JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43
On 15 August 2012 the High Court made orders in two matters concerning the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) (“the Act”). Today the High Court delivered its reasons in those matters. A majority of the High Court held that the Act was valid as it did not acquire property. It therefore did not engage s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, which requires any acquisition of property effected by a Commonwealth law to be on just terms.
The Act imposes restrictions on the colour, shape and finish of retail packaging for tobacco products and restricts the use of trademarks on such packaging. The plaintiffs brought proceedings in the High Court challenging the validity of the Act, arguing that the Commonwealth acquired their intellectual property rights and goodwill otherwise than on just terms.
A majority of the Court held that to engage s 51(xxxi) an acquisition must involve the accrual to some person of a proprietary benefit or interest. Although the Act regulated the plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights and imposed controls on the packaging and presentation of tobacco products, it did not confer a proprietary benefit or interest on the Commonwealth or any other person. As a result, neither the Commonwealth nor any other person acquired any property and s 51(xxxi) was not engaged.
Harbour Radio Pty Ltd v Trad [2012] HCA 44
Today the High Court held, by majority, that Harbour Radio Pty Limited (“2GB”) established the defence of qualified privilege at common law with respect to a number of imputations defamatory of Mr Trad. The Court granted Mr Trad special leave to cross-appeal on particular grounds but dismissed parts of the cross-appeal. The result was that each side enjoyed partial success.
Approximately one week after what have become generally known as the “Cronulla Riots”, Mr Trad attended a “peace rally” in Hyde Park, Sydney. Mr Trad spoke at the rally placing at least part of the blame for the Cronulla Riots on 2GB. At about 10:15am the next day 2GB made a broadcast which lasted 11 minutes purportedly responding to the comments made by Mr Trad at the peace rally. Mr Trad commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales alleging that the broadcast conveyed imputations which were defamatory.
A jury found eight imputations were conveyed in the 2GB broadcast which were defamatory of Mr Trad. 2GB defended their broadcast relying on the substantial truth and contextual truth of the statements made, on the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest and also argued that each imputation was published on occasion of qualified privilege at common law. Mr Trad was successful before the primary judge but the decision was reversed in part by the Court of Appeal.
The issues before the High Court included whether or not the defence of qualified privilege was available and if so how the defence then applied with respect to each imputation. Mr Trad argued that the defence of qualified privilege should have been rejected because of malice. As to the substantial truth and the contextual truth defences, 2GB submitted that the relevant test was that of a “right-thinking” person as reflective of a community standard. Mr Trad sought to challenge this submission as a matter of law and disputed the factual findings upon which the primary judge found four imputations to be substantially true and related to a matter of public interest.
The High Court held, by majority, that qualified privilege applied to a response to an attack where it was commensurate with the attack and when it was made bona fide for the purpose of vindicating one’s reputation. The majority held a sufficient connection can be established upon any one of several considerations including the content of the attack, the credibility of the attack or the credibility of the attacker. The majority concluded that the defence of qualified privilege applied to six of the eight imputations relied on by Mr Trad. Mr Trad sought leave to file a notice of cross-appeal which contended that the defence of qualified privilege must fail because of the malice of 2GB. The majority refused to grant such leave. With respect to the defences of substantial truth and contextual truth, the majority preferred an audience composed of ordinary decent persons as opposed to “right-thinking” persons. The Court, by majority, remitted four imputations to the Court of Appeal for consideration of the substantial truth defence, and a further two imputations for consideration of the contextual truth defence. As both sides had some limited success, no order was made as to the costs of the appeal or the cross-appeal.
International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd v Chameleon Mining NL (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2012] HCA 45
Today the High Court unanimously allowed an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court held that International Litigation Partners Pte Ltd (“ILP”) was entitled to an early termination fee under a litigation funding agreement (“the Funding Deed”) with Chameleon Mining NL (“Chameleon”).
