Civil Litigant Jailed for Contempt of Court in Making Submissions

In Wood v The Registrar for the Supreme Court Of Queensland [2024] QCA 196 (18 October 2024), the Queensland Court of Appeal constituted by Mullins P, Flanagan JA and Kelly J dismissed an appeal against an order made by Martin SJA on 6 June 2024 which found the appellant guilty of contempt in the face of the Court.  The contempts were committed before Burns J on 26 July 2023 and 2 August 2023.  On 2 July 2024 Martin SJA made the following orders:

1. For the contempts on 26 July 2023 the respondent is committed to prison for four months.
2. For the contempt on 2 August 2023 the respondent is committed to prison for two months.
3. The sentences are to be served concurrently.
4. The sentence of four months be suspended today for an operational period of two years on condition that the respondent be of good behaviour for the duration of the operational period.  If the respondent fails to comply with that condition, then he may be brought back to court, and the court may cancel the order of suspension imposed.  The respondent would then have to serve the sentence or such lesser term of imprisonment fixed by the court.

On the hearing of the appeal the appellant applied for Flanagan J to recuse himself.  The application was heard in accordance with the procedure identified in the High Court decision in QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 97 ALJR 419; [2023] HCA 15.   Flanagan JA refused the application.  On resumption of the Court, the appellant made two further applications.  Firstly, for Kelly J to recuse himself and secondly, for Flanagan JA to be referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) under ss 15, 18, 22, 38 and 39 of the Crime and Corruption Commission Act 2001 (Qld) (CCC Act).  Kelly J refused the recusal application.  The appellant then applied to have Kelly J also referred to the CCC.

The Court dealt with the grounds of appeal and then dealt with the application for referral, finding ultimately that the applications were misconceived.

The President summarised the appellant’s six grounds of appeal into the following five grounds with which the appellant agreed:

1. Lack of probative evidence to support the charges.
2. The (appellant’s) conduct was honest criticism directed at public purpose and did not interfere with the administration of justice.
3. There was insufficient time for the appellant to prepare for the hearing of the application.
4. Martin SJA did not give sufficient weight to the evidence relied on by the appellant to justify his allegation of corruption.
5. The sentence was manifestly excessive.

The Court then set out at [10] – [19] the reasons for the contempt findings:

[10] Martin SJA commenced by identifying the civil proceedings (before Burns J) in which the contempts were committed. The appellant had filed a claim against Sibley Lawyers seeking damages in the amount of $11,000,000.00 for “Pure Mental Harm” and $500,000.00 for “Financial Loss”. He had also filed a claim against Quinn & Scattini Solicitors seeking $16,000,000.00 for “Pure Mental Harm” and $500,000.00 for “Financial Loss”. The defendants in each proceeding applied for an order striking out the claim. The appellant applied to amend the claim and statement of claim to remove the claim for pure mental harm and replace it with claims for professional negligence and aggravated damages.

[11] Martin SJA set out each of the particulars of contempt:

“[8] After the hearing commenced there was an objection by Mr Wood to Burns J hearing the application to strike out before hearing his application to amend. It was the position of those seeking an order striking out the claims that the amendments sought made no difference to their application. There was then some discussion about whether documents had been filed and whether those documents were in court. During a discussion between Burns J and Ms Gamble (appearing for each of the defendants), Mr Wood interrupted and the following exchange occurred:

‘MS GAMBLE: It should’ve been filed with his application, as far as I understand.

HIS HONOUR: So it’ll be in July.

PLAINTIFF: They weren’t filed because they haven’t been approved.

HIS HONOUR: Just be quiet.

PLAINTIFF: The amendments —

HIS HONOUR: Just be quiet.

PLAINTIFF: —haven’t been approved, so they’re not filed.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wood.

PLAINTIFF: They’re on there for you to view.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wood. Be quiet.

PLAINTIFF: I’m just astounded that the Supreme Court is so incompetent.’

[9] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the first of the particulars of contempt.

[10] His Honour then started to make directions for the further hearing of the matter in order that all documents could be before him in the following week. There was some discussion about whether there was a proposed amended statement of claim available and the following exchange took place:

‘HIS HONOUR: I’ll set both applications down for hearing for one hour on Friday 4 August.

