Lawyers Ought be Cautious in Legal Social Media Commentary

In Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v Buckley [2025] NSWCATOD 95 (29 July 2025), the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales (Seiden SCDCJ, Deputy President, AR Boxell, Senior Member, and Emeritus Professor PJ Foreman AM, General Member) found the plaintiff guilty of both professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct in relation to, inter alia, his social media posts pertaining to NSW Supreme Court litigation involving Covid vaccination.  The Tribunal also recommended that the respondent’s solicitors name be struck from the roll.  The reasons are long, and somewhat complex, but portions thereof are worthy of reference in this section of Hearsay:

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Background

Disciplinary history of the respondent

6. The respondent was admitted as a lawyer in New South Wales on 7 July 2006. From around that time, until November 2021, he held a practising certificate issued by the applicant and practised as a solicitor at various law practices, including as a partner of G&B Lawyers (the Law Practice), from around May 2016. On 12 November 2021, the applicant resolved to suspend the respondent’s practising certificate until 30 June 2022 (the Suspension Decision) on the ground that the applicant reasonably believed that the respondent was unable to fulfil the inherent requirements of an Australian legal practitioner: Uniform Law, ss 82(1)(d) and 84.
7. The respondent sought judicial review of the Suspension Decision, which was dismissed: Buckley v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 328.
8. The respondent has not applied for a practising certificate since the expiry of the suspension period on 30 June 2022.
9. Despite not currently holding a practising certificate, the respondent is nevertheless amenable to disciplinary proceedings: Uniform Law, s 262(4).

Orders sought and response

10. The applicant contends that the alleged failures are of a sufficiently serious and persistent nature to constitute professional misconduct; and, or in the alternative, it is contended that as a result of the alleged failures, the respondent is not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.
11. In the event that it is found that the respondent engaged in professional misconduct as alleged, the applicant seeks an order under s 302(1)(f) of the Uniform Law, recommending that the respondent’s name be removed from the roll kept by the Supreme Court of New South Wales, pursuant to s 22 of the Uniform Law.
12. The respondent, on the other hand, save in respect of one course of conduct concerning comments in relation to a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW in Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard [2021] NSWSC 1320 (the Kassam Judgment) for which he has apologised (as detailed below), considers that there have been no breaches of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015 (NSW) (Conduct Rules). With respect to the conduct in relation to the Kassam Judgment, at worst, it is submitted to be unsatisfactory professional conduct.
13. For the reasons set out below, we have found that the respondent has engaged in both unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct under the Uniform Law, and the appropriate order is one recommending that he be removed from the roll of Australian lawyers maintained by the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

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The Kassam Judgment

180. Before moving to the next set of grounds, it is relevant to set out some background to the Kassam Judgment.
181. Broadly speaking, the conduct with which the Social Media Application is concerned, arises in the context of various orders (and challenges to those orders), made pursuant to s 7(2) of the Public Health Act, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; and more particularly, in response to what became known as the Delta variant. The impugned conduct also includes what might broadly be described as the respondent’s reaction to the decision of Beech-Jones CJ at CL (as his Honour then was) dismissing a challenge to those orders in the Kassam Judgment. That Judgment deals with applications made by two sets of plaintiffs known as the Kassam plaintiffs and the Henry plaintiffs, giving rise to separate proceedings dealt with together, in the one Judgment. The respondent’s involvement in the Henry plaintiffs’ proceedings, Henry & Ors v Bradley Ronald Hazzard (the Henry Proceedings), is particularly relevant to the Complaints as the Law Practice was the solicitor on record for the Henry plaintiffs.
182. In the Kassam Judgment, it was said at [1]:

“The highly contagious variant of COVID-19 known as the Delta variant was first detected in the community in New South Wales in June 2021. Since that time, it has spread rapidly. In response to the threat to public health it poses, the Minister for Health and Medical Research, the Honourable Bradley Hazzard, (the “Minister”), made various orders under s 7(2) of the Public Health Act 2010 (the “PHA”) which on any view significantly affect the freedoms of the citizens of this State and impose greater burdens on those who are not vaccinated. The main focus of the two proceedings the subject of this judgment is those aspects of those orders which prevented so called “authorised workers” from leaving an affected “area of concern” that they resided in, and prevent some people from working in the construction, aged care and education sectors, unless they have been vaccinated with one of the approved COVID-19 vaccines.”

183. The plaintiffs were not vaccinated and sought declarations that the Public Health (Covid 19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order (No 2) 2021 (NSW) and various other public health orders (the impugned orders), were invalid. It was contended, amongst other things, that because of their effect on rights and freedoms, the impugned orders were beyond the scope of s 7(2) of the Public Health Act.
184. As identified (at [7] of the Kassam Judgment), the question for the court concerned the legal validity of the impugned orders; including whether it was shown that no Minister, acting reasonably, could have considered the impugned orders necessary to deal with the identified risk to public health. The proceedings were dismissed: Kassam Judgment at [294]. Further, an appeal against the Henry Decision was unsuccessful: Kassam v Hazzard; Henry v Hazzard [2021] NSWCA 299.
185. The Henry plaintiffs relied on multiple grounds in the proceedings, one of the main grounds shared with the Kassam plaintiffs concerning the effect of the impugned orders on the rights and freedoms of persons who chose not to be vaccinated, especially their “freedom” or “right” to their own bodily integrity: Kassam Judgment at [8].
186. Another ground relied upon by both plaintiffs was that the impugned orders contravened s 51(xxiiiA) of the Commonwealth Constitution, with the Henry plaintiffs contending that in making the impugned orders, the Minister failed to take into account a relevant consideration; that is, the individual’s implied right under the Constitutionnot to be conscripted to take part in a vaccination program amounting to a medical service provided to the public: Kassam Judgment at [227].
187. The Court clarified with respect to the constitutional point that s 51(xxxiiA) proscribes the compulsory provision of medical services, as opposed to the compulsory acquisition of medical services. No part of the impugned orders involves any element of coercion on a doctor or other medical practitioner to vaccinate anyone: at [271]-[272]. Moreover, even if the impugned orders imposed a form of civil conscription, which they do not, they would not be rendered invalid by the operation of s 51(xxxiiA) because that provision is a prohibition on the exercise of the legislative power of the Commonwealth, not the states: Kassam Judgment at [275]-[277].
188. The Henry plaintiffs asserted that the impugned orders were unreasonable in light of the evidence (including expert evidence) adduced pointing to the “uncertainty surrounding the safety and efficacy of vaccines especially so far as the Delta variant is concerned”: Kassam Judgment at [140]. The Court found the evidence adduced concerning the effectiveness of vaccines, which could only go so far as to negative the “absolute certainty” of their safety, was not enough to establish that the differential treatment of unvaccinated people in the impugned orders was an approach that no Minister acting reasonably could have considered to be necessary to deal with the identified risk to public health: Kassam Judgment at [239]-[240].

Posts in connection with the Kassam Judgment (Grounds 6 and 7)

189. Ground 6 provides:

“The Respondent made public statements regarding the Judgment of Beech-Jones CJ at CL in the Kassam Judgment, which conduct was contrary to the Respondent’s paramount duty to the administration of justice under r 3 of the Conduct Rules.”

The Kassam Judgment Twitter and Facebook posts (Grounds 6 and 7)

190. Particulars 29-32 concern posts about the Kassam Judgment made by the respondent on Twitter and provide:

“29.   On or around 15 October 2021, the Respondent caused to be published a post on the Twitter platform stating, ‘So Justice Beech-Jones today said that no one in NSW has any rights. No one has a right to bodily integrity. He basically said it is ok to kill anyone you like. No one has any rights’.

30.   The post referred to at [particular] 29 above was published on the Twitter account of the Law Practice, of which the Respondent was a partner at the time, and which Law Practice acted as the solicitors on the record for the Henry plaintiffs in the proceedings the subject of the Kassam Judgment.

31.   In the Kassam Judgment:

a.   the plaintiffs argued that one of the public health orders under challenge violated a person’s right to bodily integrity (Kassam Judgment at [55]);

b.   Beech-Jones CJ at CL rejected the plaintiffs’ argument at (a) above, finding that the order did not violate a person’s bodily integrity (Kassam Judgment at [56]); and

c.    Beech-Jones CJ at CL held, among other things, that, while persons may consent to being vaccinated to avoid restrictions on their movement or to obtain access to a work site, that did not result in their consent being vitiated (Kassam Judgment at [63], [83] and [135]).

32.   The respondent’s statement referred to at [particular] 29 above:

a.   did not honestly or accurately characterise the effect of the Kassam judgment;

b.   criticised the Kassam Judgment based on facts that were not accurately stated;

c.   was likely to mislead persons as to the effect of the Kassam Judgment; and/or

d.    was likely to undermine confidence in the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW.”

191. Particulars 33-34 are in relation to the respondent’s posts about the Kassam Judgment on Facebook:

“33.    On or around 15 October 2021, the Respondent caused to be published a post on the Facebook platform stating, ‘So Justice Beech-Jones today said that no one in NSW has any rights. No one has a right to bodily integrity. He basically said it is ok to kill anyone you like. No one has any rights’.

34.   The post referred to at [particular] 33 was published bon the Facebook page of the Law Practice, of which the Respondent was a partner at the time, and which acted as the solicitor for the Henry plaintiffs in the proceedings the subject of the Kassam Judgment.”

192. The applicant repeats in particular 35 the findings made by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in the Kassam Judgment set out in particular 31.
193. The applicant repeats in particular 36 the alleged effect of the respondent’s statement set out in particular 32.