ILP agreed to fund Chameleon’s litigation against another company in return for a share of the proceeds of that litigation. The Funding Deed allowed ILP to terminate this arrangement, and entitled it to an early termination fee, if there was a “change in control” of Chameleon. A change in control did take place, and ILP terminated the arrangement and claimed the early termination fee. Chameleon refused to pay, arguing that ILP was not entitled to the fee because ILP did not hold an Australian financial services licence under Pt 7.6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Corporations Act”).
The High Court held that ILP was entitled to the early termination fee. The Funding Deed was a form of financial accommodation in that ILP agreed to pay Chameleon’s legal costs when asked to do so in return for a share of any amount recovered in Chameleon’s litigation. The Funding Deed was therefore a credit facility within the meaning of the Corporations Act, and ILP was exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services licence.
Plaintiff M47-2012 v Director General of Security [2012] HCA 46
Today a majority of the High Court held invalid a regulation which prevented the grant of a protection visa to a refugee if the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (“ASIO”) had assessed the refugee to be a risk to security. Accordingly, a majority of the Court held that the decision to refuse the plaintiff a protection visa on the basis of that regulation had not been made according to law.
The plaintiff, a Sri Lankan national, arrived in Australia in December 2009, and has been held in detention since that time. In June 2010, he applied for a protection visa. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship found that the plaintiff had a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka on the basis of his race or political opinion and was therefore a refugee. However, the delegate refused the plaintiff’s application for a protection visa because, in December 2009, the plaintiff had been assessed by ASIO to be a risk to security. Clause 866.225 of Sched 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) prescribes as a criterion for the grant of a protection visa that the applicant not be assessed as a risk to security under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth). This criterion is called public interest criterion 4002.
The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the original jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the validity of the decision to refuse him a protection visa and challenging his continued detention. The plaintiff argued that ASIO had denied him procedural fairness when making a fresh adverse security assessment in 2012, that the requirement that he satisfy public interest criterion 4002 was invalid, and that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) did not authorise the removal and detention of a person found to be a refugee.
A majority of the Court held that the plaintiff was not denied procedural fairness in connection with the making of the security assessment because the plaintiff was given the opportunity to address issues of concern to ASIO in the interview that was conducted before the fresh assessment was made in 2012. However, a majority of the Court held that the Migration Regulations could not validly prescribe public interest criterion 4002 as a condition for the grant of a protection visa because doing so was inconsistent with the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Because the prescription of public interest criterion 4002 as a criterion for the grant of a protection visa was invalid, a majority of the Court held that the decision to refuse the plaintiff a protection visa on the basis of this criterion had not been made according to law. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s continuing detention was valid for the purpose of determining his application for a protection visa. Given these conclusions, it was unnecessary for the majority to consider the plaintiff’s other arguments about the validity of his detention and proposed removal from Australia.
Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39
Today the High Court unanimously held that Fortescue Metals Group Ltd and Andrew Forrest did not contravene the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in connection with public statements about agreements Fortescue made with three Chinese state-owned entities to build, finance and transfer the railway, port and mine components of Fortescue’s proposed Pilbara Iron Ore and Infrastructure Project in Western Australia.
Each of the agreements was headed “Framework Agreement” and was four pages long. Each agreement recorded that it was to become binding upon approval by the parties’ respective boards, and that the parties were jointly to agree and develop further general conditions of contract at a later date. The parties’ boards approved the agreements. Fortescue and Mr Forrest, as Fortescue’s chairman and chief executive, made public statements that Fortescue had entered into a “binding contract” with each of the Chinese entities to build, finance and transfer the relevant construction works.
In March 2006, ASIC commenced proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia alleging that because the agreements would not be enforceable under Australian law, Fortescue had therefore engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct when Fortescue and Mr Forrest represented that the agreements were “binding”. ASIC further alleged that Fortescue and Mr Forrest had contravened the continuous disclosure requirements of the Corporations Act by not correcting the false or misleading information and that Mr Forrest had failed to discharge his duties as a director of Fortescue with the degree of care and diligence required by s 180(1).
