Counsel Sanctioned for Intimidatory Conduct to Opposing Client and Misrepresenting His Status
In Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Loukas [2025] NSWCATOD 39 (17 April 2025), the Judicial Deputy President, and two members of the NSW Tribunal imposed sanctions on a practising barrister in respect of his rude and intimidating conduct towards an opposing client and that client’s representative, and also for misrepresenting his status in acting for a client. The case constitutes an example of what a barrister ought not do in the course of attempting to assist a family friend. The Tribunal wrote:
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Instrument of Consent
[10] On 7 February 2025 the parties filed an Instrument of Consent and an Agreed Statement of Facts under s 144 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (NSW) (Application Act). It is convenient to set out the Instrument of Consent in full (subject to the confidentiality orders):
INSTRUMENT OF CONSENT
CONSENT
The NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal, having found that the conduct of the respondent particularised in the Agreed Statement of Facts below amounts:
(a) in respect of Ground One, to professional misconduct; and
(b) in respect of Ground Two, to unsatisfactory professional conduct
makes by consent, orders that the respondent:
1. be reprimanded;
2. pay a fine to the Applicant of $5,000;
3. undertake, complete and pass any reasonable educative course that the applicant requires him to undertake being the following courses (or any other course as agreed by the Applicant) within 12 months from the date the orders are made:
a. NSW Bar Association CPD seminar entitled ‘Mastering Direct Access: Navigating Pitfalls and Best Practices’;
b. Law Society of NSW seminar entitled ‘Deepening your knowledge of Domestic and Family Violence: Mastering a trauma informed approach to practice’; and
c. In Good Faith Foundation CPD seminar entitled ‘Trauma informed Legal Education’.
4. provide a statutory declaration to the applicant within 1 month of completing the educative courses referred to above to confirm that he has completed the learning and to describe what he has learnt within those courses;
5. agrees to pay the applicant’s costs and disbursements incurred to date on the indemnity basis,
and further makes orders by consent that Grounds 3 and 4 in the Application filed 8 August 2023 be discontinued.
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS
INTRODUCTION
1. At all material times the respondent was a lawyer within the meaning of s 261 of the Uniform Law and an Australia legal practitioner within the meaning of s 6 of the Uniform Law.
(a) The respondent was admitted as a Lawyer of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on or about 10 October 1997 under the name of ‘William Vasilios Loukas’.
(b) The respondent was first issued with a practising certificate from the applicant on 5 May 2010 under the name of ‘William Vasilios Loukas’.
(c) From the 2011/2012 practising year, the respondent’s practising certificate has been issued in the name of ‘Bill Loukas’.
(d) Restrictions were placed on the respondent’s practising certificate for the 2020/2021 practising year requiring him to comply with all outstanding Continuing Professional Development requirements for the 2019/2020 practising year by 9 October 2020.
(e) The conditions were removed on 26 October 2020 and the respondent has held a practising certificate without restrictions since that time.
(f) The respondent currently holds a practising certificate as a barrister.
2. On 2 October 2019 [Person A] made a complaint to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (OLSC) about the respondent. The complaint was referred to the Council of the New South Wales Bar Association on 20 October 2019.
3. [Person A] died of a toxic drug overdose on 2 April 2020.
4. The OLSC communicated to the applicant on 11 May 2020 that it was appropriate that [Person B] and [Person A’s father] (together, [Person A]’s parents) take the place of [Person A] as the complainants.
5. At its meeting on 1 September 2022, the applicant resolved to make three further complaints about the respondent.
6. At its meeting on 9 February 2023 the applicant considered the 4 grounds of complaint made against the respondent. At the same meeting, the applicant resolved that all 4 of the grounds of complaint be the subject of proceedings before the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal pursuant to s 300 of the Uniform Law.
COMPLAINT
7.On or about 25 August 2019 [Person A] separated from her husband, [the Client]. She left him a 3-page handwritten letter outlining that she feared him and asserting that she had been controlled by him for a number of years. The letter outlined a coercive and controlling relationship. The letter contained a plea to be left alone by [the Client] and for him to not make any personal contact with her.
8.At that time, [Person A] left [regional New South Wales] (where she lived with [the Client]) to live with her parents in [another state].