Breach of the Conduct Rules: The Kassam Judgment Twitter and Facebook posts (Grounds 6 and 7)

194. The applicant’s contention that, by posting the Twitter and Facebook posts, the respondent breached the Conduct Rules, is set out in Ground 6 (particular 37) and Ground 7 (particular 39).
195. By particular 37 the applicant contends:

“The Respondent’s conduct referred to in the following [particulars] was contrary to his paramount duty to the administration of justice as required under r 3 of the Conduct Rules:

a. [particulars] 29 to 32 above;

b. [particulars] 33 to 36 above;

c. [particulars] 29 to 32 and [particulars] 33 to 36 above, when considered together.”

196. Ground 7 alleges:

“By engaging in the conduct referred to in:

a. [particulars] 29 to 32 above;

b. [particulars] 33 to 36 above;

c. [particulars] 29 to 32 and [particulars] 33 to 36 above,

when considered together, the Respondent acted in a manner which, contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules, was likely to a material degree to:

d. be prejudicial to, or diminish the public confidence in, the administration of justice; and/or

e. bring the legal profession into disrepute.”

197. By particular 39 the applicant repeats particulars 29-32 and particulars 33-36 above.

The applicant’s submissions as to factual findings and breach of the Conduct Rules

198. Briefly summarised, the applicant makes the following submissions in relation to Grounds 6 and 7:

1. On no view did the Kassam judgment stand for any of the propositions made by the respondent in his posts. The focus of those proceedings was on aspects of Public Health Orders (introduced in response to COVID-19) that prevented “authorised workers” from leaving an affected “area of concern” that they resided in, and prevented some people from working in the construction, aged care and education sectors, unless they had been vaccinated with one of the approved COVID-19 vaccines (Kassam Judgment at [1]).
2. The Kassam Judgment did not say that nobody has a right to bodily integrity. A person was still required to give consent to a COVID-19 vaccine before it could be administered. The Public Health Orders did not purport to confer authority on any person, including any medical practitioner, to administer a vaccine without consent – to do so forcefully would still constitute a battery (Kassam Judgment at [55]-[56]).
3. The respondent did not honestly or accurately characterise the effect of the Kassam Judgment. His public statements were likely to mislead persons as to the effect of the judgment by representing that individuals’ bodies were not legally protected from harm (or at least, that was the finding of the Court, so mischaracterised).
4. In light of his paramount duty contained in r 3 of the Conduct Rules, the respondent, as the solicitor on the record for the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam proceedings, should have been familiar or familiarised himself with the facts of the case and the arguments raised in it to ensure he had a proper basis for the content of his posts.
5. The administration of justice requires that judicial determinations should retain authority and influence and that there be public confidence in the courts’ judgments. While it is expected that those judgments may be subject to fair and robust criticism, the respondent’s statement struck at the legitimacy of the Supreme Court of NSW without an arguable basis for doing so and fell outside the bounds of permissible advocacy, contrary to his paramount duty in r 3: see Potkonyak v Legal Services Commissioner (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 173 (Potkonyak).
6. The respondent’s post was made in circumstances where it was apparent (or at least very likely) that he was a legal practitioner, whose analysis and opinion would likely be given greater weight by members of the public, and who would not expect the respondent to make statements without arguable basis. The statements were thus likely to mislead and detract from the proper administration of justice and to encourage groundless misgivings about the integrity, propriety or impartiality of the judicial officer of the relevant court. Their effect was to undermine confidence in the administration of justice contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules.
7. The further statements by the respondent that “[h]e basically said it is okay to kill anyone you like. No one has any rights” exacerbated the misleading nature of the first two statements. Using inflammatory language, those further statements conveyed that Beech-Jones CJ at CL had delivered a judgment that condoned serious violence analogous to murder.

The respondent’s position as to factual findings and breach of the Conduct Rules

199. The respondent admits to making the statements.
200. The respondent contends in his Reply and his written submissions that the statements were never intended or meant to:

1. criticise the Henry or Kassam judgments based on facts that were not accurately stated;
2. be a description of, characterisation of the effect, or case analysis, of the Henry or Kassam judgments;
3. mislead persons as to the effect of the Henry or Kassam judgments;
4. undermine confidence in the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL or at the Supreme Court of New South Wales;
5. be prejudicial to, or diminish the public confidence in the administration of justice and or bring the legal profession into disrepute.

201. The respondent says that rather, the statements were meant to highlight the political position that the NSW Government could mandate lethal injections upon individual citizens or the broader NSW public through the use of public health orders.

Evidence given by the respondent

202. The respondent repeatedly denied in cross examination that his post was addressing the Reasons for Judgment published by Beech-Jones CJ at CL earlier that day. He instead characterises what he said as “simply rants” made at a “very stressful time”. Set out below are extracts from cross examination on this point:

“Q.  Mr Buckley, do you accept that what you were making a post about were reasons that Justice Beech-Jones had delivered that day?  Do you accept that? 

A.  No.  

Q.  You don’t accept that? 

A.  I’ve already said that doesn’t refer to the reasons. 

Q.  I’m asking you a different question.  Do you accept that what you were actually posting about were what Justice Beech-Jones had said in reasons that he had delivered that day, correct? 

A.  It doesn’t say “reasons” anywhere.  He could have said it in the street. 

Q.  I’m going to be making submissions about your insight into this conduct.  Are you seriously suggesting that it is not clear what you were posting about?  Is that your evidence on oath to this Tribunal? 

A.  That’s always been my evidence, that these are just random rants.  There was never any case analysis done in this post, which is what you’re trying to suggest.”

203. The respondent conceded in cross examination in relation to his statements that Beech-Jones CJ at CL had said that “It’s okay to kill anyone you like” was “potentially misleading”.
204. The following exchange occurred in cross examination in relation to the likely effect of the posts given the accounts they were made from:

“Q.  What I want to suggest to you – and I’ll just ask whether you agree with it – that where you as a lawyer, who was a solicitor on the record in particular proceedings, makes a post on your law firm’s social media account about what the judge said that day, that’s likely to be given an additional weight by people reading it because it’s coming from a solicitor who was on the record in the proceedings?  Can you agree with that? 

A. Perhaps.

Q.  Well, the answer’s ‘Yes’, isn’t it? 

A.  I can’t speak for everybody who read the Twitter posts.  I don’t know.”

Insight and contrition of the respondent

205. The respondent makes the following submissions:

1. The statements have been misconstrued by the Applicant and, although it doesn’t justify their being made, were simply rants in “frustration and anger” during a stressful time, a “once in a lifetime event for all Australians”.
2. With the benefit of time and self-reflection, he could see that “the statements should have never been made in the first place. It was wrong to make those statements.”
3. The respondent apologised in an email of 19 March 2023 (the Apology) and in the 19 February 2023 email.
4. Further evidence of insight into his conduct is his enrolment in the College of Law’s ‘Ethics and Professional Responsibility’ course as part of the online Practical Legal Training Program which he intends to complete successfully.
5. He otherwise replies that the making of the statements referred to in Grounds 6 and 7 amounts to, at most, unsatisfactory professional conduct.

206. The applicant makes the following submissions in relation to the respondent’s explanation for his conduct:

1. It was inappropriate for the respondent to gloss over the statements he made as merely “rants”. Such a minimisation reflects the respondent’s lack of insight into the seriousness of the statements.
2. It does not matter that the respondent did not subjectively intend to do any of the things the applicant contends he did. What is relevant is the objective result of his conduct, and whether it is caught by the relevant conduct rule.
3. The various explanations proffered by the respondent for his conduct reflect a lack of insight into the seriousness of that conduct.
4. The fact that the respondent was conducting himself during what he contends was a “stressful time” should be afforded little weight because he was not suffering from any particular health issue, and furthermore, “[c]haracter is tested not by what one does in good times but in bad.”: citing Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (1994) 34 NSWLR 408 (Foreman) at 449 (Mahoney JA).

Determination: the Kassam Judgment Twitter and Facebook posts (particulars 29 to 36)

207. The Tribunal is satisfied of the following matters:

1. The respondent made the posts using the Twitter Page of the Law Practice and the Facebook page of the Law Practice respectively, as admitted by him.
2. On readily available information it could be gleaned that the Law Practice acted for the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam proceedings. The publicly available Judgment named the Law Practice as the solicitors for the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam Judgment.
3. The posts mischaracterised the effect of the Kassam Judgment. The Judgment found that the impugned health orders forming part of the Public Health (COVID-19 Additional Restrictions for Delta Outbreak) Order (No 2)(NSW) did not authorise the involuntary vaccination of anyone and thus could not have violated their right to bodily integrity: Kassam Judgment at [55]-[70].
4. The respondent was wrong to suggest that the upshot of the Judgment was that nobody had any rights, including the right to bodily integrity, or that “it is okay to kill anyone you like.” The only ‘right’ at issue was the curtailment of the freedom of movement from the impugned orders affecting one’s ability to work and socialise, which varied according to whether a person was vaccinated or unvaccinated: Kassam Judgment at [9]. In the context of the pandemic, those limitations were found to be in line with the object of public safety contained in the Public Health Act from which the Health Minister derived the power to make such orders (s 7(2)): Kassam Judgment at [10]-[11].
5. The statements were therefore likely to mislead persons as to the effect of the Kassam Judgment.
6. The statements used inflammatory language and imputed that the Supreme Court irrationally condoned the violation of bodily integrity and violence.
7. The statements were extremely derogatory and related to the Court’s institutional integrity.
8. The statements cannot be easily dismissed as mere rants. The fact that the Law Practice acted for the Henry Plaintiffs gave the post more legitimacy.

208. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that particulars 29 to 36 of Ground 6 are made out.

Determination: Breach of the Conduct Rules (Grounds 6 and 7)

209. In light of his paramount obligation under r 3 of the Conduct Rules, the respondent, as a solicitor, should have known or made himself aware of the operative effect of the Kassam Judgment and not made public statements so clearly mischaracterising it. By posting under the name of the Law Practice, who acted for the Henry plaintiffs, the respondent was sending a message that was misleading and at the same time cloaked in legitimacy. This was contrary to his paramount obligation to the court and the administration of justice. The respondent therefore breached r 3 of the Conduct Rules.
210. Even if we are to accept the comments as mere “rants”, as the respondent describes them, we do not accept that they would be readily dismissed by readers. The publication of the statements by the Law Practice and the available knowledge that the Law Practice represented the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam proceedings imbues those statements with a degree of legitimacy when they:

1. had no arguable basis;
2. mischaracterised the Kassam Judgment; and
3. risked undermining the authority of the Supreme Court of NSW.

211. The statements posed a material risk to, and were liable to detract from, the proper administration of justice because they were highly misleading to viewers of those statements, suggesting that the Court had acted irrationally and condoned violence. Therefore, the respondent contravened r 5 of the Conduct Rules.
212. The statements were likely to undermine public confidence in the authority of Beech Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW, given the inflammatory contents of the post and the extreme effects alleged to arise from the Judgment, coupled with the association between the post and the Law Practice.

The Apology

213. The respondent refers in his submissions to the email sent to the Law Society and to Beech-Jones CJ at CL on 19 March 2023 in which he apologised for making the statements and noted that he should not have made the statements contained in Grounds 6 and 7 and in Grounds 8 and 9 (the Apology).
214. The Apology was in the following terms:

“Dear Law Society of NSW and Beech-Jones CJ at CL,

The purpose of this email is to apologise for the social media posts that I made on or around 15 October 2021 relating to the effect of the first instance decision of Beech-Jones CJ at CL in the Henry and Kassam and Ors v Hazzard proceedings, which are subject to a current disciplinary investigation and which I understand the Law Society of NSW intends to prosecute me for.

As I mentioned in my recent email of 19 February 2023, I should have never written these social media posts.

On reflection, the stresses of covid lock downs, vaccine mandates, restrictions on movement and widespread discrimination of unvaccinated people negatively impacted my judgment at the time.

With the benefit of time and self-reflection, I accept that I should not have made these social media posts.

I sincerely apologise.

Regards,
Nathan Buckley”

215. The respondent submits that this Apology:

1. was genuine and sincere;
2. was written “during the Applicant’s investigation, several months prior to the commencement of the Social Media Application”;
3. “certainly is very useful to the Tribunal in the Tribunal’s assessment of any orders to be made by the Tribunal”; and
4. highlights the respondent’s insight into the seriousness of his own conduct and the fact that he accepts responsibility for his conduct, especially in the sense that he recognises he should not have made the social media posts in the first place.

216. The respondent rejects the applicant’s submission that the respondent, by making the Apology, was seeking to avoid or mitigate the consequences of the proceedings proposed to be commenced against him by the Council.
217. In cross examination, the respondent accepted that the 19 March 2023 Apology was sent one month after he had been informed that disciplinary proceedings would be commenced against him in relation to his posts.  
218. The Apology includes a reference to the respondent’s email of 19 February 2023 sent by the respondent to the Law Society only. It is submitted by the respondent that the email highlights further insight into the seriousness of his conduct.
219. The email of 19 February 2023 was in the following terms:

“Dear Ms McAndrew,

I refer to your letter dated 17 February 2023.

I have considered Attachment A.

Whilst I believe that I have already been significantly disciplined by virtue of a near 8 month suspension period and an inability to work in the legal profession since 12 November 2021, I do not wish to contest any further matters.

What I will say is that at the time of making a number of public statements (referred to in allegations 1 to 6), the context and the dates when those statements were made should be taken into consideration.

These were very difficult times for me personally. At the height of lockdowns, restrictions on movement, covid-19 vaccine mandates, vaccine passports and vaccine discrimination. It should be noted that I have not submitted to any covid-19 injections and this impacted me personally greatly during these times.

At the time of making the public statements, I was also discriminated against and cast aside by the broader community. All of the comments made by me were made in frustration and anger. Anger at what our society and Australia had become.

The statements were never intended to suggest to anyone any analysis of a judgment or decision. They were simply comments made in frustration and anger. With the benefit of hindsight, I should have never written them.

I have always acted in the best interests of my clients. I have always had the best intentions.

Expert evidence was relied upon by the Henry and Kassam plaintiffs highlighting the health risks of the covid-19 injections, which included amongst other things, immune system related issues, myocarditis, heart failure and death arising from immunodeficiency related diseases. All of these things have proven to be true. People have died already. Millions globally have suffered numerous heart related issues, including myocarditis and pericarditis. This evidence was ultimately ignored by the Court. This is the background context to the statement referred to in paragraph 14 of your letter. In my view, it is not misleading. The decision of upholding the vaccine mandates ultimately meant that if a person wanted to leave their home or go to work and earn a living, then they had to submit to 2 doses of a covid-19 injection. That meant that the person waived any right to bodily integrity. Knowing what we knew then by way of expert evidence and what we know now, the covid-19 injections do kill people. Accordingly, it followed that by upholding the vaccine mandates, it must have also followed that the NSW Health Minister had the power to force individuals to submit to experimental injections ultimately leading to a risk of their death in order to participate in society and earn a living. That is the gist of the comment referred to in paragraph 14. You may disagree with that analysis, however, that is my view and it is not misleading. It was supported by the independent expert evidence relied upon. Vaccine mandates and any right to bodily integrity are incongruous. They cannot operate together.

What must also be considered in this context is that the decision of Beech-Jones J was taken on appeal to the Court of Appeal. No mention of that was made in your letter. It is important to note this context because at the time (15 October 2021), the view was that the Beech-Jones J decision had reasonable grounds of appeal, including with respect to human rights to bodily integrity.

Ultimately it comes down to a difference of opinion on the interpretation of the Beech-Jones J decision at first instance. The only real arbiters of that are the Court of Appeal. That was where it was tried and tested. Your failure to consider this must be reconsidered.

This context also applies to allegations 3 to 6. Effectively, the gist of the Beech-Jones J decision reflected the position that the Health Minister could order any person to submit to an injection in order to go to work and or leave their home and or participate in society. Even if that ultimately resulted in their eventual death. As noted above, people have died of heart failure and other immunodeficiency related issues arising out of the covid-19 injections. Otherwise healthy people now dying ‘suddenly and unexpectedly’. How often do we see these words splashed across news websites daily? The independent expert evidence said this was going to happen. Beech-Jones J ignored it.
Considered it irrelevant. This context must be taken into consideration. Particularly since you haven’t provided one piece of evidence to establish that anything I have ever written is misleading. As a prosecutor you have a duty to establish that these statements are or were misleading.

It is clear that based on the Beech-Jones J decision, the NSW Health Minister could order anyone to do anything so long as it was made under section 7 of the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW). That is a dangerous and serious outcome. One that raises any number of human rights issues. Issues that have been ignored and or considered irrelevant.

The statements made by me did not condone individuals to perpetrate violence on anyone. Quite the opposite. They were to highlight that the NSW Government (via the Health Minister) can perpetrate medical rape and ultimate death on people under the guise of a public health order or direction. This is not misleading. It is in fact the reality of section 7 of the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW).

Turning to allegations 7 and 8, I did not endorse anything. A like is a like of someone’s comment. That’s the end of it. It doesn’t endorse anything. As a prosecutor, this would fail. You have to establish that I endorsed anything. A like on Facebook falls short of that.

If I am right as to the gist of the Beech-Jones J decision, then I will also be right regarding allegations 9 and 10.

…

I am willing to provide a written apology to the NSW Law Society for the public statements that I made. I am also prepared not to apply for a practising certificate for a certain period of time and undertake any required course work.

I am embarrassed that the statements I made ultimately ruined my professional career. The stresses of lockdowns, restrictions on movement, vaccine mandates and vaccine discrimination negatively impacted my judgment at the time and whilst that is no excuse for my actions, I wish to make amends. The benefit of hindsight and time that has elapsed has assisted.

I am not a bad person. I admit that I have made mistakes. Like all humans, we make mistakes. In this light, I ask that you reconsider commencing an application in NCAT but rather explore an undertaking or deed with some agreed alternatives as suggested above. It should be self evident that an undertaking and or deed will provide a more certain regulatory outcome that you can enforce should there be a breach.

Regards,
Nathan Buckley.”

220. The following exchange occurred in cross examination of the respondent regarding the time at which the email was sent:

“Q.  So do you agree with me, the context in which you sent the 19 February 2023 email was that you had recently been informed by the Law Society that it would be commencing disciplinary proceedings against you? 

A.  Yes, because the first sentence of my email says, ‘I refer to your letter dated 17 February 2023’.   

Q.  So do you agree with me that the context in which you sent the 19 February email, and the apology of 19 March, was that you had recently been informed by the Law Society that it would be commencing disciplinary proceedings against you? 

A.  No.  The 19 February email was in response to the letter dated 17 February.  The apology was separate and unrelated, but it’s connected by reference to the 19 February email.”