PLAINTIFF: Just completely unnecessary. A complete waste of the court’s time; because a High Court matter precludes their application from being heard, and it means you have to approve mine. So we could’ve just dealt with it, and it could be done by now.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. Well, you could put —

PLAINTIFF: But you want to be difficult.

HIS HONOUR: Just sit —

PLAINTIFF: Because you’re obviously worried about —

HIS HONOUR: Just sit down.

PLAINTIFF: — going to prison.

 HIS HONOUR: Mr Wood.

MS GAMBLE: I’m so sorry, your Honour. My instructing solicitor’s just informed me he’s out of the country on Friday.

HIS HONOUR: Well, you’ll have to get someone else to instruct you.

PLAINTIFF: I hope these people are worth spending the rest of your life in prison.’

[11] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the second of the particulars of contempt.

[12] That was followed by this exchange:

‘HIS HONOUR: What did you say?

PLAINTIFF: I said, I hope these people are worth spending the rest of your life in prison, because that’s where you’re going under section 120 of the Criminal Code, “judicial corruption”; the benefit being to these people and you not hearing this application today. I’m – I have no doubt there have been a big discussion behind the scenes about you doing exactly what you’re doing. So you’re not actually acting impartially; you’re not acting fairly, and you’re not acting in an unwise [sic] matter. So enjoy prison.’

[13] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the third of the particulars of contempt.

[14] His Honour then told Mr Wood that he would give him an opportunity to show cause why he shouldn’t be dealt with for contempt in the face of the court.

[15] During discussions about that matter, Mr Wood told his Honour that he would file a ‘two and a half thousand-page affidavit proving that the court is corrupt, and I will take it to the High Court if necessary, and you will all be disrobed.’

[16] The following exchange then took place:

‘HIS HONOUR: Fair enough. I will give you until Wednesday 10 am to show cause why I shouldn’t deal with you for contempt, and —

PLAINTIFF: I file that as an affidavit, do I, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: No. Just listen to me, please. What I’m wanting to do is give you an opportunity to withdraw the remarks you’ve made in court today. Now —

PLAINTIFF: I’m – I have stated —

HIS HONOUR: I suspect —

PLAINTIFF: The court is corrupt.

HIS HONOUR: I suspect you —

PLAINTIFF: The court is corrupt. I’m not withdrawing those statements, because they are factual and truthful.

HIS HONOUR: All right. You are to appear before me at 10 am next Wednesday.

PLAINTIFF: What was the date for the other hearing, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR: The other hearing will be the following Friday. Ms Gamble, it may not be appropriate for me to hear it, but I’ll see what happens on Wednesday.

MS GAMBLE: Thank you, your Honour.

PLAINTIFF: So do I file my two and a-half page affidavit before Wednesday, or do you just want it on the day?

HIS HONOUR: I’m giving you the opportunity to —

PLAINTIFF: And I said, it’s a two and a-half – it’s already done up.

HIS HONOUR: I’m giving you an opportunity to withdraw your remarks, and if —

PLAINTIFF: The court is corrupt.’

[17] The statements by Mr Wood in bold constitute the fourth of the particulars of contempt identified in the applicant’s written submissions.

[18] His Honour then went on to say that he would give Mr Wood an opportunity to withdraw his remarks and, if that did not occur, then it was likely that he would formulate a charge and that Mr Wood would be given time to respond to that charge.

[19] Mr Wood replied as follows:

‘You do that, and when you falsely charge me, I’ll turn around and sue you because you haven’t acted in good faith.’

[20] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the fifth of the particulars of contempt.

[21] Soon after that Mr Wood said:

‘I’ll sue you personally. Yeah, false imprisonment; false arrest; false accusation. You’ll go to prison for the rest of your life.’

[22] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the sixth of the particulars of contempt.

Particulars of contempt – 2 August 2023

[23] On 2 August 2023, the matter was called on before Burns J and the following exchange took place:

‘HIS HONOUR: The purpose of the hearing today is to give you an opportunity to withdraw your comments from the 26th of July.

APPLICANT: Actually, your Honour, I’m going to give you the opportunity to apologise to me for abusing your power as a Supreme Court judge, which is a crime under sections 92 and 92A of the Criminal Code. Now, as I’m sure you’re aware, the Court of Appeal handed down a decision on Friday last week which prevents you from holding me in contempt because you haven’t complied with the rules. So I’m going to expect an apology —

HIS HONOUR: So is that a no?