9.On 30 August 2019 there was email correspondence between [the Client] and [Person B] proposing a division of the parties’ assets. In the email sent at 12.51pm, [Person B] stated:
Note that all communications from this email are under instruction from [Person A] and there is no alternative communication method for you
10. [The Client] sent an email to [Person B] at 1pm on the same day that stated:
I refuse to have any communication with you, [Person B], about any of this. You are not a party of this marriage. Anything further will come from my lawyer.
11. [Person B] sent a further email to [the Client] at 1.17pm on the same day:
No problem [the Client],
Please pass on my contact details to them as a means by which to contact [Person A]. None of her old contact details are current and will not work in communicating with her.
12. The respondent is [a relative] of [the Client]. The respondent was introduced to [Person A] about 5 years prior to their wedding. On or about 25 August 2019 [the Client] approached the respondent to assist him in relation to the separation and the communications he had received from [Person B]. He was provided with the hand-written three page letter from [Person A] dated 25 August 2019 and the above mentioned emails from [Person B].
13. On 31 August 2019 the respondent sent an email at 11.33am from his chambers’ email address, Bill Loukas, Barrister at law, Sir James Martin Chambers. The email attached a letter on the respondent’s letterhead. The letter stated, “I act for [the Client], (Hereafter ‘my client’) on a direct access basis”.
GROUND ONE — The respondent engaged in professional misconduct by acting unprofessionally, rudely and in an intimidating manner towards [Person A] and [Person B] in his written correspondence.
AGREED FACTS OF GROUND ONE
14. On 4 September 2019 the respondent sent an email at 1:09pm from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B]. The email was entitled “REQUIREMENT of CONFRIMATION (SIC) OF [Person A’s] WELL-BEING”. The email stated:
• “[The Client] and I (and the entire Loukas and [the Client’s] families) are extremely concerned for Person A’s well-being”;
• “The bizarre contents of the letter to [the Client], purportedly written by [Person A]”;
• “[Your] directive to control all contact with her, especially in light of her frequently expressed opinion to [the Client] and many others, that her relationship with yourself is fraught with conflict and detrimental to her mental health…”;
• “We regret that we cannot exclude the reasonable possibility that [Person A] is being controlled by you, has undergone some form of florid psychiatric episode or is otherwise unwell”;
• “[Person A] is an adult and adults should be capable of accounting for their actions…It is time for [Person A] to step up and be an adult”;
• “[She] was old enough to decide to marry, to sign a marriage certificate, sign mortgage documents etc, and she is old enough to end all of those relationships on her own too”; and
• As a matter of common decency I ask that you exercise whatever influence you have over [Person A] and have her FaceTime call him in order that he can be assured that she is well and that her decision is her own.
15. On 5 September 2019 the respondent sent an email at 11:44am from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B] entitled “MOVING FORWARD”. In the email, he stated:
[The Client’s] position is that nothing will happen, no decision will be made, no negotiation or agreement unless it is made between [Person A] and [the Client] speaking and corresponding with each other”.
[Person A] has his number and she needs to talk to him either by video chat or in person and he needs to talk to her.
Until that communication and resolution occurs between them, there will be no change in [Person A’s] obligation to pay the rent, utilities, mortgage, or rates.
16. On 5 September 2019 the respondent sent an email at 1:23pm from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B]. The email was entitled “MOVING FORWARD”. In the email, the respondent stated that “for [Person A] to refuse to talk to [the Client] is cowardice and cruelty, plain and simple”.
17. On 14 September 2019 the respondent sent an email at 1:56pm from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [the Client], copying in [Person B]. The email to [the Client] stated that he was “perfectly entitled to correspond with your wife and I encourage you to do so, in order to ensure that [Person A] is safe and not being further psychologically harmed by [Person B]”.
18. The email also provided legal advice, in relation to defending an AVO application and seeking legal costs against [Person A].
19. On 14 September 2019 the respondent sent an email at 2:05pm from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B] forwarding an email dated 14 September 2019 from the respondent to the Client, copied to Person B. The email was entitled “HI [Person A]” and included the email advice to the Client (referred to above) sent on 14 September 2019 at 1:56pm.
20. On 7 October 2019 the respondent sent an email at 8:26pm from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person A] and [Person B] entitled “ACTION REQUIRED BY YOU TO PREVENT INSTIGATION OF DEFAMATION PROCEEDINGS”. The email attached a letter on the respondent’s letter head threatening to commence legal proceedings for defamation against [Person A].