221. The respondent stood by the contents of the 19 February 2023 email although parts of it were no longer relevant.
222. The following exchange occurred in cross examination of the respondent regarding the email’s capacity to reveal insight into the respondent’s conduct:

“Q.  In this email, you were setting out your response to various allegations set out in the reasons which start at TB204.  I want to suggest to you that at no point in the matters you put forward in that email, do you express any analysis or insight as to why your conduct was wrong?  

A.  And it didn’t because that was dealt with in the subsequent emails and the apology of 19 March 2023.  Aside from, no, that’s actually, it does actually show insight and I, I can refer you to the bottom of page 466, where it says  

‘I’m willing to provide a written apology to the NSW Law Society for the public statements that I made.  I’m also prepared not to apply for a practising certificate for a certain period of time and undertake any required coursework.’

And then it goes on to say: 

‘I’m embarrassed by the statements that I have made.  They may have ultimately ruined my professional career.  The stresses of lockdowns, restrictions on movement, vaccine mandates and vaccine discrimination negatively impacted my judgment at the time.  Whilst that is no excuse for my actions, I wish to make amends.  The benefit of hindsight and the time that has elapsed has assisted.’

Then it goes on to say ‘I’m not a bad person.  I admit that I’ve made mistakes like all humans, we make mistakes.’ That’s, that’s insight.  

Q.  Well, I want to suggest to you that that’s not insight.  That’s expressing a wish that something hadn’t happened and hoping that proceedings wouldn’t be commenced.  Can you point to anywhere in this email where you expressed views or put forward any analysis addressing the allegations against you that describes or shows an understanding as to why your conduct was wrong?  

A.  I’ve just written it, written, read it out to you.  

Q.  It’s the bits you pointed to?  

A.  And the apology of 19 March 2023.” 

223. The applicant notes the following matters in relation to the Apology:

1. The Apology was made approximately a year and a half after the respondent first made the Twitter and Facebook posts in relation to the Kassam Judgment, and in the intervening period his practising certificate had been suspended.
2. The Apology was made in circumstances where the respondent was seeking to mitigate the consequences of proceedings proposed to be commenced against him.
3. The Apology did not set out detail as to why the conduct was wrong and reflects a lack of insight from the respondent.
4. The existence of the Apology does not alter the proper characterisation of the conduct for which the respondent apologised.
5. A letter was sent by the Law Society to the respondent on 17 February 2023 notifying him of the Council’s decision to commence proceedings, sent two days before the 19 February 2023 email and around one month before the Apology was sent by the respondent on 19 March 2023, which incorporates the 19 February 2023 email.
6. The substantial focus of the 19 February 2023 email was on defending the respondent’s conduct and “would not provide the Tribunal comfort” that the respondent has gained insight in respect of Grounds 6 and 7.

Consideration: The Apology and the email of 19 February 2023

224. The Tribunal is satisfied of the following matters:

1. The Apology and email demonstrate that the respondent is remorseful in relation to his conduct. The respondent admits he should never have made the statements the subject of Grounds 6, 7, 8 and 9. As he stated, his judgment was negatively impacted by the stresses surrounding the pandemic.
2. The respondent genuinely accepts that the comments should not have been made.
3. The conduct was, at least in part, the product of the extreme stress the respondent felt concerning the pandemic; the risks with vaccinations and the outcome of the Kassam Judgment.
4. There is nevertheless nothing to indicate that the respondent, yet, has insight into the severity of his wrongful conduct in light of his obligations as a legal practitioner.
5. The respondent was aware from the 17 February 2023 email sent by the Law Society that the Professional Conduct Committee of the Law Society had resolved to initiate proceedings against him for the alleged conduct. The respondent’s knowledge of this must be taken into account when considering the force of his 19 February 2023 email and the Apology sent one month later. Those explanations and apologies were given and made while the respondent was aware he was being prosecuted for his conduct. There can be no suggestion that the timing was coincidental. The conduct occurred more than a year and a half earlier.
6. The 19 February 2023 email is heavily focussed on explanations for the respondent’s conduct including “frustration and anger” and “the stresses” of the pandemic while maintaining that it has not been established “that anything I have ever written is misleading.” The respondent expressed that: “whilst that is no excuse for my actions, I wish to make amends.”
7. The Tribunal considers that, while the email demonstrates embarrassment and contrition on the part of the respondent, it does little to persuade the Tribunal that the respondent truly understands all the reasons why his conduct was wrong.
8. The respondent, while accepting that the conduct was wrong, does not accept it was misleading or might be treated by readers as a comment on the Reasons for Judgment. He maintains that his comments were an accurate representation of the effect of the Kassam Judgment.
9. The respondent does not show any true insight into his obligations as a legal practitioner or to the administration of justice that may arise from the conduct, dismissing it as a rant.
10. Notwithstanding his subjective impression of the realities of vaccine mandates and the powers of the government during the pandemic, the respondent had a professional obligation to refrain from making intemperate, unjustifiably critical and inflammatory comments.
11. Ultimately, the Apology and the 19 February 2023 email go some way to demonstrating that the respondent is aware he acted contrary to his professional obligations. However, he does not seem to appreciate how far from professional standards he strayed; even taking into account the extra stress he felt in the circumstances.

Unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct

225. In Ground 16 of the Complaint, the applicant contends that taken individually, the conduct referred to in Ground 6 or Ground 7 amounts to professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law.
226. The respondent concedes that “at most” the conduct referred to in Grounds 6 and 7 amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct.
227. While the respondent relies on his Apology in reply, which we apprehend is done so partially on the basis that it shows the respondent’s behaviour was out of character because of the pandemic-related stresses he refers to, we consider that the personal circumstances of the respondent do not affect the characterisation of his conduct as professional misconduct under s 297(1)(a).
228. Even accepting that the events surrounding the post were objectively stressful and that the respondent was subjectively negatively affected by the outcome of the Kassam Judgment, the conduct departed from the appropriate standard.
229. As the Tribunal has found a breach of rr 3 and 5 of the Conduct Rules, the respondent’s conduct is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct under ss 296 and 298(b) of the Uniform Law.
230. The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent’s public statements relating to the Kassam Judgment represent a substantial failure to maintain the requisite standard for the following reasons:

1. His failure was directly relevant to his ability to practise law: Asuzu at [40]. The respondent used the Facebook and Twitter pages of the Law Practice of which he was principal.
2. The statements were erroneous and highly misleading to viewers of those statements especially where it was public knowledge that the Law Practice represented the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam proceedings.
3. As the Law Practice represented the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam proceedings there was an even greater onus on the respondent to take care when commenting on the Kassam Judgment. What the respondent said was cloaked with the authority of a solicitor connected to the proceedings.
4. As a lawyer himself and one connected with the Kassam proceedings there was a greater ability and therefore greater onus to take care when making comments, irrespective of whether readers knew the post was his responsibility.
5. The statements cast aspersions against the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court of NSW by suggesting that Beech-Jones CJ at CL condoned serious violence.
6. The fact that the respondent characterises these as mere rants demonstrates his inattention to his professional obligations.

231. These factors constitute a fundamental lack of regard for the administration of justice of which the respondent forms part. They represent a substantial failure because the respondent did not direct his mind to the potential that he was mischaracterising the Kassam Judgment, and the severe implications of his public mischaracterisation and disparaging comments. As an officer of the Court, the respondent’s blatant lack of regard for the Court and for the administration of justice, and his lack of regard for the consequences of his actions, is serious. The respondent allowed his professional obligations to be overborne by his personal grievances.
232. The Tribunal finds that the conduct alleged in Ground 6 and 7 warrants a finding of professional misconduct under s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law.

Comments in relation to the Kassam Judgment (Grounds 8 and 9)

233. Ground 8 alleges:

“The Respondent made public comments in connection with the Kassam Judgment, which conduct was contrary to the Respondent’s paramount duty to the administration of justice under r 3 of the Conduct Rules.”

The Kassam Judgment Twitter and Facebook comments (Particulars 41 to 49:)

234. The applicant contends by particular 41 that on or around October 2021, the Respondent caused to be published the following comments on the Twitter platform which followed his Twitter post about the Kassam Judgment (the Twitter Comments):

“a.   In response to the following comment by Darren@NonlinearDarren:

‘I think we are able to cut the Testicles of pedos seeing as they don’t have rights protected by the govt or 90 yr suppression order anymore. Would I be correct in this assumption?’,

on 15 October 2021, the Respondent stated:

“You’re correct based on today’s judgment. Go for it. Pedos have no rights.”

b.   In response to the following comment by Whats Your Thoughts@colleenmenzies:

‘Does that mean I can go on a rampage? I have a few people I dislike & that have wronged Me!’),

on 15 October 2021, the Respondent stated:

‘Yeah. Beech-Jones said no one has any rights in New South Wales. Do as you please.’

c.   In response to the following comment by Kezza Ray @kezzaRay666:

‘Can I go inject heroin into people?’),

on 16 October 2021, the Respondent stated:

‘So long as it’s done under a public health order under section 7 of the Public Health Act, yes’,”

235. By particular 42 the applicant contends:

“The Twitter Comments were posted on the Twitter account of the Law Practice, of which the Respondent was a partner at the time, and which Law Practice acted as the solicitors on the record for the Henry plaintiffs in the proceedings the subject of the Kassam Judgment.”

236. The Applicant repeats in particular 43 the contents of particular 31 above (at [190]) as to the findings made by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in the Kassam Judgment.
237. The Applicant contends by particular 44 that the Twitter Comments:

“a. did not honestly and fairly describe the effect of the Kassam Judgment;

b. criticised the Kassam Judgment based on facts that were not accurately stated;

c. were likely to mislead persons as to the effect of the Kassam Judgment; and/or

d. were likely to undermine confidence in the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW.”