APPLICANT: Yes, your Honour.’

[24] The statement by Mr Wood in bold is the particular of contempt on 2 August 2023.” (citation omitted; emphasis in original)

[12] After dealing with the nature of the originating application, which was brought pursuant to Chapter 20, Part 7, Division 3 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR), his Honour noted that contempt in the face of the Court is a form of criminal contempt. Although it is a matter in the civil jurisdiction of the Court, the criminal standard of proof applies. His Honour identified that he had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the elements which constitute a contempt of court.

[13] His Honour then dealt with the issue of whether the Registrar had proved that the appellant said what was alleged. In this respect, his Honour referred to his previous decision in the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Queensland v Wood [2024] QSC 21 (Admissibility Reasons), in which his Honour ruled that the affidavit of the Registrar was admissible for the purposes of proving that the appellant had made the statements alleged in the originating application. This evidence consisted of the audio recordings of the proceedings before Burns J and the transcript of those proceedings based upon those audio recordings. The appellant had applied to have all of the evidence of the Registrar “struck out along with any testimony that she has given in relation to that evidence based on section 92 of the 1977 Queensland Evidence Act”. The appellant had objected to the evidence in the Registrar’s affidavit being received on the basis that s 92 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) had not been satisfied because the Registrar did not have personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in her affidavit.

[14] His Honour refused the application primarily on the basis that s 92 was not relevant. As explained by Martin SJA, the purpose of the Registrar exhibiting the transcripts and the audio recordings was not to prove that what was said and recorded was true, but merely that it was said. While s 92 is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule, this rule has always permitted evidence of this kind because it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.

[15] At Reasons [31], Martin SJA also noted that the appellant in cross-examination had agreed that the transcripts annexed to the Registrar’s affidavit contained the relevant statements. The appellant did not challenge the accuracy of the transcripts.

[16] His Honour considered the nature of the alleged contempt, noting that in order to establish a contempt in the face of the court, an applicant must show that the impugned conduct interferes with – or tends to interfere with – the administration of justice. His Honour expressly recognised that the purpose of contempt proceedings is not to protect the judges of the court from fair, even trenchant, criticism.

[17] Martin SJA was satisfied that each of the appellant’s statements comprising the particulars of contempt in the originating application interfered with or tended to interfere with the administration of justice.

[18] His Honour observed:

“Mr Wood’s behaviour was not spontaneous. On 26 July it was deliberate and repetitive, for example, the reference to sections of the Criminal Code and the statement made three times that ‘The court is corrupt’. On 2 August, his answer had the hallmarks of a prepared statement with a further reference to the Criminal Code.”

His Honour was therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the words set out in the originating application constituted contempt in the face of the court.

[19] His Honour then considered whether the appellant had established any evidentiary basis so as to trigger a defence of truth. After considering the relevant authorities and the appellant’s evidence, his Honour concluded:

“I can find nothing which supports or even hints at support for [Mr Wood’s] assertion of corruption. Likewise there was nothing to suggest incompetence or breach of duty. In these matters Mr Wood takes the view that if a judicial officer rejects his arguments, then that judicial officer is corrupt. The fact that the Court of Appeal upheld a decision which was against him was simply further evidence, in his eyes, of corruption.”

The Court then considered the reasons given for the penalty for the contempts before considering each of the grounds of appeal.  In relation to penalty the Court observed that Martin SJA considered the relevant principles concerning punishment for contempt noting that the underlying rationale for every exercise of the contempt power is the necessity to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice.  The Court records that his Honour referred to rr 930 and 931 of the UCPR, provisions of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld ), considered the seriousness of the contempt, considered there was a significant need for deterrence to feature in the penalty, took into account the appellant’s conduct in the course of the application and made extensive reference to comparable cases in determining the appropriate penalty.

The Court then addressed the grounds of appeal ultimately dismissing grounds 1 to 4 on the basis that either the ground could not be accepted, there was no evidence to support the allegations made or that the ground was without substance.

