Language – Banquo’s Ghost

The language “Banquo’s Ghost” refers to a character – and in turn his ghost – in Shakespeare’s Macbeth.  Macbeth and Banquo – prior to Macbeth’s assent to the throne – were generals of the King of Scotland, Duncan. After succeeding in battle against a powerful Scottish nobleman, the Thane of Cawdor, and succeeding to his title, Macbeth invites Duncan and Banquo to his new castle in Inverness. Acting on cryptic prediction of three witches he met with Banquo following the battle, and prompted by his conniving wife, Macbeth kills Duncan and subsequently – to ensure there is no competition to his ascent to the throne – orchestrates Banquo’s murder. 

Upon being informed at a dinner that Banquo has been murdered (albeit his son, Fleance, later to be king, escapes). Macbeth – conflicted by a combination of grief, fear and paranoia – sees Banquo’s ghost.  Macbeth cowers from the ghost. Lady Macbeth calms him down.  When he then mentions Banquo in a speech, the ghost reappears, quiet and brooding. 

Banquo appears once more later in the play. After Macbeth returns to the coven of witches and, although they speak in riddles, their last prediction conjures an image of Banquo wearing a crown followed by an endless parade of his descendants. 

Banquo’s ghost symbolises Macbeth’s conscience – in engineering Banquo’s (and, before that, Duncan’s) death – and marks the beginning of the decline of Macbeth’s reign. He is bereft of solace from that point.

Thus, the meaning of the collocation of language Banquo’s ghost – often referred to in literature as the ghost at the feast – according to the Free Dictionary by Farlex (online) is:

… someone or something that acts as a reminder of something negative and thus ruins the enjoyment of something:  … I think I’ll stay home.  I am afraid that since everyone knows about my recent diagnosis, I will be the ghost at the feast. 

Likewise, in Wiktionary – the Free Dictionary (online) – the collocation of language ghost at the feast is defined as follows:

… a presence that mars one’s enjoyment by causing guilt or reviving unwelcome memories.

The following references to Banquo’s Ghost appear in jurisprudence:

• In Wright v Cedzich [1930] ALR 105, Isaacs J – sitting as a member of the High Court with Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Rich and Starke JJ – wrote:

But like Banquo’s Ghost, the shadows of “dominion”, “potestas,” “possession” and “servant” still stalk about as if they were living realities. For, despite Jackson’s Case, it has been argued with great fervour that the older supposed law as to dominion governs the case.  I say “supposed” law, not only because it has been definitely negatived in 1891, but because for nearly two hundred years it has been virtually abandoned as an essential basis in favour of broader more reasonable principle, which is practically that I have above formulated.

• In VQAR v Minister for Immigration and Indigenous and Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCA 900, Heerey J, of the Federal Court of Australia, wrote at [10]:

In my view, there are a number of considerations why, as a matter of ordinary statutory construction, the power contended for cannot be implied into the Act. In general terms, the Act provides a complex scheme for dealing with visa applications in relation to non-citizens, with administrative and judicial review rights and a system whereby, once those rights are exhausted, an unlawful non-citizen must be removed from Australia; see s 198. It would be quite inconsistent with that overall parliamentary policy for the Minister to have, in the words of counsel for the applicant, “a floating inchoate power like Banquo’s ghost” extending indefinitely in point of time; see Sloane v Minister for Immigration Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 37 FCR 429 at 444, where French J, in considering a similar argument, said:

While it may be accepted that a power to reconsider a decision made in the exercise of a statutory discretion will have the advantage of convenience, it cannot always claim the virtue of necessity. And in the context of the Migration Act as it presently stands with specific regulations relating thereto, I do not consider, in the absence of clear words, that it would be proper to imply such a power.

• In AS v R [2023] NSWCCA 161, the New South Wales Court of Appeal wrote at [43]:

At one point the applicant submitted that “[t]he PV tendency evidence allied with the evidence of a joint criminal enterprise between DR and PV in counts 31–34 created a Banquo’s ghost effect in the trial”. However, that inference is contradicted by the jury’s request for clarification of the tendency directions and by the discrimination demonstrated in the verdicts. Thus, the jury acquitted both DR and PV with respect to count 33, suggested above to have been the most serious of the charges. Further, a similar degree of discrimination was demonstrated in the not-guilty verdicts with respect to seven counts involving either the applicant alone, or DR and the applicant in company. When taken with the strong directions by the trial judge, the possibility of an improper prejudicial effect may properly be dismissed.