238. The applicant contends by particular 45 that in or around October 2021, the Respondent caused to be published the following comments on the Facebook platform which followed his Facebook post about the Kassam Judgment (the Facebook Comments):

“a. In response to the comment:

‘That’s great news, I know some right asshole pedo pollies who shouldn’t be breathing’,

the Respondent stated:

‘… do your best.’

b. In response to the comment:

‘So I can rape anyone? Not that I’m going to but this is what your status is saying. Anything is possible. ff death is possible, so is rape, sexual harassment, emotional abuse already exists and many people get away with it. Fathers have no rights when it comes to court proceedings. It is not about blaming the government but the people that support the government. People are greater than the government. We the people are meant to win this’,

the Respondent stated:

‘... ask Beech-Jones. In NSW no one has any rights to bodily integrity. That’s what his judgment says.’

c. In response to the comment:

‘Anyone know his phone number. Prank him 24/7?’,

the Respondent stated:

‘it’s on the website’ and posted a link to the Supreme Court website contacts page.

d. In response to the comment, “We won’t forget what he said!”, the Respondent stated:

‘Hopefully he has a very short career as the CJ at CL.’

e. The Respondent posted the comment referred to at [particular] 45.d above:

‘... my point was you want to get somewhere in the legal world you have to give up everything that you ever believed in and wanted when you set out on your journey to be a lawyer. It’s all bullshit. Unless you are in a position of power, you‘re not getting anywhere. If you want to be a controlled muppet. Then you’ll go far. If you want to represent people on your own, you‘ll get nowhere. As soon as you take on the establishment, the Law Society will be all over your arse like a wet dildo.’

f. In response to the comment:

‘I hope that judge never sleeps another night knowingly he just consciously played his part in the murder of many Australians’,

the Respondent stated:

‘with the [image of fish emoji]?’”

239. The applicant contends by particular 46:

“The Facebook comments were posted on the Facebook Page of the Law Practice, of which the Respondent was a partner at the time, and which Law Practice acted as the solicitors on the record for the Henry plaintiffs in the proceedings the subject of the Kassam Judgment.”

240. By particular 47 the applicant repeats particular 31 above (at [190]) as to the findings made by Beech-Jones CJ at CL in the Kassam Judgment.
241. The applicant contends by particular 48 that the Facebook Comments at particular 45(a) and/or (b) above:

“a. did not honestly and fairly describe the effect of the Kassam Judgment;

b. criticised the Kassam Judgment based on facts that were not accurately stated; and/or

c. were likely to mislead persons as to the effect of the Kassam Judgment.”

242. The applicant contends by particular 49 that further or alternatively, the Facebook Comments at particular 45(a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and/or (f) above were likely to undermine confidence in the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW.

Breach of the Conduct Rules: Grounds 8 and 9 (the Twitter and Facebook comments)

243. The applicant’s contention that, by posting the Twitter and Facebook Comments, the respondent breached the Conduct Rules, is set out in Ground 8 (particular 50) and Ground 9 (particular 52).
244. The applicant contends by particular 50 that the Respondent’s conduct referred to in the following particulars was contrary to his paramount duty to the administration of justice as required under r 3 of the Conduct Rules:

“a. [particulars] 41 to [44] above;

b. [particulars] 45 to 49 above;

c. [particulars] 41 to [44] and [particulars] 45 to 49 above, when considered together.”

245. Ground 9 contends that:

“By engaging in the conduct referred to in:

a. [particulars] 41 to [44] above;

b. [particulars] 45 to 49 above;

c.[particulars] 41 to [44] and particulars 45 to 49 above, when considered together;

the Respondent acted in a manner which, contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules, was likely to a material degree to:

d. be prejudicial to, or diminish the public confidence in, the administration of justice; and/or

e. brings the legal profession into disrepute.”

246. By particular 52 to Ground 9 the Applicant repeats:

“a. [particulars] 41 to 44 above; and

b. [particulars] 45 to 49 above.”

The applicant’s submissions as to factual findings and breach of the Conduct Rules

247. Briefly summarised, the applicant made the following submissions in relation to Grounds 8 and 9:

1. By posting the Twitter comments, the respondent suggested that the effect of the Kassam Judgment was that the extraordinary and violent actions that had been described by users (such as cutting off someone’s testicles, going “on a rampage” and injecting people with heroin) were rendered permissible.
2. By posting the Facebook comments, the respondent suggested that extraordinary and violent steps could be taken because they were effectively condoned by the Kassam Judgment, as no one in NSW had “any rights” to bodily integrity.
3. The respondent’s conduct in authoring the comments on the Twitter and Facebook platforms was “particularly egregious” as they were made on the social media pages of the Law Practice which had represented one of the parties in the proceedings, meaning the comments were likely to be given greater weight.
4. The comment made on Facebook set out in particular 45(f) had the potential to convey (and appears to have been taken by some users as conveying) that Mr Buckley was recommending that Beech-Jones CJ at CL “sleep with the fishes” (being a reference to being murdered).
5. The respondent’s comments on the Facebook platform that the Chief Judge would have a “short career” and “sleep with the [fishes]” were personal attacks aimed at a judicial officer and likely to impair the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and the Supreme Court of NSW. The respondent’s explanation regarding his use of the fish emoji does not make any sense – any alternative suggestions of the intended meaning of that comment would lead to an absurd result understood in context.
6. The comment in particular 45(e) suggested that the position of his Honour (and the Law Society) was morally compromised.
7. The respondent’s criticisms of Beech-Jones CJ at CL, and the legal profession more generally, were inappropriate and groundless. They had the effect of undermining the confidence in the integrity and propriety of the legal profession.
8. For those reasons, the respondent engaged in conduct that was contrary to his paramount duty to the administration of justice (r 3) and which was likely to be prejudicial to, or diminish public confidence in, the administration of justice, and/or bring the profession into disrepute (r 5).

The respondent’s position as to factual findings and breach of the Conduct Rules

248. The respondent admits to making the statements and admits that he should not have made the statements.
249. The respondent contends that the statements made by him have been misconstrued by the applicant in a similar fashion to the statements particularised in Grounds 6 and 7 (the Kassam Facebook and Twitter statements).

Evidence and submissions given by the respondent

The Twitter comments

250. The respondent accepted in cross examination that the comments he made on the Twitter platform related to the Kassam Judgment delivered that day in which he was a lawyer on the record, and he was expressing his opinion based on that Judgment.
251. The respondent denies that the comments made on the Twitter platform were in any way condoning violence. Set out below are various extracts from cross examination of the respondent to this effect:

“Q.  So do you agree you were expressing your opinion based on Justice Beech-Jones’ judgment that day– 

A. Yes. 
Q.  –that a person would be able to cut the testicles off a paedophile? 

A.  That’s what it said.     

Q.  That’s what you said, correct? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Do you agree with me that by making a comment to that effect on your law firm’s Twitter account you were condoning violence by that person? 

A.  No.  No, it’s just banter. 

Q.  Is that your evidence this is just banter? 

A.  Yes. 

…

Q.  And that you are again condoning violence there because this person has said she wants to go on a rampage and you’ve said, ‘Do as you please’? 
A.  Again, it’s not condoning violence. 

Q.  Do you agree that she’s asked you a question, ‘Does that mean I can go on a rampage?’ and you’ve answered, ‘Yes.  Do as you please’?  Do you agree that you’re condoning violence by her? 

A.  No.  Rampage could be anything.  It could be, you know, going for a walk, going for a run.  She hasn’t described what a rampage means. 

Q.  Mr Buckley, you’re making submissions you’ve got insight into this conduct.  Are you seriously suggesting that when someone says, ‘Can I go on a rampage,’ and you say, ‘Do as you please,’ that maybe she’s talking about going for a walk.  Is that really your evidence? 
A.  Yeah.  I don’t know what she was meaning when she said rampage.”

252. When cross examined on his suggestion that it was permissible for people to “go inject heroin into people” if it was done under the Public Health Act, the respondent maintained that “[i]t’s just frustration and banter.”
253. The respondent appeared to accept in cross examination that his comments were misleading though maintained that they did not condone violence:

“Q.  You responded to his post about ‘Would I be correct in this assumption?’ The assumption that you’re able to cut the testicles off paedos.  You responded ‘You’re correct.  Based on today’s judgment, go for it.  Pedos have no right.’ You made that post, correct?  

A.Yes.  

…

Q.  Do you agree with me that it is a misleading characterisation of Justice Beech-Jones that the judgment gave licence to individuals to perpetuate forms of violence?  

A.  I accept that it was potentially misleading, I don’t accept that it had any connotations of violence.

Q.  Just listen to my question, do you accept that it would be a misleading characterisation of Justice Beech-Jones’s judgment to suggest that it gave licence to individuals to perpetuate various forms of violence.  Do you agree with that?  

A.  No, I don’t.  

Q.  You don’t agree that that would be a misleading characterisation of  Justice Beech-Jones’ judgment?

A.  I accept that.  No, I don’t accept that it had any further element of violence associated with it.”

254. The respondent conceded that it was possible his comments would be given greater weight as they were made from the Twitter account of the Law Practice, though considered that viewers would not necessarily make a connection between “G&B Lawyers” and the respondent himself being the solicitor on record in the proceedings:

“Q.  Do you accept that you are actually in a different position because you’re the solicitor on the record in the proceedings and judgment had been delivered that day?  Do you see that you’re not just anyone?  Do you agree with that? 

