
R v O’Carrigan [2013] QCA 327 Margaret McMurdo P, Mullins and Henry JJ 1/11/2013
Sentence Application — where the applicant pleaded guilty to fraudulently falsifying a record (count 1) and two counts of fraud as an employee to the value of $30,000 or more (counts 2 and 3) — where the conduct was constituted by defrauding his employer, Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd, of more than $20.7 million over 12 years — where the applicant was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment on count 3, 10 years concurrent imprisonment on count 2 and three years imprisonment on count 1, cumulative on count 3, with parole eligibility set at 17 November 2018, six years from sentence — where the applicant contends that the sentence was manifestly excessive — whether sentencing judge erred — where over 12 years between 1999 and 2012, he defrauded Leightons of more than $20.7 million, most of which has not been recovered — where the applicant’s offending was unquestionably one of the largest and most serious examples of fraud to come before Queensland courts — where applicant’s sole mitigating feature was his extraordinary cooperation with the administration of justice — where once confronted, he made immediate admissions — where he assisted Leightons to recover its funds, albeit ultimately with limited success — where communicated his intention to plead guilty within days of being charged and did so to an ex officio indictment — where had this case proceeded to trial, it is likely that it would have taken several weeks of court time and caused inconvenience and financial loss to many prosecution witnesses — where the otherwise much more costly investigation, both by the police and Leightons, and the court process was commendably and extensively reduced through this cooperation — where had he proceeded to trial, he would have been sentenced to an effective global term of imprisonment in the range of 15 to 16 years with parole eligibility at the half way point — where it follows that the sentencing judge, in setting an effective global head sentence of 15 years, did not significantly discount the head sentence to recognise these critical mitigating factors — where unless sentencing judges give proper weight to such cooperation, offenders will have no incentive to do so and the criminal justice system will require additional and expensive resources to remain efficient. Application granted. Appeal allowed. Parole eligibility date fixed at 7 November 2018 set aside, and instead fix the parole eligibility date at 7 November 2017.
R v BCO [2013] QCA 328 Margaret McMurdo P, Morrison JA and Mullins J 1/11/2013
Sentence Application — where applicant pleaded guilty to one count of rape and one count of indecent treatment of a child under 16 with a circumstance of aggravation — where the applicant was 15 years 11 months’ old at the time of offending — where the applicant was sentenced to two years’ probation pursuant to s 176(1) of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) — where a conviction was recorded for the count of rape, but not the other count — where the sentencing judge assumed the recording of the conviction would not adversely impact the applicant or his employment prospects — whether the sentencing judge erred in acting on that assumption — where discretion to record or not record a conviction to be exercised afresh — whether the balance of the factors favours recording a conviction — where s 184(1) of the Act mandates that in considering whether or not to record a conviction the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case and one of the specific circumstances is the impact the recording of a conviction will have on the child’s chances of rehabilitation generally or finding or retaining employment — where the authorities strongly support as the starting point for a youth of the applicant’s age being sentenced under the Act the inference that the recording of a conviction would have an adverse impact on the youth in respect of prospects for rehabilitation and employment — where there was nothing in the circumstances applying to the applicant that justified the assumption that was made by the sentencing judge that the applicant would not be so affected by the recording of a conviction — where there has been error made with the discretion to be exercised afresh by this Court — where factors in favour of the recording of the conviction include the age of the complainant, the nature of the offence (though not penile/vaginal rape) and that the applicant had committed property offences prior to the subject offences and committed further property offences whilst on bail for the subject offences — where it counts against recording a conviction that it would make the applicant a reportable offender under the Child Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 for seven and one-half years which is at odds with the applicant’s risk assessment as a low to moderate risk of sexual recidivism — where other factors against the recording of the conviction also include the age of the applicant, that the offending was opportunistic rather than a manifestation of sexual deviance and that the applicant was suitable for offence-specific treatment — where it is also relevant that no convictions were recorded for the property offences for which the applicant was sentenced in March 2013. Application for leave granted. Appeal allowed. Sentence varied to the extent only of setting aside the order recording a conviction and substituting the order that no conviction is recorded.
R v Reynolds [2013] QCA 338 Holmes and Morrison JJA and North J 12/11/2013
Appeal against Conviction — where the appellant was convicted of entering a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence, where the entry was by means of break, the offence was committed at night, actual violence was threatened, and the appellant was armed with an offensive weapon — where the appellant was convicted on the basis of s 7 of the Criminal Code (Qld), in that he went by car to the complainant’s house with the person who actually committed the offence — where the appellant appeals against his conviction — where the appellant contends a miscarriage of justice resulted from admission of inadmissible evidence — where the appellant submits a miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure of the learned primary judge to give proper directions to the jury in relation to the use they may make of particular evidence — where the appellant contends the learned primary judge failed to give proper direction to the jury as to drawing of inferences — whether the appeal should be allowed — whether, if the appeal is allowed, a retrial should be ordered or a verdict of acquittal entered — where the Crown case was put squarely and solely on the basis that the appellant was culpable as an aider under s 7(b) of the Criminal Code — where it was essential that the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew that Hansen meant to burgle a dwelling and aided him in doing so — where although the jury might not, as a general proposition, regard the appellant as a witness of credit, they had still to consider whether the Crown had excluded all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence — where it is entirely possible, perhaps probable, that the appellant was sitting in the driver’s seat of the car waiting to drive the primary offender (Hansen) away at speed because he knew that Hansen had walked away with the intent of committing burglary — where nothing makes that inference inevitable — where it is also rationally possible that he was in that position under the impression that Hansen had gone to buy drugs or, alternatively, that he was simply not sufficiently alert to consider the matter — where the Crown could not, on the limited evidence it had, exclude hypotheses in which the appellant would be innocent; or, at any rate, innocent of aiding a burglary. Appeal allowed. Conviction quashed. Enter a verdict of acquittal.