The trial judge dismissed ASIC’s claims, but the Full Court of the Federal Court allowed ASIC’s appeal and made declarations that Fortescue had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct and contravened its continuous disclosure obligations and that Mr Forrest had contravened his continuous disclosure obligations and directors’ duties. In particular, the Full Court concluded that, because the agreements would not be enforceable under Australian law, it was misleading or deceptive to describe them as “binding” contracts. By special leave, Fortescue and Mr Forrest appealed to the High Court.
The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal. Four members of the Court held that the statements made by Fortescue and Mr Forrest represented to those hearing or reading them that Fortescue and the Chinese state-owned entities had entered into agreements that each intended to be binding. This representation was neither false nor misleading. There was no evidential basis for assuming that a person hearing or reading these statements would understand that the parties had entered into agreements that would be enforced by an Australian court according to Australian law should a dispute ever arise between them.
Because the statements were neither misleading nor deceptive, the Court further found that Fortescue and Mr Forrest had not failed to meet their obligations under the Corporations Act. The Court therefore set aside the Full Court’s decision and declarations and reinstated the primary judge’s decision that Fortescue and Mr Forrest had not contravened the Corporations Act.
Barclay v Penberthy [2012] HCA 40
Today the High Court held, by majority, that a pilot, his employer and an aeronautical engineer were liable to Nautronix (Holdings) Pty Ltd (“Nautronix”) for the crash of a plane which a company related to Nautronix had chartered. The pilot, his employer and the engineer were liable in the action per quod servitium amisit (“per quod”) for wrongfully depriving Nautronix of the service of its employees injured in the crash, and the pilot and his employer were also liable to Nautronix in negligence.
In 2003, a company related to Nautronix chartered an aircraft from Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd (“Fugro”) to test technology Nautronix had developed. Mr Penberthy, an employee of Fugro, flew the aircraft with five passengers on board. Each of the passengers was an employee of Nautronix. The plane crashed, killing two passengers and injuring all others. The accident was caused by an engine failure and Mr Penberthy’s negligent handling in response to that engine failure. Mr Aaron Barclay, an aeronautical engineer, designed the engine component that ultimately caused the engine failure.
Nautronix, the surviving passengers and the spouses of the deceased passengers commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia against Mr Penberthy, Fugro and Mr Barclay. The primary judge found that each of Mr Penberthy, Fugro and Mr Barclay was liable to each of the surviving passengers and the spouses of the deceased passengers in negligence. The primary judge further found that Mr Penberthy and Fugro (but not Mr Barclay) were liable to Nautronix in negligence.
Some of the primary judge’s conclusions were appealed and cross-appealed to the Court of Appeal. That Court concluded that Mr Penberthy, Fugro and Mr Barclay were liable in negligence for any economic loss suffered by Nautronix as a result of the loss of its three injured employees. It further held that Nautronix could not claim for damages resulting from the loss of its two deceased employees due to the rule established in Baker v Bolton that a person cannot recover damages for the death of another.
Mr Penberthy, Fugro and Mr Barclay appealed to the High Court and Nautronix sought special leave to cross-appeal. In the High Court, Nautronix did not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeal that Mr Barclay was liable to it in negligence. The proceedings in the High Court raised three broad issues.
The first issue was the status of the rule in Baker v Bolton. The High Court unanimously held that this rule formed part of the common law of Australia and that it prevented Nautronix from recovering damages for the loss of its two deceased employees.
The second issue was the liability of Mr Penberthy and Fugro to Nautronix in negligence. A majority of the Court held that Mr Penberthy and Fugro owed Nautronix a duty to take care not to cause it economic loss.