A.  People reading it might not have known that. 

Q.  Can you engage with my question?  Do you accept that you’re in a different position?  You’re not just anyone.  You’re the solicitor on the record in proceedings of great public interest that were delivered that day.  You’re not just anyone bantering on social media.  Do you agree with that? 

A.  Possibly. 

Q.  Do you accept that in fact you’re in a different position because you’re the solicitor on the record and that things that you write on social media are likely to be given greater weight?  Do you accept that? 

A.  It’s possible too.  

Q.  Do you accept it or not? 

A.  It depends on the reader.  The reader might not know who posted this.  It just says G&B Lawyers.  They might not know that I was the – the person writing the post was the solicitor on the record.  It just says G&B Lawyers.”

The Facebook comments

255. The respondent accepted in cross examination that the comments he made on the Facebook platform related to the Kassam Judgment delivered that day in which he was a lawyer on the record, and he was expressing his opinion based on that Judgment.
256. The respondent denies that the comments made on the Facebook platform were in any way condoning violence. He indicates his acceptance that at least some of those comments were potentially misleading as to the true effect of the Kassam Judgment. Set out below are various extracts from cross examination of the respondent to this effect:

“Q.  I want to suggest to you that by posting that in response to a question from someone, “Can I rape anyone?” that you were condoning violence? 

A.  No.  It’s preceded by the words, “Ask Beech-Jones.” 

Q.  I want to suggest to you that you were condoning violence and suggesting that that was an effect of what Justice Beech-Jones had said that day? 

A.  No.  I wasn’t condoning violence. 

…

On the following page, a woman asks you “I know some arsehole pedo pollies who shouldn’t be breathing” and you responded “Do your best.” What I want to suggest to you is that you were, by making those posts, affirming a misleading characterisation of Justice Beech-Jones’s judgment?  

A.  Yes.  

Q.  That’s what you were doing in making those posts?  

A.  Potentially, that was the outcome, yes.  But there’s no evidence to prove that.”

257. The respondent states in his submissions that the reference to a fish emoji does not convey anything of the description suggested by the applicant. The respondent suggests that the use of the emoji and the subsequent question mark leaves a number of potential possibilities open for what this means.
258. The following exchange occurred in relation to the respondent’s Facebook comment allegedly recommending that Beech-Jones CJ at CL “sleep with the fishes”:

“Q.  You’re aware, aren’t you, that a post of “fishes” in that context, that that is a mob term for someone who’s been killed? 

A.  No.  Don’t know that at all. 

Q.  Are you aware of that? 

A.  No.

…

Q. I want to suggest to you that by posting the ‘with the fishes emoji’ in the context in when (as said) you posted, that you were encouraging personal attacks aimed at a judicial officer?

A. No, I reject that.”

259. Set out below are extracts from cross examination of the respondent in relation to what the applicant contends are personal attacks contained in the respondent’s Facebook comments aimed at Beech-Jones CJ at CL:

“Q. And I want to suggest to you – if you go back to 156 – that when you posted ‘Hopefully he has a very short career as the Chief Justice at Common Law’ and when you posted his phone number of his website in response to a ‘Prank him 24/7’, that you were encouraging or assisting people to engage in personal attacks aimed a judicial officer?

A. I reject that.

Q. And that you were doing that in the context of encouraging or assisting people in relation to personal attacks at a judicial officer, motivated by the mere performance of his judicial function?

A. I reject that

Q. Do you accept that for a person to prank call a Supreme Court judge 24/7 after they deliver reasons in a proceeding, that that is likely to impair the authority of that Supreme Court judge?

A. I didn’t do that.

…

Q. I want to suggest to you that your conduct in doing so is likely to undermine confidence in that judge and the Supreme Court by assisting in conduct that would involve the harassment of that Supreme Court judge as part of them undertaking their judicial function?

A. No, I didn’t do any of that. All I did was post a link to the website.

…

Q.  Mr Buckley, I want to suggest to you that for you as a solicitor, being the solicitor on the record of proceedings in which a judgment had been delivered that day in a contentious judgment with a lot of public interest and someone says, ‘Prank the judge 24/7,’ that for you to provide the phone number for that judge on a website was contrary to your duty to the administration of justice? 

A. No, I disagree

…

Q.  What I want to suggest to you is the fact that you as a solicitor, the solicitor on the record in these very proceedings, were providing a phone number that a person could use to prank call Justice Beech-Jones, the fact that you did it, not anyone else, the fact that you did it would be likely to diminish public confidence in the administration of justice.  Do you agree with that? 

A.  No.  All I did was post a link to a website.  That’s all.”

260. The respondent accepted that by providing the link to the publicly available phone number of the chambers of Beech Jones CJ at CL he was providing assistance to those seeking to contact him, though denied that this extended to assistance for those seeking to prank call him. The following exchange occurred in cross examination:

“Q.  Mr Buckley, you don’t even accept that what you did involved some assistance that you provided to this person who was seeking the phone number of a Supreme Court judge, correct?  You deny that you were even providing assistance? 

A.  I gave assistance.  I gave him the phone number via a link to a website which is publicly available. 

Q.  So do you agree you gave him assistance should he wish to prank call Justice Beech-Jones? 

A.  Not to prank call.  I gave him assistance by giving him the phone number.  I didn’t assist him to prank anybody.  I didn’t give him any devices to do, you know, continuous phone calls or – there’s no assistance done in that regard.  All I did was I posted a link to a website which had information that was freely available to the public. 

Q.  Do you accept the context in which you provided the assistance was someone saying to you, ‘Prank him 24/7,’ and that’s relevant to the assistance you provided, correct? 

A.  No.  The pranking, I didn’t do any assistance in regard to.  All I did was I gave a phone number.”

261. The respondent denied in cross examination that by suggesting Justice Beech-Jones would have a short career as Chief Judge at Common Law, the respondent was impugning his Honour’s authority.

Insight and contrition of the respondent

262. The respondent relies on the submissions made as to his insight and contrition for the original statements made which are the subject of Grounds 6 and 7, which includes his reliance on the Apology.

Determination: the Facebook and Twitter comments (particulars 41 to 49)

263. The Tribunal is satisfied of the following matters:

1. The respondent made the Twitter and Facebook comments using the social media pages of the Law Practice.
2. It was easily ascertainable to Facebook and Twitter users that the Law Practice acted for the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam proceedings.
3. It was not necessarily apparent to users on Facebook and Twitter that the respondent was a solicitor. However, the statements were made by the respondent through the Law Practice and the respondent is responsible for them. Moreover, the statements would have been accorded authority by viewers in a similar way because they were made by the Law Practice.
4. The Twitter comments did not accurately describe the effect of the Kassam Judgment. On no reasonable reading did the Kassam Judgment suggest that the impugned Public Health Orders violated the right to bodily integrity. The respondent said “Beech-Jones said no one has any rights in New South Wales. Do as you please” and then agreed with Twitter users that they could “cut the testicles of pedos” and “go on a rampage” and “inject heroin into people”.
5. The Twitter comments were therefore misleading as to the effect of the Kassam Judgment, which did not condone any violence or interference with bodily integrity.
6. The Facebook comments made by the respondent were a misleading characterisation of the Kassam Judgment which was used to condone the violent acts suggested by various commenters on the basis that “In NSW no one has any rights to bodily integrity. That’s what his judgment says.”
7. An obvious consequence of the respondent’s mischaracterisation of the effect of the Kassam Judgment on both the Facebook and Twitter platforms is that public confidence in the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and the Supreme Court of NSW would tend to be undermined.
8. Aside from their obvious inappropriateness, the comments by the respondent expressing hope that Justice Beech-Jones has a short career as Chief Judge at Common Law, and what the Tribunal accepts are suggestions that the Law Society lacks integrity, could undermine confidence in the administration of justice and the legal profession. Rather than taking a microscope to their individual meanings, the Tribunal has satisfied itself that the cumulative effect of these comments could undermine confidence in the integrity and propriety of the legal profession, and that on a reasonable reading, a selection of those Facebook comments constituted a personal attack on Beech-Jones CJ at CL.
9. By providing a link to the Supreme Court of NSW’s judicial officer contacts list, the respondent was assisting people in contacting the chambers of Beech-Jones CJ at CL. Although users could have accessed this public list themselves, the respondent was assisting users by removing a step in the process of ascertaining the relevant phone number. The Tribunal finds that the context in which the link was posted – in response to the comment ‘Prank him 24/7?’ – connects the respondent’s behaviour with the suggestion to prank call the Chief Judge at Common Law and therefore he was assisting them to prank call the chambers.
10. Further, it was easily ascertainable that the respondent’s Law Practice, which posted the comments, was the solicitor on record in the Kassam proceedings, giving further credence to the mischaracterisation contained in the comments.
11. We reject the respondent’s characterisation that the posts were “mere banter”. The comments were inflammatory, derogatory and, in context, not able to be dismissed as mere banter. They were more pernicious than mere banter. Whilst they might be seen as hyperbole, this is not sufficient for them to be entirely negatived.

264. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal is satisfied that particulars 41 to 49 have been made out.

