Language – Infelicitous

The Macquarie Dictionary says:

Adjective 1. Not felicitous, happy, or fortunate; unhappy 2. Inapt or inappropriate; an infelicitous remark. Infelicitously, adverb.

The Cambridge Dictionary says:

Adjective – not suitable for the occasion.

Dictionary.com says:

Adjective

1. inapt, inappropriate, or awkward; malapropos: an infelicitous remark.

2. not felicitous, happy, or fortunate; unhappy.

…..

In King v The Queen (2012) 245 CLR 588; [2012] HCA 24 (20 June 2012), Bell J said:

106. At this point, the direction of which Mr King complains should be set out in full. The trial judge directed the jury that:

“There are two important differences between the offence of culpable driving causing death, and dangerous driving causing death that reflect the fact that the offence of culpable driving causing death is a more serious offence. First, the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused drove in a way that significantly increased the risk of harming others. There does not have to be a high risk of death or serious injury. That is only a requirement for culpable driving causing death by gross negligence. And secondly, unlike the offence of culpable driving causing death by gross negligence, in relation to the offence of dangerous driving causing death the Crown does not have to satisfy you that the driving is deserving of criminal punishment. The second element will be met [as] long as you find that the accused drove in a speed or manner that was dangerous to the public.”

107. In my view, the penultimate sentence of this direction is more than infelicitous; it is wrong. Although the prosecution was not required to prove, as an element of the offence of dangerous driving causing death, that Mr King’s conduct merited criminal punishment, it is not correct to identify that circumstance as an important difference between the two offences.

….

In Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Incorporated v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532; [2008] HCA 4 (7 February 2008), Kirby J said:

87. Had the legislature of Western Australia intended the construction now accepted in this Court to prevail, there would have been obvious ways of expressing that intention. One of any number of drafting conventions could have been employed to indicate that the Supreme Court was to be vested with an oversight role. However, the sub-section does not provide, for instance, that the Supreme Court must be “satisfied” that an identification was proper, or envisage the Commissioner making an “application” to have information quarantined. There is nothing analogous in this context to s 76(5) of the Act, which makes explicit the ability of the Supreme Court to “decide whether or not the Commissioner … could have reasonably had the belief required by section 72(2) when issuing the notice”. Rather, s 76(2) establishes an apparently simple consequential scheme by which the Commissioner’s act of identification has the results stated in the sub-section. In this context, I cannot accept that the present case is one in which infelicitous drafting has served to obscure the legislative intention. The intention is all too clear.

…..