The third set of issues concerned the per quod action, which enables an employer to recover damages for wrongful loss of an employee’s services. The Court unanimously held that this action was a part of the common law of Australia and that, if it were permissible for Nautronix to raise the claim in the High Court, Mr Penberthy, Fugro and Mr Barclay would be liable to Nautronix for the wrongful loss of the services of its injured employees. A majority of the Court held that it was open to Nautronix to raise this claim, and the majority therefore held that each of Mr Penberthy, Fugro and Mr Barclay was thus liable to Nautronix in this action. The majority further concluded that the amount of damages in this action was to be measured by reference to the market value of the services lost. That market value was generally to be calculated by reference to the price of employing a substitute less the wages no longer payable to the injured employee.
Commissioner of Taxation v Qantas Airways Ltd [2012] HCA 41
Today the High Court held, by majority, that Qantas Airways Limited (“Qantas”) was liable to pay goods and services tax (“GST”) when it received fares on unclaimed flights.
Qantas and its subsidiary Jetstar Airways Pty Limited (“Jetstar”) provide domestic airline travel services. These airline travel services have variable fare rules and conditions of carriage. Not all passengers take the flight they book. Whether the fare the passenger has paid is refundable is determined by the applicable fare rules and conditions of carriage. Even if a refund can be claimed, not all passengers who have not taken the booked flight claim the refund.
The Commissioner of Taxation (“Commissioner”) assessed a GST liability on the fares received for flights not taken. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the assessment. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court held that as actual travel was the sole purpose of the transaction, there was no taxable supply if the travel does not occur. This meant a GST liability was not incurred.
By special leave, the Commissioner appealed to the High Court of Australia. The High Court held, by majority, that Qantas made a taxable supply which attracted GST when it received fares whether or not the passenger took the flight that was booked. Flights were sold and bookings taken on the basis that Qantas would use its best endeavours to carry the passenger and baggage, having regard to the circumstances of the business operations of the airline. Consequently, even if the passenger did not actually travel, there was a taxable supply incurring GST liability and Qantas was liable to remit the GST received on fares for unclaimed flights to the Commissioner.
Burns v The Queen [2012] HCA 35
On 20 June 2012, the High Court allowed an appeal by the appellant against her conviction for the manslaughter of David Hay, quashing her conviction for manslaughter and directing that a verdict of acquittal be entered. Today the High Court published its reasons for allowing the appeal.
The appellant and her husband were registered participants in a methadone programme conducted by a Sydney clinic. They were in the business of selling some of their methadone to friends and acquaintances. On 9 February 2007, the deceased attended the Burns’ unit to purchase methadone. His body was discovered in the toilet block at the rear of the block of units the next day. The deceased died as a result of the combined effect of methadone and a prescription drug.
The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the New South Wales District Court. At trial, the prosecution case was left to the jury on the basis that either the appellant was a party to a joint criminal enterprise with her husband to supply methadone to the deceased and that the supply of methadone was an unlawful and dangerous act which caused the deceased’s death, or the appellant’s failure to seek medical attention for the deceased was a grossly negligent cause of his death.
The appellant appealed against her conviction to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, but that appeal was dismissed. By special leave, the appellant then appealed to the High Court.
The High Court allowed the appeal because, as the Crown conceded, the supply of methadone to the deceased without more was not a dangerous act that was capable of supporting the appellant’s conviction for unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter. That was one of the two possibilities left to the jury to consider, and it could not be known whether the jury convicted the appellant on this impermissible basis. The Court held that the appellant was not under a legal duty to take steps to preserve the deceased’s life and a majority held that the evidence given at the trial was not capable of establishing the appellant’s complicity in injecting, or assisting to inject, the deceased with the drug. Accordingly, a majority of the Court declined to order a new trial and the Court made orders quashing the appellant’s conviction and entering a verdict of acquittal.
Likiardopoulos v The Queen [2012] HCA 37
Today the High Court unanimously dismissed an appeal by Dimitrios Likiardopoulos against his conviction for murder. The Court held that there was no abuse of process in prosecuting the appellant as an accessory to murder in circumstances where the Crown had accepted pleas of guilty to lesser offences from five other people involved in the deceased’s death, nor had the trial judge erred in leaving the accessorial case to the jury in those circumstances.