21. The respondent’s written correspondence in the email dated 5 September 2019 at 1.23pm was unprofessional and inappropriate and amounted to professional misconduct. The respondent’s conduct in sending the letter amounted to a failure to maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence.
22. The respondent’s written correspondence in the email dated 14 September 2019 at 1:56pm, was unprofessional, inappropriate and amounted to professional misconduct. The respondent’s conduct in sending the letter amounted to a substantial failure to maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence.
23. The respondent’s written correspondence in the letter dated 7 October 2019 to [Person A] and [Person B] was unprofessional and amounted to professional misconduct. The respondent’s conduct in sending the letter amounted to a substantial failure to maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence.
24. On numerous occasions in his Affidavit sworn 13 December 2023 the respondent concedes the regrettable nature of the particularised correspondence, as identified in paragraph 13 of the respondent’s written submissions filed on 6 May 2023.
25. The respondent also admitted contrition and regret in relation to the particularised correspondence in his 2022 correspondence with the Bar Council, as listed in paragraph 14 of the respondent’s written submissions filed on 6 May 2023.
GROUND TWO — The respondent engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct by misrepresenting to the applicant the professional nature of his relationship with [the Client] by asserting that he was engaged in a private capacity and not in his capacity as [the Client]’s barrister, noting however that the respondent did not deliberately misrepresent to the applicant the professional nature of his relationship with [the Client], and that any such misrepresentation was inadvertent.
AGREED FACTS OF GROUND TWO
26. On 31 August 2019 the respondent sent an email at 11:33am from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B]. The email attached a letter on the respondent’s letter head. The letter stated: “I act for [the Client] (thereafter ‘my client’) on a direct-access basis”.
27. On 1 September 2019 the respondent sent an email from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B] entitled “In the separation of [the Client] and [Person A] Notice of Intention to Commence Legal Proceedings”. The email discusses the division of property and includes the statement “without prejudice save as to costs”.
28. On 5 September 2019 the respondent sent two emails from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B]. The emails are signed off as follows:
Bill Loukas
Barrister-at-Law
29. On 14 September 2019 the respondent sent an email from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to [Person B] forwarding an email dated 14 September 2019 from the respondent to [the Client]. The email to [the Client] included legal advice in relation to defending an AVO application and seeking legal costs against [Person A].
30. On 9 April 2020 the respondent sent an email from his email address at Sir James Martin Chambers to Danielle Harris, the then solicitor for [Person A], where he stated that he is, “the legal representative of” [the Client].
31. On 15 January 2021 the applicant wrote to the respondent and (amongst other things) requested that the respondent provide an answer to the following question:
Were you engaged by [the Client] on a direct access basis? If yes, were you engaged in a private capacity or in the position as barrister?
32. On 23 February 2021 the respondent sent the applicant a letter, where the respondent stated:
I was engaged in a private capacity at the request of my [relative], [the Client] to assist him in dealing with correspondence received from [Person B], as invited by her. I did not act pursuant to a cost’s agreement, a retainer or formal instructions and I did not charge a fee.
33. The respondent’s response to the applicant misrepresented the professional nature of his relationship with [the Client] by asserting, contrary to the fact, that he was ‘engaged in a private capacity’ and not in his capacity as [the Client]’s barrister.
34. The response is inconsistent with correspondence set out above, which establishes that the respondent was engaged in the provision of legal services as a barrister.
35. On 4 March 2022 the Respondent wrote to the Bar Association stating: “In the circumstances I accept the Committee’s preliminary finding that I was acting in my capacity as a barrister”.
36. At paragraph [113] of the respondent’s affidavit sworn 13 December 2023, the respondent stated that he did not deliberately misrepresent to the applicant the professional nature of his relationship with [the Client] in his letter of 23 February 2021, and that such misrepresentation was inadvertent. The respondent stated that he was wrongly focusing on the fact that he was attempting to assist [the Client] privately, and on the lack of a retainer, costs agreement or fees.