The Court gave significant consideration to Ground 5, that the sentence was manifestly excessive.  The Court found at [55] as follows:

[55] While the sentence imposed cannot be considered manifestly excessive by reference to comparable cases, the structure of the sentence, whereby the two months of actual custody was made concurrent with a wholly suspended sentence of four months, potentially renders it so. This is because a possible outcome is that prior to being dealt with for the suspended sentence of four months, the appellant may have served the whole of the sentence of actual custody of two months.

And at [70] to [72], the Court considered what was determined to be an oral application for discharge:

[70] The appellant’s submission that he has already served sufficient time in custody may be properly understood as an implicit oral application for discharge. An order for discharge would ordinarily follow a formal application. In any event, there is no need for an application for discharge to be made; it is within the inherent power of the Court to make an order for discharge of its own motion. In the circumstances, having regard to the appellant’s status as a self-represented litigant, the statement set out above constitutes an application for a discharge of the remainder of his sentence, even though he has been found guilty of contempt.

[71] As the Court is re-exercising its inherent jurisdiction in terms of the appropriate punishment for the contempt, the Court may have regard to the appellant’s oral application for discharge in determining the appropriate sentence.

[72] This Court has all the powers of the court at first instance in respect of contempt proceedings, including the power to order a discharge of sentence. While the rules of the UCPR do not restrict this Court’s inherent jurisdiction in contempt proceedings, r 931(2) expressly provides that where a contemnor is imprisoned for a term, the Court has the power to order that they be discharged from prison before the end of the term.

[73] The Court’s power to order a discharge of sentence is based on considerations of clemency. It generally must be shown that there has been a change in circumstances

[74] In Young v Registrar, Court of Appeal (No 3), Kirby P (as his Honour then was) identified that the exercise of the discharge power based on considerations of clemency is not unqualified. His Honour, in refusing the contemnor’s application for discharge in that case, observed:

“… Against the background of the authorities cited, and in its context, the discharge power must be seen as normally directed to the provision of clemency to the imprisoned contemnor. It will usually be applicable only where the contemnor shows remorse. Ordinarily, some new considerations, which were not before the court which imposed the sentence, will have to be demonstrated in order to authorise the later court, of co-equal authority, to discharge the contemnor from prison short of the term originally imposed. Thus, in King v President, Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Gisborne … Nathan J rejected an application for discharge before the expiry of a term of imprisonment for contempt. He found that the applicant was broken, distressed, and destitute. But that he did not demonstrate remorse or contrition, and could show no new factors warranting interference with the sentence originally imposed. …

It was clear to me that Mr Young did not really accept the judgment of the Court. He continues, in his own mind, to believe that what he did was designed to ensure the safety of his son, and that this justified his conduct. Unfortunately for him, that belief is not consistent with the finding of the Court which convicted and sentenced him for contempt. I appreciate that there are limits to which the conscience of an individual may be pushed to accept error when the individual still believes that he is right. But if contrition and true acknowledgment of error are the primary established grounds for the exercise of the discharge power, Mr Young has not evinced the requisite emotions to enliven the exercise of that power.

Upon this footing… I do not believe that we would be warranted to order discharge.” (emphasis added)

The Court found at [78] that a difficulty in the present appeal was that the appellant had not sought to purge his contempt or offered an apology.  He was given an opportunity to apologise before Burns J and refused to do so.  Now was there any sign of contrition evidence before Martin SJA or during the course of the appeal.

Ultimately the Court made the following orders:

1. The appeal against the order made by Martin SJA on 6 June 2024, which found the appellant guilty of contempt in the face of the court, is dismissed.
2. The appeal against the orders made by Martin SJA on 2 July 2024, punishing the appellant for contempt, is allowed but only to the extent of varying the orders as follows:

1. Add to order 1, “to be suspended after serving 23 days’ imprisonment, for an operational period of two years on the condition that Ian Andrew Wood be of good behaviour for the duration of the operational period. If Mr Wood fails to comply with that condition then he may be brought back to court, and the court may cancel the order of suspension imposed. Mr Wood would then have to serve the balance of the sentence or such lesser term of imprisonment fixed by the court”.
2. Substitute 23 days’ for two months in order 2.
3. Order 4 is deleted.

3. Pursuant to s 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act, it is declared that the 23 days served between 4 July 2024 to 26 July 2024 is taken to be imprisonment already served under the sentences.
4. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

The link to the case can be found here.