R v Cormack [2013] QCA 342 Margaret McMurdo P, Gotterson JA and McMeekin J 15/11/2013
Appeal against Conviction — where the appellant was convicted of arson of a St Vincent de Paul Society store — where the appellant had been working as a volunteer at the store during the day — where the appellant left at approximately 4.30 pm and came back at around 11.00 pm, purportedly to collect some electrical goods he had left at the store — where the appellant called 000 to report a fire in the store — where fire fighters arrived to find the shop engulfed in smoke and the right hand side front door of the store broken — where the appellant identified himself, spoke to police and provided a key to the store — where police seized a metal bar from the appellant’s car and the appellant’s clothes — where the appellant told police that the metal bar had been used for, inter alia, carrying bulk bags used to transport recyclable material including glass — where the appellant’s trial counsel did not make admissions under s 644 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) in respect of the continuity of the handling of the metal bar and the appellant’s clothing — where glass fragments with the same refractive index as the broken front door of the store were found on the appellant’s metal bar and the appellant’s clothing — where no evidence was led as to the incidence of the type of glass used in the front door of the store — where the police did not investigate the appellant’s claim to have used the metal bar in handling bulk bags which may have contained broken glass — where nearby CCTV footage showed an unidentified male who was not the appellant in the vicinity of the store about 50 minutes prior to the store’s alarm activating — where the appellant contends that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory in that it was not reasonably open on the evidence — whether verdict unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence in terms of s 668E(1) Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) — where a forensic scientist from the Queensland Police Fire and Explosion Unit gave evidence that the fire was the result of human involvement, either accidental or deliberate — where the appellant contends that this raised the issue of the fire being caused unintentionally — where the appellant contends that the trial judge erred in failing to direct the jury as to s 23 Criminal Code or at least, when directing the jury as to the elements of arson, in failing to convey that a critical issue was whether the appellant deliberately set fire to the premises — whether trial judge erred — where the directions sufficiently highlighted for the jury the real issues in the case, namely, that they had to be satisfied not only that the appellant lit the fire but also that he did so wilfully, that is, deliberately — where there was no doubt that the evidence against the appellant made him a prime suspect — where Ms Megan Richards, a forensic scientist with the Queensland Police Service, gave evidence of her experience in glass analysis — where she did not examine and had never seen the metal bar, the control samples of glass fragments from the broken door panel or the appellant’s t-shirt, denim shorts and fabric belt — where Celeste Huraki, another forensic scientist, conducted those examinations — where she gave evidence from another forensic scientist’s (Ms Huraki) notes and statement — where it is common ground that defence counsel agreed to this course as Ms Huraki was unavailable at trial — where with hindsight, this seems to have been an unsatisfactory course — where not only did Ms Richards give hearsay evidence from Ms Huraki’s notes and statement, but, as members of this Court noted at the hearing, she added some surprising and highly prejudicial details about an unnamed study comparing glass fragments found on clothing of members of the general public and on those charged with criminal offences involving the breaking of glass — where after review of the evidence at trial, the Court is not persuaded that the prosecution evidence established, to the criminal standard of proof, that the glass fragments in his clothing and on his metal bar were from the glass in the store front door — where it follows, consistent with the respondent’s concession, that it was not open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the glass came to be on the appellant’s clothing and metal bar by smashing the glass front door of the store rather than in some innocent way. Appeal allowed. Guilty verdict set aside. Verdict of acquittal is entered.
R v Barron [2013] QCA 349 Margaret McMurdo P, Ann Lyons J Daubney J 27/11/2013 (delivered ex tempore)
Sentence Application — where the applicant, Allan Raymond Barron, pleaded guilty to burglary and stealing (count 1) and assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed (count 2) — where the judge sentenced him to 18 months imprisonment on count 1 and to two years imprisonment on count 2, both sentences to be served concurrently with each other but cumulatively on a sentence of three years imprisonment with a parole release date set on 19 April 2013 imposed by a different District Court judge on 19 October 2012 for the offence of unlawful wounding — where parole eligibility was fixed at 18 June 2014 — where with the concurrence of the respondent, the applicant was granted leave to adduce evidence from his lawyer that the applicant had been diagnosed since his sentence of terminal throat cancer — where counsel do not know why the applicant, upon learning of his terminal condition, did not immediately apply for special circumstances parole rather than making this application — where it can be expected that this ordinarily would be the avenue to be adopted in a case of this kind — where time is of the essence for the unfortunate applicant and the interests of justice require this Court to now deal with his application — where the respondent fairly, compassionately and appropriately concedes that, in light of Dr Jones’s opinion, the application for leave to appeal should be granted, the appeal allowed and the applicant re-sentenced to enable him to be released into the community forthwith — where it is important to note that this must not be viewed as a comparable sentence for the offences of burglary and stealing and assault occasioning bodily harm whilst armed for which the District Court judge sentenced the applicant — where it is emphasised that the applicant has not established that those sentences were manifestly excessive on the basis of the information then before the court. Application granted. Appeal allowed. Orders below partly set aside with the applicant ordered to be released on parole today with the orders otherwise confirmed.