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[50] Despite the parties agreeing to the disciplinary facts and form of protective orders, the Tribunal must be independently satisfied that the admitted conduct of the barrister is properly characterised as professional misconduct or unsatisfactory professional conduct, and that the protective orders are appropriate in the circumstances. The discretionary nature of the Tribunal’s power under s 144 has been acknowledged in several decisions including: Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Butland [2009] NSWADT 177 at [29]; Legal Services Commissioner v Maddock [2021] NSWCATOD 46 at [4],[17]–[18]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Feng [2023] NSWCATOD 129 at [7]; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Elina [2021] NSWCATOD 98 at [4], [34]–[35].
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[55] As noted above, professional misconduct may be made out where the conduct is unsatisfactory professional conduct that involves a “substantial” or “consistent” failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence: s 297(1)(a). Relevantly, for unsatisfactory professional conduct to be found under this provision, the conduct must be in connection with the practice of law: s 296.
[56] Alternatively, professional misconduct may be made out, whether in connection with legal practice or otherwise, where the conduct would “justify a finding that the lawyer is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice”: s 297(1)(b).
[57] Only one of either subsections (a) or (b) of s 297(1) of the Uniform Law need be proved, to warrant a finding of professional misconduct: Tangsilsat at [62]–[68].
[58] There are no precise limits to, or fixed categories of, conduct that may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on a legal practitioner: Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 199 –200; Bechara v Legal Services Commissioner (2010) 79 NSWLR 763; [2010] NSWCA 369 at [44].
[59] In Kennedy v Council of the Inc Law Institute of New South Wales (1939) 13 ALJ 563, Rich J said that:
…a charge of misconduct as relating to a solicitor need not fall within any legal definition of wrongdoing. It need not amount to an offence under the law. It was enough that it amounted to grave impropriety affecting his professional character and was indicative of a failure to either understand or to practise the precepts of honesty or fair dealing in relation to the courts, his clients or the public. The particular transaction the subject of the charge must be judged as a whole and the conclusion whether it betokened unfitness to be held out by the court as a member of the profession in whom confidence could be placed…
[60] In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Webb [2013] NSWCA 423 the NSW Court of Appeal said at [22] in relation to the definition of “professional misconduct” in s 497(1)(a) of the former Legal Profession Act 2004 (which is in almost identical terms to s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law):
The distinction made by that definition is between conduct which involves a “substantial” failure to reach or maintain the required standard and conduct which involves a “consistent” failure to do so. The former directs attention to the nature and consequences of the failure, which may be sufficiently serious to raise questions as to the lawyer’s competence and diligence and thereby warrant the description “substantial”. The reference to a “consistent failure” is to ongoing or persisting acts of failing on different occasions to reach or maintain the required standard. The same or similar failures which occur on a series of related occasions and are explained by an overarching error of judgment on the part of the lawyer (which is not itself the or a relevant failure which is the subject of complaint) do not involve a “consistent failure” in the sense in which that expression is used in this definition.
[61] The Court of Appeal in New South Wales Court of Appeal in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v EFA (pseudonym) (2021) 106 NSWLR 383; [2021] NSWCA 339 stated the relevant considerations when determining who is a fit and proper person under s 297(1)(b) at [169]:
…as the majority judgments in Ziems, (particularly that of Kitto J show), a finding of unfitness involves more than an objective analysis of the impugned conduct, absent often relevant (often extenuating) circumstances. The question of fitness to engage in legal practice focuses not only on the objective circumstances of the conduct in question but also on the personal qualities of the lawyer in question, and other circumstances that bear upon the conduct. Unfitness is ultimately a finding about character, although conduct plays an important role in the evaluation of character.
In connection with the practice of law
[62] In Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Costigan [2013] NSWCA 407 the Court of Appeal made extensive observations in relation to the statutory term “in connection with” at [51]–[52]. It is a relational term, that can be described as “having to do with”. The nature and strength of that relationship may vary.
[63] The test for whether a person is engaged in the provision of legal services as a barrister is set out in s 6 of the Uniform Law, which relevantly defines “engage in legal practice” to include “practise law or provide legal services, but does not include engage in policy work”. Legal services are defined to mean “work done, or business transacted, in the ordinary course of legal practice”: s 6 of the Uniform Law; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Mack [2024] NSWCATOD 120 at [41].
[64] In determining whether a practitioner’s activities occur in connection with his or her legal practice, the Tribunal is to assess the true character of the overall dealings, specifically, the practitioner’s activities and the relationship with the client: Vaughan v Legal Services Board (2009) 25 VR 536; [2009] VSCA 187 at [60] –[61], referring to Carr v Swart [2007] NSWCA 337; Solicitors’ Liability v Gray (1997) 77 FCR 1.