In March 2007, the appellant and others were involved in a sustained assault on an intellectually handicapped 22 year-old man which lasted about two days. The appellant’s involvement in the assault included two “king hits” which dislodged two of the deceased’s teeth, as well as punching and kicking the deceased. There was also evidence that the appellant had directed or encouraged the others in the assault. The deceased died as a result of the assault.
Seven people, including the appellant, were charged with the deceased’s murder. Five of those people pleaded guilty to lesser offences, and the charge against a sixth person was dropped. The appellant was tried for murder in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The prosecution case was advanced on two alternative grounds. The principal case was that the appellant was liable for murder by virtue of his participation in a joint criminal enterprise. The alternative case (“the accessorial case”) was that the appellant, knowing that one or more people would assault the deceased intending to do him really serious injury, intentionally assisted or encouraged the commission of the fatal assaults.
The appellant appealed against his conviction to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria on grounds including that the trial judge erred in her directions concerning the accessorial case and in leaving the accessorial case to the jury. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
The appellant was granted special leave to appeal to the High Court on the sole ground that it was an error to leave the accessorial case to the jury. The appellant submitted that in law he could not be an accessory to murder in circumstances in which the Crown had accepted pleas of guilty to lesser offences from each of the persons said to be the principal offenders. On this submission, there was no “murder” to which he could be an accessory. Alternatively, the appellant submitted that it was an abuse of process for the Director of Public Prosecutions to accept pleas of guilty to lesser offences while prosecuting the appellant as an accessory to murder.
The High Court dismissed the appeal. The Court unanimously held that the evidence at the trial was capable of proving that one or more of those whom the appellant directed and encouraged to assault the deceased were liable as principals for the murder. There was no inconsistency between the other participants’ convictions for manslaughter and the appellant’s conviction for murder on the accessorial case because the evidence in each case differed. Further, the acceptance of the pleas of guilty to lesser offences involved an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The majority held that certain decisions involved in the prosecution process are insusceptible of judicial review. Nothing in the conduct of the proceedings produced unfairness of the kind that would lead a court to intervene to prevent abuse of its process.
The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd v Australian Competition Tribunal [2012] HCA 36
The High Court today held that the Australian Competition Tribunal’s review of the Minister’s decision whether to declare certain services relating to railway lines in the Pilbara under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth
) (now the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)) (“the Act”) had not been undertaken according to law. Part IIIA of the Act provides for processes by which third parties may obtain access to infrastructure owned by others. The High Court quashed the Tribunal’s determinations and remitted the matters to the Tribunal for determination according to law.
The dispute related to four railway lines in the Pilbara: the Goldsworthy line and the Mt Newman line operated by BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd and BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd (together, “BHPB”), and the Hamersley line and the Robe line operated by Rio Tinto Ltd and its associated entities (“Rio Tinto”). Fortescue Metals Group Limited (“FMG”) or its wholly owned subsidiary, The Pilbara Infrastructure Pty Ltd (“TPI”), applied to have the services declared under the Act. The Minister declared the services relating to the Hamersley, Robe and Goldsworthy lines for a period of 20 years but did not declare the Mt Newman line services.
FMG, BHPB and Rio Tinto appealed to the Tribunal. At the hearing before the Tribunal, the
parties presented materials and evidence far in excess of what was placed before the Minister. The Tribunal ruled the Mt Newman line services should not be declared, the Goldsworthy line services should be declared for 20 years, the Hamersley line services should not be declared and the Robe line services should be declared for 10 years until 2018.
FMG and Rio Tinto both applied to the Full Court of the Federal Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The Full Court dismissed FMG’s applications and allowed Rio Tinto’s application, and set aside the decision of the Tribunal regarding the Robe line services. By special leave, FMG and TPI appealed to the High Court.
The appeal to the High Court raised three issues. First, what is the meaning of the expression, “uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the service” under s 44H(4)(b) of the Act? Second, what matters can be taken into account under s 44H(4)(f) of the Act when the section requires the decision maker to be satisfied that access to the services “would not be contrary to the public interest”? Third, if a decision maker was satisfied as to the matters stated in s 44H(4) of the Act, was there a residual discretion to be exercised? During the hearing of the appeal, an issue was raised as to the nature of the task the Tribunal was required to perform when asked to review the Minister’s decision.