Determination: Breach of the Conduct Rules (Grounds 8 and 9)

265. Viewed in the context of the respondent’s role as principal of the Law Practice on record in the proceedings, the above findings satisfy the Tribunal that the respondent overlooked his responsibility to familiarise himself with the true implications of the Kassam Judgment and instead facilitated the spread of misinformation about the Judgment and criticism of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and the Court. He has therefore breached r 3 of the Conduct Rules. Contrary to r 3, the respondent has denigrated instead of upheld his paramount duty to the Court and the administration of justice.
266. The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent has undermined public confidence in the administration of justice contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules. The respondent’s comments on both the Twitter and Facebook platforms have the effect of implicating Justice Beech-Jones and the Supreme Court of NSW in the curial approval of violence from an erroneous reading of the Kassam Judgment published on the Twitter and Facebook accounts of the Law Practice, which would have lent the interpretation legitimacy. This is especially so where it was publicly available information that the Law Practice represented the Henry plaintiffs in the Kassam proceedings.
267. The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent was acting contrary to his duty to the administration of justice by purporting to assist users in the Facebook comments to contact the chambers of Justice Beech-Jones and ‘Prank him 24/7’ by providing a link to access his number. The respondent’s overall involvement in what was likely to practically interfere with the daily functioning of the chambers of Beech-Jones CJ at CL was contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules.
268. The parties’ submissions and the Tribunal’s consideration of the Apology is set out above. The existence of the Apology does not alter the proper characterisation of the conduct for which the respondent apologised.

Unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct

269. In Ground 16 of the Complaint, the applicant contends that taken individually, the conduct referred to in Ground 8 or Ground 9 amounts to professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law.
270. The respondent relies on the Apology in response and contends that “at most” his conduct in making the comments amounted to unsatisfactory professional conduct.
271. As the Tribunal has found a breach of the Conduct Rules, the respondent’s conduct constitutes unsatisfactory professional conduct under ss 296 and 298(b) of the Uniform Law.
272. Although fair and robust criticism of the Court is permissible, the conduct of the respondent could not be so described. That conduct is capable of constituting professional misconduct after it crossed the line and passed fair and robust criticism: Potkonyak at [150].
273. The Tribunal is satisfied that the respondent’s comments in connection with the Kassam Judgment represent a substantial failure to maintain the requisite standard for the same reasons articulated in Grounds 6 and 7 above. In addition:

1. The comments inappropriately challenged the integrity of the Law Society and the legal profession.
2. The comments constituted a personal attack on Beech-Jones CJ at CL.
3. The comments facilitated interference with his Honour’s chambers by providing a link to the chambers’ contact number.

274. Taken together, the Facebook and Twitter comments by the respondent suggesting that the Supreme Court of NSW had condoned “extraordinary and violent steps” by the government pursuant to a Public Health Order are sufficiently serious to be a substantial failure to maintain the requisite standard. As has been established, they were posted by the respondent using the social media accounts of the Law Practice and their impact is heightened by this fact. The respondent did not turn his mind to the severity of his repeated suggestion to Twitter and Facebook users that the Kassam Judgment rendered legally valid a broad range of illegal acts. The conduct falls dramatically short of the respondent’s professional obligations toward the administration of justice.
275. The Tribunal finds that the conduct contained in Grounds 8 and 9 warrants a finding of professional misconduct under s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law.

Endorsement of public comments: the Facebook likes (Grounds 10 and 11)

276. Ground 10 provides:

“The Respondent endorsed public comments on the Facebook platform which conduct was contrary to the Respondent’s paramount duty to the administration of justice under r 3 of the Conduct Rules.”

277. By particular 54 the applicant contends:

“In or around October 2021, the Respondent clicked the ‘like’ button on the Facebook platform (Liked) in relation to the following public comments, as a result of which an image of a thumbs up appeared on the comment, together with the words ‘G&B Lawyers’, which were visible to the viewers of the comment and conveyed that the Law Practice supported and/or endorsed the comment:

a.    comment from Sean O’Sullivan stating, among other things, ‘you are a legend Nathan, way to raise hell, so we can freeze it over and be done with the pedos, they seriously are now on record defending pedos, that alone is worth the price of admission…’;

b.    comment from Megan Bliss stating, ‘I hope this cracks the injustice system. A court that validates medical rape is invalid’;

c.    comment from Brad Marks stating, ‘Can we ask for an independent audit of the justice’s and his families finances???? Any large government transfers lately???’

d.    comment from Marieanne Winspear stating, ‘They are showing their hand at how corrupt and evil they are’;

e.    comment from Colin Laraine Bunt stating, ‘Really, OMG what sort of soulless man is he?’; and

f.    comment from Deborah Eagles stating, ‘Our Parliament and overseeing legal system is corruptly privatised. They don’t like fair and just lawyers, standing for the rights of the people, under the Commonwealth of Australia…’.”

278. By particular 55 the applicant contends that the comments referred to in particular 54:

“a. did not constitute fair and legitimate criticism of the Kassam Judgment;

b. were published on the Facebook page of the Law Practice;

c. were made in response to the Respondent’s post at [particular] 33 above, which used inflammatory language that was likely to encourage adverse commentary; and

d. were Liked using the Facebook account of the Law Practice.”

279. The applicant contends by particular 56 that by Liking the comments referred to in particular 54, the respondent:

“encouraged and/or publicly condoned the making of public statements that were likely to undermine confidence in the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW.”

280. The applicant’s contention that, by liking the Facebook comments on his post, the respondent breached the Conduct Rules, is set out in Ground 10 (particular 57) and Ground 11.
281. The applicant contends by particular 57 that the respondent’s conduct referred to in particulars 54 to 56 above was contrary to his paramount duty to the administration of justice as required under r 3 of the Conduct Rules.
282. Ground 11 alleges that:

“By engaging in the conduct referred to in [particulars] 54 to 56 above, the Respondent acted in a manner which, contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules, was likely to a material degree to:

a. be prejudicial to, or diminish the public confidence in, the administration of justice; and/or

b. bring the legal profession into disrepute.”

The applicant’s submissions as to factual findings and breach of the Conduct Rules

283. Briefly put, the applicant makes the following submissions in relation to Grounds 10 and 11:

1. The respondent did not take any steps to remove, delete or conceal the adverse comments. Instead, he ‘Liked’ them.
2. The act of ‘liking’ a post would naturally be understood by users, given the “ubiquitous nature of social media and reactive actions”, as the respondent endorsing or at least publicly condoning the comments he had liked.
3. The respondent’s liking of the comments would naturally have been perceived as a form of approval for the sentiments expressed in those comments and a criticism of Justice Beech Jones CJ at CL and the Kassam Judgment.
4. The comments appeared in response to the respondent’s post in connection with the Kassam Judgment using the Facebook of the Law Practice, which had represented the Henry plaintiffs in the proceedings.
5. The proper administration of justice requires that there be public confidence in the courts’ judgments. It is contrary to that objective for a legal practitioner to publicly endorse or condone the making of public statements that undermine the authority of a judicial officer and the court. The respondent’s conduct in ‘Liking’ the comments undermined the administration of justice, contrary to his paramount duty under r 3 of the Conduct Rules.
6. The respondent’s conduct in endorsing or publicly condoning the statements set out above was likely to undermine confidence in the administration of justice and to bring the profession into disrepute contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules.

The respondent’s position as to factual findings and breach of the Conduct Rules

284. In his submissions and reply, the respondent:

1. admits to the act of liking the comments using the Facebook page of the Law Practice but denies that the effect of this was to endorse those comments;
2. contends that there is “no evidence whatsoever” to support the applicant’s conclusion that the act of clicking a ‘like’ button on Facebook amounts to an endorsement of any third party’s public statement made on Facebook; and
3. asserts that clicking ‘like’ did not amount to any criticism of the Kassam Judgment, nor did it amount to the endorsement or condoning of the comments relied upon by the applicant in support of this ground.

Evidence given by the respondent

285. In cross examination, the respondent disagreed with the proposition that a comment he ‘liked’ suggested the Kassam Judgment was motivated by an improper purpose:

“Q.  Down the bottom of 161, Brad Marks asked, ‘Can we ask for an independent [audit] of this justice’s and his family’s finances?’  You understood that to be a reference to Justice Beech-Jones, correct? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  “Any large government transfers in lately?”  Do you see that? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  Do you agree with me that the impression or the gist of Brad Marks’ post was that Justice Beech-Jones’s judgment was motivated by an improper purpose or corruption? 

A.  No, it doesn’t actually say that at all

…

Q.  Just look at the post.  Do you accept that for a person to react to a judgment that’s been delivered by a judge by asking, “Can we get an independent audit of his and his family’s finances”, and whether there’s been large transfers, is to raise a question about the propriety of the judge? 

A.  No. 

Q.  You don’t agree with that? 

A.  No. 

Q.  Isn’t that the obvious gist of what that person is posting?  They’re querying:  is this judgment – are there questions we need to analyse about Justice Beech Jones’ finances? 

A.  As I said, I don’t know.  You’d have to ask Mr Marks. 

Q.  You’re unable to engage with my question about that? 

A.  Cause I didn’t write it, so I don’t know what Mr Marks was intending to infer when he wrote that.”

286. The respondent agreed in cross examination that the comment of Megan Bliss was a misleading characterisation of the Kassam Judgment:

“Q.  Do you agree with me that to characterise Justice Beech-Jones’s judgment as “validating medical rape”, that that would be a misleading characterisation of that judgment? 

A.  It would depend on the situation.  If there was a public health order that did that, then it would not be misleading. 

Q.  I’ll ask my question again.  Do you accept that to characterise Justice Beech-Jones’s judgment as “validating medical rape”, that would be a misleading characterisation of his Honour’s judgment? 

A.  Yes.”

287. However, the respondent disagreed that his interaction with the post affirmed the allegedly misleading nature of the Judgment:

“Q. And that by liking that post, you were expressing a form of view that that was an available inference of what the judgment stood for?

