence the substance of an expert report so that it favours their client, it is permissible, and usually desirable, that lawyers do become involved in the editing of expert reports so that they present material in a way which is accessible and comprehensible, and do not contain irrelevant material.  Draft expert reports are disclosable so that the effect of any such input will be obvious to the other parties to the litigation – see r 212(2) and Mitchell Contractors Pty Ltd v Townsville-Thuringowa Water Supply Joint Board.

[20] In this case, Dr Macintosh’s reports are prolix and disorganised. There ought to have been conferences between Dr Macintosh and the plaintiffs’ lawyers before they were filed to see what could be done to improve these types of problems.  Conferences like this are a proper, necessary part of preparing a case.  In a proceeding like this I would expect that attention to have come from both the solicitors and counsel briefed in the matter.

[21] Any disciplined and structured conferences with Dr Macintosh would have revealed that there were faults in his opinions which went beyond matters of expression and presentation.  They would have revealed significant contradictions, errors and gaps in reasoning in his reports.  It is permissible for matters of substance like this to be drawn to an expert’s attention in conference with lawyers, and remedied if the expert is able and willing to do so.  Again, coaching is not permitted, and drafts will be disclosable. 

[22] The course of this proceeding shows the importance of attention to the reports of experts by the lawyers running the case, not just to achieve a comprehensible and rational expert opinion for use at the trial, but to evaluate the strength of the case sought to be advanced by the litigant.  In this case, had early attention been paid to what reasoned opinion Dr Macintosh could give, the plaintiffs’ lawyers would have understood the weaknesses in their expert case at a stage of the litigation when there might still have been alternatives open to them.  Instead, it appears that the only effort the plaintiffs’ lawyers made to come to terms with Dr Macintosh’s opinions was immediately prior to trial, by which time any such avenues were very limited. …

Rule 70 provides:

A barrister must not confer with, or condone another legal practitioner conferring with, more than one lay witness including a party or client at the same time:

a. about any issue which there are reasonable grounds for the barrister to believe may be contentious at a hearing, and

b. where such conferral could affect evidence to be given by any of those witnesses,

unless the barrister believes on reasonable grounds that special circumstances require such a conference.

11. In Landel, Dalton J also said with respect to the necessity to confer with witnesses separately:[16]

…. However, I am critical of the defendant’s lawyers for meeting with both experts together.  Lay witnesses should never discuss their evidence with each other.  Experts see each other’s reports before trial, and sometimes there are Court-ordered conferences between expert witnesses.  Here, where the plan apparently was to present two independent views to the Court, meeting with both experts together, particularly before they had committed their views to writing, obviously had the potential to compromise that independence.  

12. In Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd Sheller JA observed:[17]

It has long been regarded as proper practice for legal practitioners to take proofs of evidence from law witnesses separately and to encourage such witnesses not to discuss their evidence with others and particularly with other witnesses. … In the present case, it is hard to see that the intention of the teleconference with witnesses discussing amongst themselves the evidence that they would give was for any reason other than to ensure, so far as possible, that in giving evidence the defendant’s witnesses would all speak with one voice about the events that occurred. Thus, the evidence of one about a particular matter which was in fact true might be overborne by what that witness heard several others say which, as it happened, was not true. This seriously undermines the process by which evidence is taken. What was done was improper.

[1] By Corones, Stobbs and Thomas, 2nd ed, 2014, says at para [12.60], pages 457 – 458.

[2] Justice D A Ipp, “Reforms to the Adversarial System in Civil Litigation – Part II” (1995) 69 Australian Law Journal790 at 799. 

[3] In re Eldridge, 37 N.Y. 161, 171 (N.Y. 1880), cited at fn., 4 in Wydick R. C. ‘The Ethics of Witness Coaching’ Cardozo Law Review (1995) 1, 17, 1.

[4] (1992) 27 NSWLR 391 per Young J at 395. These comments of Young J were referred in the article by Declan Kelly SC (now Justice Kelly) and Dan Butler, “Ethical Considerations in Dealing with Experts”, BAQ Seminar 1 December 2010 and ‘Hearsay’ dated 24 February 2011. This paper also considered the Australian and UK positions with respect to the permissible limits of the involvement of lawyers in the preparation of expert reports, as did the paper by Blake SC and Gray in ‘Can Counsel Settle Reports’ (2013) 119 Precedent 16 – 20.

[5] 11th ed, 2017, paragraph [29080], page 1118.

[6] See Phosphate Co-operative Co of Australia Ltd v Shears (No 3) (Pivot case) [1989] VR 665 at 680; Vernon v Bosley (No 2) [1999] QB 18 at 56-60; FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33 at [16] and [19]-[21]; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1 at [227]-[231] R v Doogan (2005) 158 ACTR 1 at [119] …

[7] By Ian Freckleton QC, 6th ed, 2019, paragraph [5.10.360], page 316.

[8] [2016] NSWSC 265 (17 March 2016) at [21] – [22].

[9] [2013] WASCA 10 at [32].

[10] 7th ed, Law Book Co 2021, paragraph [17.165], page 602.

[11] R v Chapman (1958) 26 WWR 385 at 393 per O’Halloran JA.

[12] R v Noble (2000) 117 A Crim R 541 at [19] per Pinucs JA.

[13] See Applegate, “Witness Preparation” (1989) 68 Tex L Rev 277.  It has been noted, to this end, that witness preparation is in line with the rules noted at [17.250], which require limiting evidence to issues genuinely in dispute and taking up as little as possible of the court’s time: Legg, “Preparing Witnesses Effectively” (2003) 41 (Dec) LSJ 60.

[14] [1999] HCA 64 at [279]; 74 ALJR 209; 167 ALR 575 (9 December 1999)

[15] At [19] – [22].

[16] At [26].

[17] Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd (2005) 62 NSWLR 731 at [30].