Offensive conduct and misrepresentation
[65] Here, we are particularly concerned with two types of conduct: first, what might be described as offensive conduct; and second, misrepresenting the professional nature of the relationship between barrister and client.
[66] Offensive conduct has been held capable of constituting professional misconduct. For instance:
(1) In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Sideris [2024] NSWCATOD 3, the practitioner was found guilty of professional misconduct for, inter alia, sending discourteous correspondence to a solicitor and to the representatives of the client of that solicitor in proceedings.
(2) In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Malakhov [2023] NSWCATOD 182, the Tribunal accepted that the solicitor was guilty of professional misconduct by, in the course of representing a client in domestic violence proceedings, making a statement to the wife of the client which grossly exceeded the legitimate assertion of the rights of his client in a domestic violence dispute (contrary to r 34.1.1 of the Uniform Rules) that intimidated her or could reasonably be seen to intimidate a person in her position.
(3) In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v R [2018] NSWCATOD 157 (King) the practitioner forwarded a letter to the Associate of a Judge who was presiding over proceedings in which the respondent’s client was a party. The letter contained comments which were derogatory of the client and the partner of a client, and contained information of a confidential kind and was prima facie the subject of legal professional privilege. The Tribunal considered that this conduct, aggregated with the practitioner’s subsequent threatening behaviour and improper demand for immediate payment of costs, constituted professional misconduct.
(4) In Griffin v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2016] NSWCA 364 the practitioner, after the dismissal of an extension of time application in the Federal Court, sent an email to the Judge’s Associate attaching a letter containing serious allegations against the Judge and requesting that the Judge vary his decision.
(5) In Ellis v Law Society [2008] EWHC 561, the practitioner conducted “inappropriate, offensive and derogatory” correspondence directed to and about the Law Society, a litigant, members of the judiciary and others which “crossed the line” in terms of acceptable criticism: at [33].
[67] In relation to the conduct the subject of Ground Two, the misrepresentation was inadvertent. Nevertheless, the conduct occurred in the context of a professional conduct investigation. Owing to the high standards generally expected of legal practitioners, a practitioner subject to an inquiry is under a duty to assist with the investigation in good faith. The applicant relies on the following cases to support the proposition that careful attendance to these obligations is a part of proper professional conduct:
(1) In Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v Lind (2011) 110 SASR 531; [2011] SASCFC 104, the practitioner failed to assist the Board over the course of its inquiries in relation to the practitioner’s unprofessional conduct and failed to respond to repeated requests of the Board over several years. The Supreme Court of South Australia considered the practitioner’s unprofessional conduct in her dealings with the Board “very serious”: at [16].
(2) In Law Society of New South Wales v Grech [2006] NSWADT 73 the Tribunal found that the respondent had clearly and unjustifiably failed to assist and co-operate with the Law Society in its investigation of a complaint, where he was “obliged to provide appropriate assistance”: at [109]. The respondent sent a letter in response to the Law Society’s various letters which did not provide any answers to the Society’s questions, and also failed to forward to the Society many of the documents it requested: at [107] and [110].
(3) In Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Dwyer [2015] NSWCA 302, the practitioner engaged in conduct on six separate occasions that was knowingly deceptive or misleading of the Council in dealings with the Council in relation to his position and conduct as a legal practitioner. The Court of Appeal concluded that a person who did so is guilty of professional misconduct and, further, “is not a fit and proper person to remain on the Supreme Court Roll.”: at [32].
(4) In Malfanti v Legal Profession Disciplinary Tribunal [1993] NSWCA 171 at 7 the Court of Appeal recognised the principle that a solicitor who appears before the Tribunal is bound to assist in its investigations.
[68] In Johns v Law Society of New South Wales [1982] 2 NSWLR 1 Moffitt P said at 6:
The obligation to inform and assist has always been regarded as resting upon a solicitor or barrister whose conduct is the subject of an inquiry whether by the court or the committee, as appears in the court’s observations on numerous occasions, an example being in Re Veron; Ex parte Law Society of New South Wales (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 136, at p 141.
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(emphasis added)
The link to the full decision is here.