A. No, you’re, you’re overreading into the whole meaning of likes.

Q. And that by liking posts of that nature, you were affirming or encouraging someone to have a wrongheaded impression about what Justice Beech-Jones’s decision actually stood for. Do you agree with that?

A. No. They might not have the notifications on; they may never have seen that I liked the post.”

288. The respondent did not accept that by liking a comment alleging corruption he was reflecting his support for that idea:

“Q.  Then can you look please at page 162 towards the middle of the page.  Marianne Winspear(?) says, “They are showing their hand at how corrupt and evil they are”? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  And you liked that post as well? 

A.  Yes. 

Q.  So that by liking that post, you were showing a form of support for an idea or speculation that Justice Beech-Jones or the judgment was corrupt? 

A.  No.” 

289. In cross examination, the respondent denied that the ‘liking’ of the Facebook posts by him, specifically those of Sean O’Sullivan and Megan Bliss, had the effect that the applicant contended it did:

“Q. I want to suggest to you that using a like button on Facebook, that that’s an action that you have to take, to press a button, correct?

A. You press a button, yes, but you don’t use Facebook, do you, counsel? So you’re not familiar with the purpose and how Facebook works and how people interact with it, are you?

Q. Mr Buckley, just listen to my question.

A. I’m asking you a question.

Q. You accept that, in order to like a post, I want to suggest to you that by liking a comment on Facebook, a person is conveying some type of positive action or endorsement?

A. Wrong.

Q. That they like that post in the sense of agreeing with it or that the post is a good thing, do you agree with that?

A. No, I could have also done a love heart or a care emoji, or I could’ve done a smiling emoji, I could’ve done a sad emoji.

Q. Mr Buckley, you didn’t, did you? You used the like button?

A. Yes, I liked it. That’s all it is. It doesn’t have any further meaning to it.

Q. I want to suggest to you it does have meaning, and it’s a type of positive affirmation or endorsement as to what the person has said?

A. No. I do not accept that.

Q. So, it is your evidence on oath to this Tribunal that for you to press the like button on a post that says, “A court that validates medical rape is invalid” has no meaning?

A. It has none whatsoever.

Q. None whatsoever?

A. Just a like.”

290. The respondent ultimately denied that his interaction with selected comments expressed any view on the comment even if the respondent agreed with the applicant’s view on the ‘gist’ of a comment:

“A. No, I don’t support anyone’s ideas when I click like.”

291. The following exchange occurred in cross examination with respect to the applicant’s submission that the respondent’s conduct was more serious due to his affiliation with G&B Lawyers:

“Q.  I want to suggest to you that the fact that the like is coming from G&B Lawyers, which is a law firm, makes the liking of these posts more serious? 

A.  No, not at all, no. 

Q.  I want to suggest that the fact that the liking is being done by G&B Lawyers makes it more serious, because people are likely to give greater weight to the fact that it’s a lawyer or a firm of lawyers expressing this type of liking support.  Do you agree with that? 

A.  No.”

292. The respondent contended in his cross examination that the conduct of then-NSW Premier Gladys Berejiklian was relevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of his conduct in the proceedings. The respondent contended it is relevant:

“A. Because, because all of the things that her government did should be – particularly in the context of the subject matter of this proceedings, is tainted in corruption and should be considered in that light.”

293. The respondent submits that since none of the likes amount to an endorsement of a third party’s public statements made on Facebook, that his conduct was not contrary to rules 3 and 5 of the Conduct Rules.

Determination: the Facebook likes (Ground 10, particulars 54 to 57)

294. The Tribunal is satisfied of the following matters:

1. The respondent “liked” the comments using the Facebook account of the Law Practice. It was clear to Facebook users that the Law Practice was liking the comments, although not necessarily that the respondent was doing so.
2. The respondent was interacting with the comments on a public forum.
3. The original post upon which the comments were posted, the subject of Grounds 6 and 7, was likely to encourage adverse commentary because it was a gross mischaracterisation of the Kassam Judgment which could reasonably lead to serious misgivings about the nature of the Judgment and the Supreme Court of NSW given the respondent’s status as a lawyer, which gave his statements a higher degree of legitimacy.
4. The comments set out in particular 54 were not fair and legitimate criticism of the Kassam Judgment. They suggest the following:

1. A consequence of the Judgment was that the Supreme Court of NSW and/or Justice Beech Jones CJ at CL were “on record defending pedos”.
2. The Judgment “validated medical rape”.

5. The comments attack the integrity of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW. They suggest as follows:

1. Beech-Jones CJ at CL should be subject to an independent audit.
2. The Court and/or Justice-Beech Jones CJ at CL is “corrupt” and “evil” and “corruptly privatised”.
3. Beech-Jones CJ at CL is a “soulless man”.
4. The Parliament and legal system “don’t like fair and just lawyers”.

6. On no reasonable reading of the Kassam Judgment did it have the effect suggested by those commenting on the respondent’s post.
7. The Tribunal was not taken to any evidence on the usage of the like button on the Facebook platform or other forms of social media. The symbol is ubiquitous but does not necessarily have a settled meaning in all contexts to all people. We infer that it may have different connotations to different people and be context dependent; it may be an express approval of the sentiment contained in the post, or something more nuanced.
8. Nevertheless, the action of “liking” a post on Facebook is not an expression of complete neutrality. We are satisfied that the action of “liking” is not an expression of disapproval. It has a positive connotation. We note that the extract of the cross examination of the respondent set out above reveals that he is aware other reactions were available to him on the Facebook platform when interacting with comments. If he wished to express disapproval of those comments, he could have chosen a different reaction. As to whether the ‘like’ reaction conveyed an approval of the comments made, we would infer that at least some readers would take it as a positive to some extent, as its name suggests.
9. Some members of the public would view the liking of various comments by the Law Practice, on a post published by the Law Practice, as an indication that the Law Practice approved or endorsed the content of those comments.
10. The respondent, therefore, encouraged and/or publicly condoned the making of public statements that were likely to undermine confidence in the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW.

295. For the above reasons, the Tribunal finds that particulars 54 to 57 of Ground 10 are made out.

Determination: Breach of the Conduct Rules – The Facebook likes (Grounds 10 and 11)

296. The Tribunal is satisfied of the following:

1. The respondent’s public endorsement of the comments was contrary to the respondent’s paramount duty to the Court and to the administration of justice pursuant to r 3 of the Conduct Rules. The respondent should have familiarised himself with the true implications of the Kassam Judgment instead of endorsing numerous misgivings about the effect of the Judgment and propriety of the Court. The respondent’s lack of regard for the seriousness of his endorsement of these inflammatory comments runs contrary to his paramount obligation in r 3.
2. The conduct was likely to undermine confidence in the administration of justice and to bring the profession into disrepute contrary to r 5 of the Conduct Rules. It was clear that the Law Practice was liking the comments, which makes the endorsements more serious. As the respondent was acting through the account of the Law Practice, he is responsible for the likes. The nature of the comments was injurious to the institutional integrity to the Court and its Judges, and the respondent has directly involved himself in this dialogue by “liking” them.

Unsatisfactory professional conduct and professional misconduct

297. In Ground 16 of the Complaint, the applicant contends that taken individually, the conduct referred to in Ground 10 or 11 amounts to professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law.
298. The applicant submits:

“a.   Mr Buckley endorsed public statements by others in connection with the Kassam Judgment which were likely to impair the authority of Beech-Jones CJ at CL and/or the Supreme Court of NSW. Members of the public place their trust in members of the legal profession who, in turn, provide representation and advice to them according to the law. It is fundamental that the legal profession be seen as facilitating, rather than detracting from, the administration of justice. Mr Buckley’s conduct was contrary to rules 3 and 5 of the Conduct Rules.

b.   Mr Buckley’s conduct was sufficiently serious to be described as a ‘substantial failure’ for the purposes of s 297(1)(a). It also demonstrated ‘consistent failure’, involving endorsement of multiple problematic comments on Facebook. Therefore, the conduct in each of grounds 10 and 11 constituted professional misconduct under s 297(1)(a).”

299. The respondent submits that the clicking of a ‘like’ button in respect of a comment made by a third party on Facebook cannot amount to an endorsement of any views expressed and did not constitute criticism of the Kassam Judgment or encourage any adverse commentary by other third parties. Accordingly, no order should be made in relation to this conduct.
300. As the Tribunal has found a breach of the Conduct Rules, the respondent’s conduct constitutes unsatisfactory professional conduct under ss 296 and 298(b) of the Uniform Law.
301. The Tribunal is satisfied there is a sufficient connection with the practice of law since the respondent was using the Facebook page of the Law Practice to ‘like’ the relevant Facebook comments. The Tribunal is satisfied that this form of interaction with the various comments criticising the Kassam Judgment amounts to a ‘substantial’ failure to maintain the requisite standard of competence or diligence. Instead of upholding the integrity of the administration of justice, it encouraged abusive and offensive comments.
302. While the respondent has ‘liked’ multiple comments on the Facebook platform, they are confined to one primary post made by the respondent (see particular 33) and the Tribunal is not prepared to brand the conduct specified in Ground 10 as a “repeated” or “persistent” failure across different occasions to maintain the requisite standard: Webb at [26].
303. The Tribunal finds that the respondent’s conduct referred to in Grounds 10 and 11 constitutes professional misconduct within the meaning of s 297(1)(a) of the Uniform Law because it presents a ‘substantial’ departure from the requisite standard.

(emphasis added)

The link to the full decision is here.