The High Court held that the Tribunal should have considered only those materials considered by the Minister supplemented, if necessary, by any information, assistance or report given to the Tribunal by the National Competition Council in response to a request made under s 44K(6) of the Act. On the other issues considered on appeal, a majority of the High Court ruled that the expression, “uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the service” in s 44H(4)(b) of the Act required an inquiry whether there was anyone who could profitably develop another facility. The Court held that the requirement that the decision maker be satisfied that access to the services “would not be contrary to the public interest” needed to be applied in the context of the limited scope of review by the Tribunal. Finally, the Court held that, if a decision maker was satisfied as to the matters stated in s 44H(4) of the Act, there was no residual discretion to be exercised.
Douglass v The Queen [2012] HCA 34
On 16 August 2012, the High Court allowed an appeal by the appellant against his conviction for the aggravated indecent assault of his granddaughter, CD, and directed that his conviction be quashed and a verdict of acquittal be entered. Today the High Court published its reasons for allowing the appeal.
The appellant was alleged to have persuaded CD to hold his penis on an occasion when the two were alone in a shed. CD was aged three years at the time of the alleged offence. The appellant was tried by a judge without a jury in the District Court of South Australia. The only evidence of the offence came from CD in unsworn statements made by her in an interview with a psychologist which took place a few weeks after CD’s fourth birthday. The limited detail of CD’s allegation in the interview was given in response to leading questions and only after she had failed to recall the incident on three occasions. Subsequently, CD had given inconsistent accounts of the scene of the alleged offence. It was also at least possible that CD could not recall the day of the alleged offence by the time she gave evidence 22 months later. The appellant gave sworn evidence denying the allegation against him. He was convicted and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment with a nonparole period of 18 months.
The appellant appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia on two grounds. The first ground of appeal was that the trial judge had failed to give sufficient reasons for the verdict. The appellant complained that the judge had arrived at a conclusion of guilt without rejecting his sworn denial of the offence. The second ground of appeal was that CD’s evidence was insufficient to establish proof of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was dismissed.
In the High Court, the appellant was successful on both grounds. On the first ground, the Court found that the trial judge’s failure to record any finding respecting the appellant’s evidence left as one possibility that the judge simply preferred CD’s evidence and convicted upon it applying less than the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of reasons sufficient to exclude that possibility constituted legal error.
On the second ground, the High Court observed that the trial judge’s finding was of satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt of the truthfulness of CD’s evidence and that he had not addressed the distinct question of the reliability of CD’s evidence to establish the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The problems with CD’s evidence meant that it was not sufficient to support a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the offence that the appellant was charged with had occurred. Success on the second ground required that the appellant’s conviction be quashed and a verdict of acquittal be entered.
Plaintiff S10-2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] HCA 31
Today the High Court dismissed four applications for declaratory relief and the issue of certiorari and constitutional writs against the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (“the Minister”) and the Secretary for the Department of Immigration and Citizenship.
Sections 48B, 195A, 351 and 417 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) confer powers upon the Minister to intervene with respect to the granting of visas under the Act. The powers may only be exercised by the Minister personally and the Minister cannot be compelled to exercise them.
Each of the plaintiffs in these proceedings had sought to invoke the exercise by the Minister of those powers after having unsuccessfully sought merits review and, in some cases, judicial review of a decision to refuse to grant a visa.
The plaintiffs submitted that in deciding whether or not to consider the exercise of the relevant powers, or deciding whether or not to exercise those powers, the Minister was obliged to afford natural justice or procedural fairness to the plaintiffs.
The High Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ applications, finding that the distinct nature of the powers conferred on the Minister by the Act meant that the exercise of the powers is not conditioned on the observance of the principles of procedural fairness.
